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Abstract 
The current thesis set out to investigate the suitability of the IRAP to assess attitudes in the 
moral domain and to predict cheating behaviour in a controlled context. Across six studies in 
two countries, we developed three IRAPs that targeted relations between actions and 
concepts of morality, reports of frequency of moral and immoral behaviour, and personal 
feelings towards engaging in moral or immoral actions, and interpreted our findings through 
the Relational Elaboration and Coherence (REC) Model.  In the first part of the current 
research programme, correlations between the IRAPs and a cheating task suggested that 
individuals who are highly practised at immoral behaviour such as cheating, deceiving and 
lying are more likely to confirm that they do not engage in such behaviours, in itself an 
instance of that behavioural class. Further studies revealed that a history of bad feelings 
associated with engagement in immoral behaviour correlated with lower cheating, and that 
higher pro-moral biases in the IRAP correlated with lower reported psychopathic traits. In 
the latter part of the research programme described in the current thesis, a values-oriented 
intervention was shown to have an effect on IRAP performance and to produce a non-
significant trend toward decreasing cheating levels. To conclude, strengths, limitations and 
opportunities for further research are discussed. 
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Introduction 
The study of moral behaviour has a long history within Psychology, despite the 
difficulties of identifying its area of interest and scope with precision. The quality of ǲbeing moralǳ is in fact not easily defined: philosophers and scientists who have engaged in the study of moral behaviour, or ǲmoralityǳ as a dimension of behaviour, have advocated nearly 
every position ranging from the existence of moral universals shared by all human beings 
irrespective of culture and time, to moral systems entirely built upon social whim.  For the 
most part, modern theories seem to establish a compromise between both extremes: a 
culturally mediated set of moral general, universal rules.   
The word ǲmoralǳ is defined as pertaining to the quality of being good or bad, both 
individually and socially, and it comes from the Latin term ǲmosǳ, meaning ǲcustomǳ (Hayes, 
Gifford & Hayes, 1998, p. 253).  According to the Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology 
(Onions, Friedrichsen, & Burchfield, 1978), the word was first used by Cicero as a translation 
of the Ancient Greek word ǲēthikósǳ; this is also the root for our word ǲethicsǳ, which refers 
in turn to the study of morals and moral choices (Hayes, Adams & Rydeen, 1994).   
In Western Philosophy, however, the two words have evolved to indicate two related 
but different things: the word ǲmoralǳ describes both a set of prevailing behavioural 
guidelines within a culture and the ways in which the behaviour of individuals or groups 
adheres to (or departs fromȌ these guidelines.  The word ǲethicsǳ refers to the study what is 
moral, and is mainly concerned with offering behavioural guidelines based on philosophical 
and sociological reflection – the distinction is not unlike the one between theory (ethics) and 
practice (moral) (Ardila, 2014).  However, the distinction between moral and ethics is not 
always observed and some authors have chosen to use both concepts interchangeably (Jones, 
1991), since it is generally perceived that a component of ǲought to beǳ is indeed present in 
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the realm of morality, which makes ethics redundant in non-philosophical settings.  This is 
the approach we will follow in this document. 
Another way of distinguishing between moral, ethics, and convention is to place them 
in a continuum marked by perceived importance of following a certain guideline, or the 
severity of its transgression.  In this perspective, certain issues are ordinarily perceived to be 
moral in nature, such as the death penalty, incest, or abortion.  Others, such as dishonesty 
and violations of professional codes seem to be within the realm of ethics, and disregard for 
local tradition or socially constructed rules of behaviour are assigned to the domain of 
convention.  These are, however, very general guidelines and it is easy to find examples of 
situations that involve moral, ethical and conventional dilemmas at the same time. 
Even though questions of morality and ethics have been historically dealt with by 
philosophers and, to some extent, politicians and legal professionals, they always refer to 
behaviours in context.  Due to the pervasiveness of moral issues in human behaviour, it was 
only natural that social sciences tried to tackle the subject early on.  The social scientific 
approach enriches the concept of morality by integrating the perceptions and beliefs of 
people in different cultures, which helps paint a more detailed picture of the separations and 
overlaps amongst the related domains of morality, ethics and convention.  Some of this 
research, for example, suggests that the moral domain is perceived to be backed by a kind of 
prescriptive force independent of the power of authorities (i.e. divinities), and that 
transgressions of this domain are regarded as more serious than violations of convention 
(Kelly, Stich, Haley, Eng, & Fessler, 2007). 
However, other research suggests that it is almost impossible to find examples of 
behaviours which could be universally considered immoral independently of culture, history 
and geography.  For example, two cultures may differ in their consideration of funeral rites.  
Are they a moral obligation, or just a convention? For certain groups, lack of proper burial 
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may be as serious as incest, and for others it may be no worse than white lies.  Moreover, 
some studies suggest that the distinction between moral and convention may be inherently 
flawed due to the nature of the tasks used to assess them (Kelly et al., 2007).   
What seems to be clear is that people in a community, given appropriate context, can readily label certain behaviours as ǲgoodǳ or ǲbadǳ.   In a very general sense, these behaviours 
comprise the domain of ǲmoral behaviourǳ.  Whenever such behaviours occur, a ǲmoral issueǳ 
arises - a situation in which a personǯs behaviour brings either benefit or harm (Jones, 1991), 
and the individuals responsible for the emission of those behaviours, or affected by them, are 
called ǲmoral agentsǳ.  Traditionally, Moral Psychology studies the factors that influence 
decisions made by moral agents in situations involving moral issues. 
Studying these moral issues is not always easy or straightforward, for two main 
reasons.  First, moral judgment seems to depend heavily on contextual factors and on 
individual histories, which are difficult to cover completely using traditional measures.  And 
second, people naturally tend to present themselves in a good light, even if it involves 
exaggerating their morality or, more often, underreporting their immorality.  Therefore, 
explicit measures such as questionnaires or interviews entail the risk of capturing distorted 
or biased responses.  Recently, however, researchers in the field of implicit cognition have 
been used special measures to assess socially sensitive topics such as prejudice and 
stereotype.  These measures, as we will discuss later, seemingly capture attitudes that people 
explicitly conceal or are unaware of. 
In the current thesis we present a programme of research on moral behaviour that 
uses one such measure of implicit cognition, the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure 
(IRAP), to explore the moral domain and predict cheating behaviour.  Our first port of call is a 
review of psychological theories of morality, which will provide context to the research 
proper. 
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Theoretical Approaches to Morality 
Until the consolidation of social sciences and cultural studies in the 20th century, it 
was philosophers who mostly had the monopoly of conceptual work on ethics and morals.  
However, social and psychological research has expanded continuously into the realm of 
morality, in an attempt to determine the factors that influence moral decisions and to create 
interventions that help decrease the frequency of unethical behaviour.  Most accounts of 
moral behaviour in Psychology are influenced by cognitive science, and the core assumption 
is that moral behaviour (like any other) is the result of a series of internal cognitive 
processes.  The most significant of those accounts are reviewed next.  
Kohlberg’s Moral Development Theory and its Revisions  
Perhaps the most commonly used framework to study moral behaviour is the theory 
of justice reasoning (Levine, Kohlberg, & Hewer, 1985), a refined version of Kohlbergǯs 
previous cognitive moral development theory (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977).  The latter was 
inspired by Piagetǯs cognitive structuralism, and stated generally that cognitive structures 
responsible for moral reasoning gradually develop in a universal, culture-independent 
sequence.  Both the original and the reformulated versions rely on an interviewing 
methodology which involves presenting individuals with moral dilemmas in the form of 
hypothetical situations, and requires them to answer a number of questions about the 
behaviours and motivations of the characters involved in the stories. 
According to the theory, this method makes it possible to assess the level of 
development of the individualǯs justice reasoning processes.  Broadly speaking, if the personǯs responses show that he or she tells right from wrong depending on the 
consequences of the behaviour (reward or punishment), their moral reasoning is said to be at a ǲpreconventionalǳ level.  )f, on the other hand, the action being right or wrong depends on 
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what society, community or authority agree upon, moral reasoning is said to be at a ǲconventionalǳ level.  But if the person comes to reason that right or wrong depend on 
reflectively constructed moral standards which are independent of the consequences to the 
self or others, his or her moral reasoning will be at a ǲpostconventionalǳ level. 
Despite being widely known and having remained virtually unchallenged for some 
time, Kohlbergǯs theory of moral development has been criticised on at least four grounds: its 
emphasis on moral reasoning, the methodology used to assess it, the idea of sequential stages 
of moral development, and the universality of those stages across cultures (Burman, 1999; 
Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987).  
The first criticism states that if moral reasoning were the most important cause of 
moral behaviour, people who scored higher in moral development would have more refined 
moral reasoning processes, and their behaviour would therefore be more morally 
appropriate; however, research suggests that moral reasoning is not always related to actual 
behaviour (FeldmanHall et al., 2012; Shweder et al., 1987).  In fact, even though individuals 
frequently report positive perceptions of their own moral behaviour, with most people 
describing themselves as kind, honest, compassionate, righteous, and caring (Aquino, Reed, 
Thau, & Freeman, 2007; Aquino & Reed, 2002), they also have trouble predicting and 
remembering unethical behaviour on their part (Tenbrunsel, Diekmann, Wade-Benzoni, & 
Bazerman, 2010).  Both daily experience and controlled research reveal that a sizeable part 
of the population engages in behaviours that break their referential moral standards; these 
include corruption, cheating, and stealing, amongst others.  As a matter of fact, such 
behaviours are practically endemic, in that people not only exhibit them rather frequently, but also seem to ignore othersǯ immorality under certain circumstances (Gino & Bazerman, 
2009).   
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This gap between moral judgment and behaviour challenges the idea that moral 
reasoning is an immediate cause of moral behaviour (Frimer & Walker, 2008).  For Shweder 
et al. (1987), the situation is analogous to the fact that native speakers of a language can use 
grammatical decision rules properly and identify grammar mistakes, but they are not 
necessarily able to describe those rules.  In the same way, people may not be able to 
appropriately describe their moral reasoning processes, but that does not mean they cannot 
use them to actually decide whether something is morally sound or not.  In this line of 
thought, moral reasoning and its categories become just labels for a certain set of responses 
in a test, but are not really precursors of behaviour in other contexts. 
Even if there were no such gap between behaviour and explicit reports of moral 
reasoning processes, the success of the interviewing methodology depends on the participant 
having relatively high verbal skills, including the ability to properly discuss complex and 
abstract ideas.  However, this reliance on verbal argumentation can be affected by the fact 
that the possibility of knowing and using concepts and ideas is not necessarily correlated 
with the ability to discuss them accurately in speech.  Starting with the seminal experiments 
by Nisbett and Wilson (1977), many researchers in the area of cognitive psychology have 
confirmed that participants can be aware of the results of their decision-making processes 
but rarely are they able to give accurate verbal reports of those processes themselves.  More 
recently, Johansson et al. (2005) used a paradigm involving deception to show that people 
justify decisions that they in fact have not made.  In short, over-reliance on verbal reports 
might produce skewed results due to the numerous factors that have an influence over them. 
The idea of stages of moral reasoning is also a problematic one, since scientific 
evidence does not support the idea that cognition presents itself in clearly separated stages.  
In fact, research in the area of moral reasoning has shown that typical adults and children 
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tend to mix concepts and principles from different substages, and that it is very rare to 
observe the stages in pure form described by the theory (Shweder et al., 1987). 
Finally, the universality of moral stages has been also challenged.  Evidence in favour 
of this idea (for example Snarey, 1985) commonly consists of studies performed with 
populations much like the ones studied by Kohlberg and his colleagues (typically western, 
white, and urban).  However, recent cross-cultural research on the subject has revealed, for 
example, that spontaneous descriptions of the moral domain made by people in the lower 
social classes or with religious backgrounds other than Christianity include factors such as 
duty, purity of mind, traditions, religious norms and others that are not part of the original 
model (Graham et al., 2011).   
As a matter of fact, Kohlberg himself observed that some populations tend to score 
higher than others.  This is usually explained by stating that processes of rational reasoning 
are unequally distributed across populations, although it may also be explained by a bias 
towards westernised elites in the theory (Shweder et al., 1987).  Counter-intuitive findings, 
such as Tibetan Buddhist monks scoring lower in moral reasoning than ordinary populations 
(Gielen, 1983, cited by Snarey, 1985), also support this criticism. 
The refined version of Kohlbergǯs theory of moral development addresses some 
criticisms by introducing a few changes: specifically, it states that it is concerned with ǲjustice reasoningǳ ȋinstead of moral reasoningȌ, and relaxes the rigid stage structure of the original 
proposal.  However, the methodology, the concept of stages, and the notion of fundamental, 
culturally-independent principles survive basically untouched (Levine et al., 1985), and the 
general idea remains intact, which extends most of the previous criticisms to this new 
version as well. 
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Post-Kohlberg Cognitive Theories 
For the previous reasons, contemporary moral Psychology has started to explore 
other factors beyond moral reasoning, and cognitive approaches have flourished.   Perhaps 
the most well-known criticism of Kohlbergǯs theory was raised by Carol Gilligan (1982), who 
proposed that men and women have different moral orientations and moral developmental 
pathways related to their gender-specific traits, and that  most accounts of morality are 
based on the typically masculine orientation towards justice (as opposed to care in women).  
Her theory involves substantial changes not only to the conceptual basis of morality that had 
been stated up to that point, but also to the methods used to assess moral development 
(Walker, 2006).   
Other, more general approaches have focused on social and cultural factors beyond 
gender.  One of the most recognised is Social Cognitive Theory (Bandura, Barbaranelli, 
Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996), which states that people develop moral standards and will 
usually do things according to these moral standards, due to the existence of self-monitoring 
and self-regulatory cognitive processes.  However, there are many different mechanisms 
through which people can temporarily soften or relax their moral standards, and thus engage 
in actions that go against them (ǲmoral disengagementǳ).  These mechanisms are used 
because the misalignment of actions and goals creates cognitive dissonance, a psychological 
state of discomfort.  The reduction strategy is either a change in behaviour, or a temporary 
change in morals (Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 2011). 
According to the theory, the mechanisms involved may operate during the various 
steps of the self-regulatory process.  The reprehensible behaviour may be justified, 
euphemistically labelled, or compared to other situations as a means of reducing its impact; 
the effects of this behaviour may be minimised, ignored or misconstrued, and the victim may 
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be dehumanised or made responsible for the negative consequences.  And if those are not 
enough, displacement or diffusion of responsibility can also happen (Bandura, 2002). 
Other cognitive approaches have also been described.  In general, most propose that 
moral behaviour is the product of a four-staged process: a) awareness of an ethical issue, b) 
ethical judgment, c) establishment of an intention to behave ethically, d) and actual display of 
the behaviour (Reynolds, 2006).  However, cognitive perspectives have been challenged by 
theories drawing from evolutionary science and neuroscience.  One of the most recent 
approaches, which illustrates the influence of evolutionary theory, is Moral Foundations 
Theory (MFT; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). It states that humans are genetically endowed with the 
possibility of developing concern for a small number of moral intuitions related mainly to 
protection of kin, reciprocity, group cooperation, respect for authority, and avoidance of 
microbes and parasites (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009).  MFT thus differs from previous 
theories in that moral reasoning mostly happens after innate moral intuitions have played 
their part.  However, empirical evidence is still scant (Graham et al., 2009), and some 
criticism has also appeared based on MFTǯs ideas of innateness and modularity, and that 
there may be other strong candidates for additional moral foundations (such as 
industriousness) (Suhler & Churchland, 2011). 
The idea of moral reasoning not being the sole precursor of moral action is not 
unique to MFT.  Intuitionist models of morality have suggested that moral reasoning may 
simply be a way of justifying the moral judgment or the moral behaviour after it has already 
been performed, in a sort of rationalisation of moral intuitions (Haidt & Joseph, 2004).  An 
emphasis on intuitionism suggests that whatever mechanisms lead to moral behaviour are of 
a more unconscious, irrational nature, probably related to the evolutionary history of the 
species. 
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A Discussion of Cognitive Views of Morality in Psychology   
The dominant paradigms in Moral Psychology stem from cognitive perspectives.  
These perspectives regard observable behaviour as the result of the operation of internal 
structures or processes on external and internal stimuli.  The nature and features of those 
internal components are inferred through the use of different assessment methods, ranging 
from the simple and mundane, like behavioural observation and interviews, to the highly 
sophisticated, such as electrophysiological measures and neuroimaging.   
A problem with this view is that the mental or cognitive structures and processes that 
are said to cause behaviour cannot be observed directly: their existence and mode of 
operation can only be inferred with reference to the conditions in which they presumably 
operate (observable features of a context or situation), the biological events that are assumed 
to underlie the mental events themselves, or to their products (actions).  This has resulted in 
several different (and sometimes conflicting) models of cognitive systems, and also, as 
previously described, in contradictory or counterintuitive findings that limit research and 
conclusions derived from it.   
One example of these counterintuitive findings is the problem of the discrepancy 
between verbal descriptions that people give of their moral reasoning processes and their 
actual moral behaviour, which presumably results from those processes.   For instance, a 
person may overtly say that he or she believes that no one should be punished to death, yet 
when called for jury duty may act by voting for capital punishment of an individual.  If moral 
actions are guided by internal moral processes or beliefs, little or no discrepancy should be 
found.  However, it would seem that people think and act in a certain way, but are able to 
report that they think and act differently.  
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Even though cognitive perspectives do acknowledge that social processes are 
conditions that shape moral judgment, the main explanatory mechanism for behaviour 
generally remains the action of internal and individual factors that account for the 
presentation of behaviour.  This view is so pervasive that it has hardly been questioned at all, 
even in modern scientific literature.  For example, a relatively recent review of morality considers it to be ǲa mental phenomenon that consists in thoughts and feelings about rights 
and duties, good and bad character traits (virtues and vices),  and right and wrongǳ (Krebs, 
2008, p. 150, emphasis added). 
However, the shortcomings of these views have led psychologists and other social 
scientists to seek other assessment methods and explanations, specifically exploring whether 
genetics or physiology could contribute to a more complete account of morality, either as 
innate processes or as biologically mediated experiences. This biological focus was 
considered very briefly above, but a more detailed summary of the contributions of research 
on the biological factors participating in morality is presented in the next section. 
Biological Factors linked to Moral Behaviour 
Ethological views 
Ethologists and biologists have generally maintained that considering human 
morality an exceptional case in nature does not follow the central tenets of evolutionary 
science, where morality is part of human nature and is also the result of evolutionary 
processes that have been operating for thousands of years.  According to a recent view, 
interdisciplinary studies suggest the presence of moral building blocks, automatic moral 
judgments and intercultural similarities in moral domains such as fairness, reciprocity and 
empathy, and taken together this provides evidence for a biologically-determined layer of 
moral decision-making (De Waal, Smith Churchland, Pievani, & Parmigiani, 2014) 
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Studies with animals have observed behaviours in non-human species that, if emitted 
by humans, would raise moral issues. Indeed, one can speculate that the presence of such 
behaviours in different species makes the case for phylogenetic inclinations to immoral 
behaviour in humans, which are modulated and modified by social and cultural influences 
upon the development of language.  We will discuss this possibility later in more detail from 
the psychological perspective of Relational Frame Theory. 
For the time being, it seems important to note that through the examination of ǲimmoralǳ behaviours in other species, evolutionary science has provided ethological 
perspectives to the study of morality.  The most obvious example of deception, a moral issue 
if applied to human affairs, is mimicry, widespread in the animal and plant kingdoms, but not 
really behavioural in nature since it normally involves camouflage not under the control of 
the organism (for example, eye-shaped patterns on butterfly wings).   
However, certain animal behaviours have been observed that are akin to what is called ǲimmoralǳ or ǲunethicalǳ in humans. Primate deception, for example, occurs both 
actively (e.g., a false anti-predator call in order to take advantage of the momentary 
distraction) and passively (e.g., withholding information about a food source), and is mainly 
related to the decreased availability of food (Wheeler, 2008).  For example, capuchin 
monkeys seem to use deceiving alarm calls more frequently when both the amount and 
location of the available food makes it more contestable, and when the individuals 
themselves are in a spatial location that maximises their feeding success if their peers answer 
to the deceptive call (Wheeler, 2009).  However, deception is not only related to the 
availability of food resources: gelada baboons, for instance, exhibit increased likelihood of 
extra-pair copulation, and less accompanying vocalisation, when the cuckolded male is a 
large distance away (Le Roux et al., 2013).   
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Perhaps it is unsurprising that other primates present human-like unethical 
behaviour, given our similarity to them and the ubiquity of deceptive behaviours in humans, 
but there are also examples in lower-order species.  The giant cuttlefish, a colour-changing 
cephalopod, can fool other males by displaying female patterns on the skin on one side and 
male patterns on the side visible to females (Brown, Garwood & Williamson, 2012).  The 
dance fly (Rhamphomyia sulcata) and spiders of the Lycosoidea family are some of the species in which males present ǲgiftsǳ ȋpreyȌ to females in order to increase their mating 
chances, and deception has been observed in both species with regards to those gifts: Lycosoidea male spiders wrap their gifts in silk, but occasionally ǲreuseǳ gifts that were 
rejected by the females or simply give them empty silk packages, which results in nearly 
equally increased mating opportunities.  Dance fly males also give inadequate or false gifts on 
occasion, deceiving the female (Albo, Winther, Tuni, Toft, & Bilde, 2011).  
Even though these behaviours are normally emitted in response to certain 
environmental conditions (a decreased availability of resources being the main example), the 
fact that their properties change on occasion suggests that more elaborate behavioural and 
perceptual processes than reflexes or fixed action patterns are involved in their presentation.  
Even though they do not reach the levels of complexity involved in decision-making in 
verbally sophisticated humans, such actions may not be completely unrelated to human 
morality or at least the evolutionary basis of moral/immoral behaviour in humans.  
Other factors related to biology 
Biologically oriented perspectives have also addressed other biological factors that 
may be related to moral behaviour.  One of them is the depletion of cognitive resources due 
to tiredness; for example, Barnes, Schaubroeck, Huth and Ghumann (2011) found reduced 
self-control on a cognitive task in participants reporting fewer hours of sleep, and also more 
unethical behaviour correlated with less sleep.   
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Self-regulatory resources seem to decrease throughout the day, which could explain 
the so-called ǲMorning Morality Effectǳ (Kouchaki & Smith, 2013) – the presumed higher 
prevalence of immoral behaviour during the afternoon hours.  Cognitive depletion can also 
result from tasks that involve response inhibition, and again, it seems to have an effect on 
subsequent responding in situations related to moral issues (Muraven, Pogarsky, & Shmueli, 
2006).   
While the role of fatigue on moral judgment has only been explored recently, an older 
candidate is physical disgust.  People have long been using expressions containing words 
related to disgust to describe moral transgressions, their perpetrators, and their own feelings 
with regards to them.  Some studies have found correlations between the strength of moral 
judgments and sensitivity to physical disgust (Chapman & Anderson, 2014; A. Jones & 
Fitness, 2008), although a recent study seems to have detected a dissociation between moral 
judgments and the elicitation of disgust when using electrophysiological measures (Yang, Li, 
Xiao, Zhang, & Tian, 2014) .  However, others believe that people use disgust-related words to 
describe events in the moral domain out of convenience, but they are really invoking the 
basic emotion of disgust anyways (Nabi, 2002). 
Having presented the main theoretical approaches and reviewed some of the 
biological and cognitive factors that influence moral behaviour, it is time to turn our attention 
to the general methodological approaches to the assessment of  moral behaviour and the 
issues faced when employing them.   
General Methods for the Assessment of Moral Behaviour 
As mentioned earlier, each theoretical approach seems to have a preference for a 
certain subset of methods.  Classical Moral Psychology from the cognitive perspective relies 
on interviewing methods and standardised psychological testing, sometimes including 
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projective techniques which have little empirical support (Lilienfeld, Wood, & Garb, 2000).  
More contemporary approaches advocate the use of physiological measures such as skin 
conductance, electroencephalography and magnetic resonance imaging.  We will now discuss 
the advantages and disadvantages of these methods of assessing moral behaviour. 
Self-report methods.  A simple way of assessing moral behaviour is to use 
interviews and self-reports.  These are easy to use and require little more than pen, paper 
and a desk.  Kohlbergian approaches, for example, use a form of interview in which verbal 
responses to imagined situations ȋǲmoral dilemmasǳȌ are used as a device to assess the state 
of an individualǯs moral reasoning processes.  An example of one such dilemma tells the story 
of a man considering stealing a drug that might save his wifeǯs life after not being able to 
come up with enough money to pay for it and finding his pleas to the seller rejected.  The 
participant is asked a series of questions such as ǲShould he steal the drug?ǳ and ǲ)s it right or wrong to steal itǳ. 
The moral dilemma scenario has been used in other ways to study how the 
presentation of the situation impacts the answer given.  A classic example is the ǲtrolley problemǳ (Klein, 2011), which has two variations that generally produce different results, 
although the problem is essentially the same.  In the first variation, people are asked whether 
they would flip a switch to change the course of a runaway train carriage (i.e. trolley), and by 
doing so getting it to kill a bystander, but saving five others instead.  The second variation 
asks whether individuals would push the bystander onto the track so as to stop the trolley 
and save the other five.  Far more people are willing to flip the switch than to push the 
bystander, even though the result is the same (the person interviewed would save five lives 
at the expense of one). 
The main issue with self-reports to study socially sensitive topics, including moral 
behaviour, is that they have been long proven to be highly susceptible to cognitive biases and 
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distortions.  For instance, research on personality assessment through questionnaires and 
scales has shown that responses vary in the presence of certain contextual cues and that the 
overall results can be faked by respondents trying to present a certain image of themselves 
(Holden, 2007; Krahé, Becker, & Zöllter, 2008). 
 Studies involving other situations where participants are requested to report their 
performance frequently find discrepancies between reported and actual performance, and 
examples are numerous: reporting donating to charity and not doing so (Bekkers & 
Wiepking, 2010), or declaring having been offered gifts or services in exchange for votes only 
when asked in an anonymous survey but not when questioned face-to-face (Gonzalez-
Ocantos, de Jonge, Meléndez, Osorio, & Nickerson, 2012), to name a few. 
In fact, as early as the 1950s, psychologists had already noticed the inaccuracies of 
introspection and observed that responses to clinical measures were commonly affected by a 
tendency towards socially desirable responding, which prompted the development of scales 
to assess this type of bias in both clinical and non-clinical populations (see for example 
Crowne & Marlowe, 1960).  Many different measures and studies tried to isolate social 
desirability during the following decades, and despite some research suggesting that its role 
was being exaggerated, there appears to be evidence for a sizable enough effect, which 
demands a need to control for this variable in order to reach valid conclusions (Holden, 
2007). 
To account for these inaccuracies, researchers have hypothesised that giving overt 
answers to questions, either orally or in a questionnaire, involves a controlled (i.e. conscious) 
process in which respondents have enough time to analyse the question and become aware 
of the social implications of their answer.  The final response will, to some degree, be affected 
by the results of this process, and thus may not accurately reflect ǲtrueǳ or actual personal 
beliefs . 
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Whatever the possible explanation may be, it is clear that verbal reports of mental 
activity seem to be strongly susceptible to the influence of cognitive bias due to limited 
access to said activity or, more commonly, to the perceived need for adapting reports to 
social convention (Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011).  Some researchers have 
tried to circumvent the problems of accessibility and self-presentation by using modern 
neuroimaging technology to try to find the components of moral decision making in the 
brain. 
Neuroimaging.  In general, the use of functional magnetic resonance or other real-
time brain imaging techniques suggest that immoral behaviour involves the intentional 
suppression of a default truth-telling (moral) response (Verschuere, Spruyt, Meijer, & Otgaar, 
2011), which seems to include the participation of several areas of the brain.  For instance, a 
meta-analysis by Christ, Van Essen, Watson, Brubaker and McDermott (2009) supports the 
critical role of prefrontal areas in deception, most likely due to their participation in 
executive control, which is regarded as an important component in producing deceptive 
responses; for example, participants asked to lie show increased activity in the bilateral 
ventrolateral prefrontal area (Spence et al., 2001).  The ventromedial pre-frontal cortex has 
been suggested to be important in the perception of harmful intent, which in turn modifies 
moral judgment (Young et al., 2010).   
Other areas whose role in deception has been studied include the posterior superior 
temporal sulcus and the amygdala (Stanley, Phelps, & Banaji, 2008), which seem to respond 
differently when evaluating positive and negative deviances from moral standards 
(Takahashi et al., 2008).  Further research has suggested that the participation of 
mesencephalic and diencephalic structures can account for the non-conscious and intuitive 
components of moral decision-making (Reynolds, 2006). 
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Findings from neuroimaging studies are generally used as supporting evidence in the 
creation of cognitive models that intend to account for the hypothesised internal processing 
that results in the emission of behaviour.  For example, the different responses in the two 
versions of the aforementioned ǲtrolley problemǳ are accounted for from a cognitive 
perspective by theorising that morality works via a dual-process system, in which the 
wording of the problem and the nature of the situation primarily engages either the cognitive 
or emotional components of moral judgment.  This roughly corresponds with neuroimaging 
findings of increased posterior cingulate and superior temporal activity during consideration 
of emotional dilemmas ȋǲpush and kill someone to save manyǳȌ in which participants are 
asked to imagine causing direct harm, and increased activity in the inferior parietal lobes and 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during reasoned judgments ȋǲone must die for the greater 
goodǳȌ (Klein, 2011). 
There are two main problems with assessing moral behaviour from neuroscientific 
perspectives.  The first one has to do with resources: experimental paradigms are complex 
and require resources and technology, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
devices, that are not necessarily readily available to most researchers due to their cost and 
their complexity.  For this reason, researchers have sought to devise cheaper, simpler and 
less invasive alternatives within the experimental context, in order to control for 
interpretations and biases. 
The second and more critical problem with neuroimaging studies of immoral 
behaviour is that despite the evidence for the participation of certain brain areas in moral 
responding, studies have been unable to identify systematic differences in activation patterns 
that enable researchers to separate moral from immoral responses (Verschuere et al., 2011).  
Moreover, the areas identified have been also shown to have important roles in processes 
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such as working memory, task switching and inhibitory control, making it difficult to 
separate the specific components of moral behaviour (Christ et al., 2009). 
Electroencephalography and involuntary motor actions.  The aforementioned 
difficulties in the use of neuroimaging have led some researchers to turn to less resource-
intensive techniques which sacrifice spatial resolution but increase temporal resolution, such 
as standard electroencephalography (EEG), event-related potentials (ERP) and regional 
cerebral blood flow (rCBF).  Of these, ERP, the analysis of brain activity related to the 
presentation of a stimulus, is the best candidate for a general method of assessing 
moral/immoral behaviour.  Ortu (2012) suggested, for example, that the P300 (a positive 
electrical peak in the EEG signal approximately 300ms following the onset of a 
stimulus)could be used as a marker of deception. Using deception and concealment of 
information as operationalisations of unethical behaviour, several studies have found 
particular ERP patterns in tasks involving detection of simulated amnesia (Rosenfeld et al., 
1998; Rosenfeld, Ellwanger, & Sweet, 1995), deception (Johnson & Rosenfeld, 1992; Spence & 
Kaylor-Hughes, 2008) and concealed information in mock crime experimental paradigms 
(Rosenfeld et al., 2008). Nevertheless, it has been argued that the P300 (and related ERP 
patterns) could merely be a reflection of an orientation response or a shift in attention and is 
not directly related to immoral behaviour per se.  
On balance, direct measurements of cerebral activity may not be the only 
physiological indicator of moral behaviour.  Several experimental findings suggest that 
certain motor behaviours occur before conscious awareness of a moral judgment or correlate 
with psychometric measures but not with self-reports about certain tasks. This idea is known 
as the ǲideomotor principleǳ, which presumes that ideas or thoughts can occur together with 
involuntary motor actions (Stock & Stock, 2004), and from the observation of these actions, 
the corresponding cognitive activity could be inferred.  A key component of the ideomotor 
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principle is that those involuntary motor behaviours are not necessarily accompanied by 
conscious awareness, which suggests that their presentation is less susceptible to voluntary 
distortion. At the time of writing, however, systematic evidence to support the use of the 
ideomotor principle to examine moral behaviour was unavailable. 
Response latencies.  Some of the studies described before have found a correlation 
between ERPs and response latencies (Rosenfeld et al., 1998; Seymour, Seifert, Shafto, & 
Mosmann, 2000), which suggests that removing the electrophysiological component and only 
using latencies can still be useful in the assessment of moral behaviour.  The use of response 
latencies –the elapsed time between the presentation of a stimulus and the emission of a 
particular response – has a long history in psychology, because it was one of the favourite 
measures used in psychophysics, during the first decades of the development of scientific 
psychology.  
In the moral domain, response latencies have been used in experimental paradigms 
where moral issues are operationalised by putting people in situations in which they can 
conceal information or tell lies. Such actions have been suggested in a number of studies to 
involve a greater degree of cognitive control, which in turn results in increased reaction 
times when participants take these tests.  For instance, Spence et al. (2001) interviewed 
participants to get a baseline of simple actions that they had recently performed and were 
then instructed to lie on some of them in the presence of an observer who would ostensibly 
try to tell which responses were true or false.  Upon comparing both sets of answers, 
significantly different response times during lies and truths were found. 
More recently, Noordraven and Verschuere (2013) used a mock crime scene 
paradigm to assign participants to a guilty group, who had advance knowledge of a crime that 
was supposed to take place, and an innocent group without such knowledge.  They found 
significant differences in reaction times between both groups using the Concealed 
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Information Test (CIT), with the guilty group having higher response latencies than the 
innocent group.  Similar results were obtained by Williams, Bott, Patrick and Lewis (2013), 
who tried to control for extraneous factors by asking participants to lie or tell the truth about 
the shape of a figure presented on the screen, and found that, on average, telling lies took 
slightly more time.   In general, the most widely supported explanation for this effect, as 
previously mentioned here, is that telling lies entails suppression of a default truth-telling 
response, and the extra cognitive workload involved explains the difference in response 
times (Vendemia, Buzan, & Green, 2005).   
Of course, a reaction time measure would only be useful to assess moral behaviour if 
it successfully resisted the individualǯs attempts to change it or fake it – that is, if it were an 
accurate, non-changeable somatic marker of telling lies or behaving immorally (Sobhani & 
Bechara, 2011).  Only a few studies have so far concerned themselves with investigating this 
possibility, and the evidence seems to be inconclusive.  On the one hand, for example, 
Vendemia et al. (2005) found that practice does not seem to have a significant effect on 
reaction times. In a more recent study, however, latencies associated with lying decreased 
when participants often told lies during an earlier part of the experiment, and conversely, 
lying became more difficult (i.e., increased latencies) after frequent truth-telling. (Van 
Bockstaele et al., 2012). 
Implicit measures.  Response latencies have also been used within a booming 
domain in Experimental Social Psychology: implicit testing.  Researchers in the field of 
implicit cognition suggest that there are automatic, meaningful responses which can be 
modified by subsequent conscious, socially-mediated assessments of the potential 
consequences of those responses.  Essentially, the adjective implicit  used in this manner is 
synonymous with automatic and describes psychological processes that require few 
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cognitive resources, are relatively resistant to change and are present even in the absence of 
awareness and particular goals (De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009). 
Implicit testing borrows from the so-called response priming paradigm, which uses 
response latencies to study issues of early information processing.  A typical response 
priming experiment involves responding (e.g. pressing a key) quickly to a target stimulus 
which is preceded by a prime stimulus.  The prime can be mapped to either the same 
(consistent prime) or the opposite (inconsistent prime) response to the target stimulus, and 
the generally observed effect is that consistent primes result in faster responses to the target, 
whereas inconsistent primes typically slow the responses (Schmidt, Haberkamp, & Schmidt, 
2011).   
A sample trial presents a sample shape (diamond or square) for a few milliseconds, 
and then a target shape which would either be the same as the prime (consistent) or a 
different one (inconsistent).   Two different response keys are assigned to each target, and it 
is predicted that response latencies are lower in consistent responding (i.e., both prime and 
target are the same) – this is the priming effect. 
A variation called affective priming involves the use of emotionally-loaded stimuli 
(such as pictures of faces or situations, or words describing emotions), and the differences in 
reaction times when responding to targets after consistent and inconsistent primes are 
hypothesised to reflect attitudes towards the affective primes (De Houwer et al., 2009). 
Evidence for response and affective priming comes mainly from two sources: the 
implicit cognition literature and vision research; the latter because the procedure has been 
used to study observed relationships between motor control and visual awareness (Schmidt 
et al., 2011).  In their meta-analysis, De Houwer et al. (2009) state that studies have 
established that affective priming tasks are a useful device to capture attitudes, despite the 
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well-known fact that priming effects may be produced by features of the stimuli other than 
the evaluative dimension (e.g. target depletion, De Houwer, Hermans, & Spruyt, 2001; signal 
strength, Francken, Gaal, & de Lange, 2011; previous learning, Horner & Henson, 2008). 
A number of tests are currently available for the assessment of implicit cognition, 
most of them based upon the paradigm of rapid responding in computerised categorisation 
tasks, with reaction time and response accuracy as indicators of the implicit attitude.  The 
stimuli involved in the categorisation tasks are manipulated according to the topic towards 
which the implicit attitude is exhibited.  We will now present a summary of those available 
implicit measures. 
The Implicit Association Test and related measures. According to Greenwald, 
McGhee and Schwartz (1998), implicit attitudes, which reflect automatic, non-conscious 
evaluation, can be tapped into if participants are asked to categorise stimuli both as 
accurately and quickly as possible.  This is because latencies are a function of the degree to 
which concepts are associated in memory, with lower latencies meaning that two stimuli are firmly related in a given individualǯs cognitive structure, and thus have the power to 
influence behaviour.   
To test this idea, Greenwald, et al. (1998) designed the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT), which has become the best known implicit measure, and it is currently supported by 
extensive evidence: over 700 papers using the IAT have been published since its inception in 
the late 1990s.  Studies using the IAT have dealt with such diverse topics as consumer 
preferences (e.g. Ayres, Conner, Prestwich, & Smith, 2012; Piqueras-Fiszman, Velasco, & 
Spence, 2012), cultural perceptions of body image (e.g. Brewis & Wutich, 2012), violence (e.g. 
Eckhardt, Samper, Suhr, & Holtzworth-Munroe, 2012), and, especially, racial, ethnic and 
gender stereotypes (Haider et al., 2011; Rezaei, 2011; Roddy, Stewart, & Barnes-Holmes, 
2011; Rooth, 2010; van Ravenzwaaij, van der Maas, & Wagenmakers, 2011).  Under the 
30 
 
weight of this accumulated evidence, there is now a general consensus that IAT scores reflect 
implicit attitudes, at least sometimes and to some degree (De Houwer et al., 2009). 
The basic structure of the IAT and many of its derivatives involves asking participants 
to categorize two stimuli together by pressing one response key and to categorize another 
two stimuli together using a second response key. In a race-related IRAP, for example, one 
block of trials might involve pressing one key whenever a picture of a white person or a 
positively valence word is presented and pressing a second key whenever a picture of black 
person or a negatively valenced word is presented. In another block of trials the 
categorisation responses are reversed, such that one key is pressed for white pictures and 
negative words and the second key is pressed for black pictures and positive words. 
Typically, white participants find it easier (i.e. produce lower response latencies) when they 
have to respond White+Positive and Black+Negative compared to when they have to respond 
White+Negative and Black+Positive.  
The mechanism by which this type of IAT effect is produced has been disputed.  
Greenwald et al. (1998) first suggested that the results of IAT tasks are related to the degree 
of association between two concepts in memory.  During the following years, efforts were 
undertaken to elaborate on this idea and give a more detailed account of the process.  Brendl, 
Markman and Messner (2001) have suggested that the effect is produced in a random-walk 
model in which both valence and identity of the stimuli compete or collaborate to produce a 
response depending on whether a consistent or inconsistent response is required.  Other 
mechanisms, including response-activation effects and differential response costs derived 
from task switching have also been proposed (De Houwer, 2001).   
Despite its widespread use and apparently high validity, some limitations have been 
identified with the IAT.  It has been established that the nature of the stimuli used, the 
differences in cognitive abilities, and order effects may be partially responsible for IAT effects 
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(De Houwer et al., 2009).  In order to address these and other limitations, other tests such as 
the Go/No Go Association Task (Nosek & Banaji, 2001), the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task 
(EAST, De Houwer, 2003) and the Brief IAT (Sriram & Greenwald, 2009) have been 
developed.  The detailed methodological issues surrounding the development of these types 
of alternative tests are beyond the scope of the present chapter. The critical issue, for the 
current research revolves around the theoretical claim that the IAT and the vast majority of 
implicit tests are based either explicitly or implicitly on the notion that implicit cognition is 
inherently associationistic. That is, excitatory or inhibitory links between internal 
representations of stimuli are said to be passively formed under certain environmental and 
organismic conditions by pairing of the stimuli.  These links enable activation of one of the 
stimulus through activation of the other and it is these activations that are captured by the 
IAT and related measures (Hughes et al., 2011).   
Critically, however,  recent studies have been providing some evidence for the 
predictions made by alternatives to associationist views, such as those posed by 
propositional and functional-contextualistic theoretical perspectives.  For example, it has 
been found that non-evaluative propositions can influence automatic evaluative responses 
and that implicit attitudes might be formed not only by pairing stimuli, but through other 
sources of information such as instructions (De Houwer, 2006) or even interactions between 
parents and siblings (Castelli, Zogmaister, & Tomelleri, 2009). Other recent findings, such as 
the ability of people who show strong stereotypes to make intracategory differentiations 
(Scherer & Lambert, 2009) and the well-established fact that indirect procedures do not 
provide exclusive and unimpaired access to automatic processing, but also reflect some 
controlled processing at least, also suggest that there is more to implicit attitudes than 
association between concepts and evaluations (Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & Vahey, 2012). 
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For these reasons, interest in pursuing alternative conceptual frameworks and 
improved assessment methods has rekindled. One such programme of research that has 
grown quite rapidly in recent years is the emergence of a behaviour-analytic or functional-
contextual approach, driven largely by a modern behavioural account of human language and 
cognition, known as Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes & Roche, 2001). 
This perspective provides the conceptual bedrock for the empirical research presented in the 
current thesis and thus we will consider it in some detail. Before doing so, however, it seems 
wise to explain how this relatively novel approach to implicit cognition emerged from the 
behaviour-analytic tradition. 
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A Behavioural View of Morality 
As we have seen, with the influence of neurocognitive and evolutionary perspectives, 
explanations of moral behaviour have drifted from strictly rational, individualised 
approaches, to more culturally-sensitive processes of moral decision-making with non-
conscious, automatic components.  Still, most psychological approaches to moral behaviour 
consider it to be a product of cognitive processes (moral reasoning and self-regulatory 
processes, both related to activity in certain areas of the brain) which are influenced by both 
genetic endowment (moral foundations) and social experiences.   
More recent models, such as the neurocognitve approaches, also provide new 
methods of assessment. Even though studies employing physiological measures such as EEG, 
event-related potentials, and cerebral blood flow are to be found in the literature, the 
equipment needed and the difficulties for interpretation inherent to their use has prevented 
this type of research from taking a more prominent role. Thus studies of morality from the 
neurocognitive perspective remain a very small minority of the published literature.   
In general, cognitive (including neurocognitive) theories and explanations attempt to 
explain moral behaviour by appealing to some form of mental mechanism or processes 
through which moral reasoning or judgments occur, which then serve to control moral or 
immoral actions. As such, moral decisions may be explained through different cognitive 
mechanisms, and the general purpose of cognitive research is to determine which 
mechanism or processes provide the best explanation.  As we will see, the behavioural view 
contrasts with cognitive accounts in that it does not concern itself with hypothesised or 
inferred internal cognitive mechanisms as an explanation of behaviour and seeks to identify 
and analyse the functional relationships between behaviour and environmental conditions 
and events (Hayes et al., 2001). 
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Skinner’s Operant Account and its Criticisms 
According to Soreth (2011), a behaviour analytic account of morality is based on the 
rejection of internal agents as causes of moral behaviour, the recognition that human rights 
and morals are culturally dependent (anti-foundationalism), and the role of reinforcement as 
a sort of universal principle that governs behaviour.  These principles are exemplified by Skinnerǯs treatment of morality, a concise version of which is presented in Beyond Freedom 
and Dignity (Skinner, 1971). 
In the book, Skinner propounds that science can provide not only answers to 
questions of possibilities (what people can do), but to questions of duties as well (what 
people ought to do).  The latter are generally perceived to correspond to value judgments, 
out of the realm of science.  A behavioural account, however, posits that labels such as good 
or bad, or right or wrong, can be applied to stimuli and behaviour, and this classification will 
essentially refer to their positive and negative reinforcement properties (Skinner, 1971, 
1975).    
A basic example would be tasty food.  Eating it increases the probability that we will eat it in the future, and hence we can say it is ǲreinforcingǳ.  Of the food we say it is ǲgoodǳ or ǲdeliciousǳ, which are verbal labels we assign to positively reinforcing things.  Things that we 
label as bad are those that negatively reinforce us, such as physical pain: its disappearance 
reinforces the behaviour that enables us to avoid it.  However, these reinforcing effects need 
not only be biological in nature, because a verbal community can also teach its members to 
value something as good or bad, and conditioned reinforcers (e.g., money) can also be held as 
such. 
In a view of morality as the realm of what is good and bad, of what is and ought to be, 
the behavioural processes of positive and negative reinforcement are the foundations of what 
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other perspectives in psychology have called a ǲsense of moralityǳ, meaning the attachment 
of value judgments to both environmental stimuli and behaviours.  This sense of morality develops as children become more experienced with the ǲmoralǳ labels shared by their 
verbal communities. 
It is important to add that, in a behavioural perspective, there is no causal 
relationship between moral reasoning and moral behaviour, because any instance of moral 
reasoning is verbal behaviour potentially influenced by a different set of contingencies; that 
is, the environmental arrangements or conditions that make an instance of moral reasoning 
possible are probably not the same that create an instance of the actual moral behaviour.   
For instance, a person may verbally state a moral judgment such as ǲ) think terrorists 
deserve capital punishment and I would carry it out for my country and for freedomǳ.  
However, when the opportunity to act according to said moral judgment presents itself, the 
person might not be able to do the deed, and this is due to functional relationships between 
both behaviours and separate sets of contextual conditions.  In the first case, the statement of 
the moral judgment is probably influenced by public outrage in the media, or beliefs presented by the reference cultural group, or a desire to look ǲstrongǳ and ǲpatrioticǳ in front 
of others.  However, upon having to actually carry out an execution or otherwise act in such a 
way that the salience of causing a death is increased, other sets of influences become 
apparent: perhaps ǲthou shalt not killǳ or ǲ) do not want my children to remember me for thisǳ. 
The behaviouristic perspective has been traditionally considered by some 
professionals to be unable to account for complex human moral behaviour. The basic 
argument is that reinforcement as a determinant of behaviour could not possibly explain the 
subtleties of moral judgment.  This particular criticism is raised when trying to account, for 
example, for the different responses to the trolley problem described above. That is, the 
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consequence in both cases is the same (i.e., 5 people survive because 1 person is killed), and 
yet participants respond differently depending on how the ǲmoral dilemmaǳ is presented to 
them. Thus an explanation for a moral judgement simply in terms of the reinforcing 
consequences that are arranged for a particular act does not seem to apply here. On balance, 
behavioural psychology recognises that reinforcement does not exist independently of other 
contextual arrangements, and factors such as discriminative stimuli, particular learning 
histories and verbal behaviour need to be taken into the explanation. 
In the end, assessment of moral behaviour from the Behavioural perspective is based 
on one of the central tenets of Behavioural Psychology: that behaviour is in itself a legitimate 
object of study for Psychology, and is not to be regarded simply as the by-product of internal 
processes or states.  This means that traditional measures of morality, such as those derived from Kohlbergǯs theory, are, at least, not to be interpreted in the same way from a behaviour-
analytic point of view, since they presume that what is being assessed is the current state of a 
set of cognitive structures that are responsible for the appearance of certain behaviours.  
This is not to mean that they cannot be used at all, but only to point out that the information 
they provide is framed in a particular way, different from mainstream Psychology.  For example, the very concept of ǲmoral behaviourǳ in Behavioural Psychology involves verbal behaviour ȋǲlabellingǳȌ related to the behaviour of interest, because it has no inherent moral 
value – as said before, behaviour in itself is neither good nor bad. 
Perhaps the main criticism of the traditional behavioural approach to the psychology 
of morality is that the preponderance of basic learning processes in explanations of 
behaviour fails to capture and clarify the role of language in human interaction and learning.  
Skinner recognised that language is a powerful modulator of experience, and some of his 
concepts have been employed widely and with considerable success in teaching basic 
language skills to learning disabled populations ȋDymond, Oǯ(ora, Whelan, & Donovan, 
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2006).  However, his works on verbal behaviour failed to generate systematic and productive 
programmes of research.   
This failure has been attributed to an inadequate definition of verbal behaviour as 
behaviour of the speaker that is modulated by the behaviour of a listener constitutes a 
departure from the functional definition of all other behaviours. Specifically, this definition is 
not made in terms of the learning history of the speaker (Hayes & Hayes, 1989; Hayes et al., 
2001).  For example, the behaviour of a rat inside an operant chamber may be mediated by 
the behaviour of the experimenter, who was trained by a verbal community on how to 
perform that mediation, and Skinner explicitly defines that operant behaviour of the rat as 
verbal. As pointed out by Hayes, et al, however, if the same rat in the same chamber obtains reinforcers ǲaccidentlyǳ ȋe.g., lever presses knock food pellets into the chamber by nudging a torn sack of pellets resting against the side of the chamberȌ, the ratǯs behaviour is rendered 
non-verbal. In effect, the distinction between verbal and non-verbal behaviour of a specific 
organism is not defined in terms of the behavioural history of that organism, but in terms of 
the behavioural history of a separate organism (i.e., the listener). This constitutes a clear 
departure from how other functional definitions are rendered in behaviour analysis. 
New Directions in Behavioural Treatments of Verbal Behaviour   
Attempts to devise productive programmes of basic research using the categories proposed in Skinnerǯs treatise about verbal behaviour resulted mostly in cumbersome 
processes of data collection and analysis (e.g., the Reno Methodology) that yielded few 
insights, at least within the context of a basic research agenda. or research that so closely 
resembled traditional operant studies that the categories proposed in Verbal Behavior could 
be dispensed with (Hayes et al., 2001). )t is worth noting, however, that Skinnerǯs ȋͳͻͷ͹Ȍ 
taxonomy did lead to some success in the area of applied behaviour analysis in terms of 
developing protocols for teaching specific language skills to learning disabled populations 
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(Sundberg, Partington, & J.W., 1998). Nevertheless, the field of basic research on human 
language and cognition within behaviour analysis stagnated for a few decades, and the 
problem of how to account for the florid nature of human verbal behaviour remained 
unsolved. 
However, in the early 1970s the seminal work of Murray Sidman on the phenomenon 
of stimulus equivalence provided key elements for a better understanding of verbal 
behaviour.  Sidman (1971) trained a young boy with learning disabilities to match a set of 
printed words he had not seen, with their corresponding spoken forms, which he could 
already match to drawings.  After the training, it became apparent that the boy could also 
match the printed words to the figures, even though that relation had not been explicitly 
trained.  Sidman proposed that the three stimuli —printed word, spoken word, and 
drawing— were now members of a category and were now ǲequivalentǳ to one another.   
The emergence of a relation that was not explicitly trained was interesting because it 
did not yield to an explanation using existing behavioural principles.  Behavioural 
researchers were already familiar with the concept of a conditional discrimination, in which 
an organism is taught to emit a certain response in the presence of a certain stimulus (in a sort of ǲif-thenǳ relationȌ, but neither conditional discrimination nor any other known behavioural principle could account for the spontaneous formation of the ǲprinted-drawingǳ 
relation that had not been trained.   
Once stimuli become members of a single category of stimuli, behavioural 
performances in tasks involving these members show interesting properties.  In abstract 
terms, if a human participant is trained to match A to B and A to C in a series of conditional 
discrimination tasks, that individual may match B to A and C to A, and B to C and C to B, 
without any specific training to do so. When this pattern of spontaneous matching responses 
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emerges, Sidman suggested that we define them as participating in, or forming, an 
equivalence class or relation.  
Inspired by set theory in mathematics, Sidman argued that equivalence relations had 
three defining properties. The first property was reflexivity and was demonstrated when a 
participant matched each stimulus to itself (A-A, B-B, and C-C). The second property was 
symmetry and was shown when participants spontaneously reversed each trained matching 
response (A-B yielded B-A matching, and A-C yielded C-A matching). The third property was 
transitivity and was shown when a participant spontaneously combined the trained relations 
across a mediating node (A-B and A-C matching yielded B-C and C-B matching). Note, that in 
the latter case, the performance would actually be defined as combined symmetry and 
transitivity because it apparently involved both properties (see Sidman, 1994 for a detailed 
description). 
The phenomenon of stimulus equivalence was explored extensively over the next few 
years in numerous studies that found that it appeared readily in the behaviour of verbally-
able humans but not so readily in non-humans (if at all) or severely language impaired 
humans (Devany, Hayes, & Nelson, 1986). And despite on-going efforts over the next 30 years 
or so there is still very limited evidence for the most basic forms of equivalence class 
formation in non-human participants (Dymond, 2014; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2014) 
Excitement over the equivalence phenomenon built up quickly due to its apparent 
overlap with symbolic relations in natural language (for an interesting exchange on this area 
see Sidman, 1994; letters between Murray Sidman and Willard Day).  In general terms, the 
link between stimulus equivalence and human language, or at least symbolic relations, was 
widely recognised within the behavioural research community. However, three different 
conceptual perspectives on the nature of this relationship emerged during the late ͳͻͺͲǯs 
and early 1990s. In brief, Sidman suggested that stimulus equivalence should be considered a 
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basic behavioural process that may account for the symbolic properties of human language. 
In contrast, other behavioural researchers suggested that human language, and in particular, 
naming served as the basis for the formation of equivalence relations (Dugdale & Lowe, 
1990). The third conceptual approach that emerged during this period extended beyond an 
account of stimulus equivalence and/or symbolic relations per se, and instead used the work as a ǲspring-boardǳ to develop a broad and ambitious theory of human language and 
cognition. This latter perspective quickly gained momentum as a research programme during 
the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s leading in 2001 to a full book-length treatment, 
entitled Relational Frame Theory: A Post-Skinnerian Account of Human Language and 
Cognition.  
Relational Frame Theory 
)n contrast to Skinnerǯs (1957) treatment of human language, RFT was developed 
specifically to generate a systematic programme of research in this domain. As such, RFT is a 
contemporary behaviour analytic approach to human language and cognition, which aims to 
offer a comprehensive, empirically-supported, functional-analytic account, including a 
treatment of moral behaviour (Hayes et al., 2001).  
RFT integrates a number of key conceptual and empirical developments within 
behaviour analysis.  The first of those pillars is the ability, found in many different species, to 
respond relationally based on the formal properties of the relevant stimuli. Selecting the 
smaller, or darker, or wider object in a simple discrimination task provides a simple example. 
In effect, with appropriate training, many complex organisms are able to respond in the 
presence of stimuli they have not previously encountered, but whose physical properties 
(dimensions, colour, brightness, etc.) may be used to control a particular pattern of relational 
responding. Although this is true for most species, relational responding in humans is not 
limited to physical properties.  For instance, a person can be presented with a number of 
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different objects and asked to select the most valuable, but value is a non-physical construct, 
an abstract property that may be based on social whim (e.g., a 5 euro note is more valuable 
than a 10 euro note).   
According to RFT, the ability to respond relationally based on contextual cues that 
extend beyond the physical properties of the to-be-related stimuli is explained by appealing 
to the concept of a ǲgeneralisedǳ, ǲpurely-functionalǳ or ǲoverarchingǳ operant response class 
(see below). The basic idea is that exposure to the verbal contingencies operating in the 
natural environment of most humans provides literally thousands of exemplars of reinforced 
relational responses in the context of specific contextual cues. For example, a young child 
may be exposed literally to hundreds of thousands of ǲnamingǳ exemplars during the first few 
years of life, in which specific cues come to predict the bi-directional nature of symbolic relations. Questions, such as ǲ)s this your mommy?ǳ and ǲ)s this your teddy?ǳ and so on, serve to establish the word ǲisǳ and the naming context more generally, as one that predicts 
reinforcement for a two-way relationship between symbol and object. 
 In this case, if the child hears the word teddy and then orients towards the actual toy, 
social reinforcement may follow (e.g., smiling and praise from the care-giver). Furthermore, if 
the child looks at her teddy on another occasion and then smiles and giggles if the caregiver says ǲAre you looking at your teddy?ǳ then again social reinforcement may follow. RFT 
suggests that exposure to many such examples serves to establish a relational operant that is controlled by specific contextual cues ȋin this case the word ǲisǳȌ. With sufficient exposure 
across a large enough number of exemplars, ǲtrainingǳ in one direction (look at object-hear 
word) may generate the spontaneous emergence of relational responding in the opposite 
direction (hear word-look at object), without having to provide direct reinforcement, 
instruction or prompting beyond the presence of the relevant contextual cue.  
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The same general logic is applied to explain the emergence of a wide range of 
patterns of relational responding, which are labelled relational frames. For example, the words ǲbiggerǳ and ǲsmallerǳ may come to function as contextual cues following exposure to 
a sufficient number of relevant exemplars. For illustrative purposes, imagine a young child who is told that a ǲdog is smaller than a horseǳ. )f she were asked subsequently, ǲ)s a horse smaller than a dog,ǳ she may answer yes, and in this case she has failed to derive what RFT 
refers to as the frame of comparison between the two words (horse and dog). In the natural 
language environment, of course, it is likely that a care-giver would correct the childǯs 
response in this instance and say, ǲNo, a horse is bigger than a dog, not smallerǳ. Gradually, across many such exemplars the contextual cues ȋǲbiggerǳ and ǲsmallerǳȌ will come to control 
appropriate relational responding. Thus, if a child is told that X is bigger than Y, they will 
spontaneously derive that Y is smaller than X without further instruction, reinforcement or 
prompting. These types of learning histories are referred to as generalized or over-arching 
operant classes because the history involves generalizing across (or arching over) many 
exemplars before the final operant pattern of relational framing itself is established in the 
behaviour of the young child. 
 Contextual events and conditions can be functionally tied to specific types of 
relational frames, so they are able to initiate particular relational responding patterns.  Just 
like equivalence relations, relational frames have certain properties, some of which resemble 
those of equivalence.  These are mutual entailment (roughly symmetry), combinatorial 
entailment (roughly transitivity) and the transformation of stimulus functions. The third 
property refers to the acquisition of psychological functions by virtue of participation in a 
relational frame.  The transformation of stimulus functions thus helps to explain how 
symbols and other verbal stimuli, such as abstract concepts, come to elicit emotional 
responses. The concept of the transformation of functions is central to RFT and thus it will be 
described in detail here. 
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Suppose that a young boy was attacked by a dog and as subsequently experiences a 
high level of fear whenever he is approached by a dog. Simply telling the child something like ǲwe are going to visit a relative who has a pet dogǳ may also evoke a similar state of anxiety 
and fear, although no actual dog has been observed in the present moment. The effect 
appears to involve more than classical or Pavlovian conditioning, in that relational framing is 
involved. That is, having learned to frame events relationally, as a generalized operant pattern of behaviour, if actual dogs enter into a frame of coordination with the word ǲdogǳ, 
the latter may now be transformed into an aversive or ǲfear-inducingǳ stimulus in and of 
itself.  
Critically, participation in relational frames allow for the emergence of different 
patterns of transformations of functions depending on the type of frame. For instance, the 
positive functions linked to a certain stimulus may become negative if the said stimulus 
participates in a relational frame of distinction.  A relevant example would be a situation in 
which a person is presented with a previously unknown animal, in this case a ferret, and is 
told that it is ǲnot at all aggressive or dangerous.ǳ Insofar as the phrase ǲnot at allǳ functions 
as a contextual cue for distinction, the ferret may acquire approach rather than avoidance 
functions for the listener. Or to put it more informally, the ferret is seen as relatively safe to approach because ǲsafeǳ is in a frame of distinction with ǲaggressiveǳ and ǲdangerousǳ. 
The transformation of stimulus functions may also be involved in instances of 
behaviour in which partial information serves to evoke psychological functions.  A mother 
who says ǲAn engineer? ) like her alreadyǳ when her son talks about his new girlfriend, shows 
that psychological functions have been already linked to an uncontacted stimulus by virtue of 
its participation in a relational network (in this case the label ǲengineerǳ with well ǲeducatedǳ 
and ǲprofessionalǳ).  This process, almost instantaneous in many different instances of 
human behaviour, is possible because of relational entailments and transformation of 
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stimulus functions (i.e., relational framing).  Through interactions and experience (continued 
relational framing), individuals are able to build increasingly complex relational networks, 
full of overlapping concepts, actions, and psychological functions.  Eventually, the verbal 
repertoire becomes so sophisticated that an individual can operate (i.e., frame relationally) in 
abstract worlds that have few, if any, physical properties directly accessible to the organism, 
such as mathematics, logic, perspective-taking, and future plans.  The types of relational 
framing involved in the construction of such complex relational histories will be described 
now. 
Families of relational frames and complex relational networks. 
Several different types or families of relational frames have been identified.  
Developmentally, the earliest ones are probably those of coordination and distinction.  
Coordinative relational framing conveys the sense of sameness or general equivalence, and it is evoked by contextual cues such as the utterance of the word ǲisǳ; for instance, when a 
parent points at a dog and tells a child at the same time ǲthat is a dogǳ.  The contextual cue prompts the relational response of coordination between the animal and the word ǲdogǳ.  
Responding in a frame of distinction, on the other hand, is probably controlled by utterances 
such as ǲis notǳ or simply ǲis different fromǳ. In addition to coordination and distinction other 
relational frames also appear in the behavioural repertoires of young children, such as 
opposition, comparison and class containment or hierarchical frames. Finally, deictic 
relational frames have been widely discussed and studied. These frames involve relating a 
speaker to others (as in I versus You) and locating speakers and others in time and space. For 
example, young children learn through interactions with the verbal community to utter and 
understand statements such as I am here (at home) now (at the current time), but I was there 
(at school) then (an hour ago).  
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Relational frames typically involve only involve only three stimuli or events. One 
example would be a coordination relation between the word ǲdogǳ, the onomatopoeic ǲwoofǳ 
and the picture of a dog, which naturally involves mutual and combinatorial entailments and 
transformation of functions. However, families of relational frames can combine to form 
complex relational networks.  For example, a person can give another the following complex instruction: ǲ) will leave on holidays in two weeks and will be gone for a month.  )f you water 
and mow my lawn each week I am gone, the following month I will pay you $100." (Hayes et 
al., 1998, p. 256)  The ability to respond in terms of several core relational frame families is 
required to understand and follow the instruction: before-after frames ȋǲmow after two weeksǳȌ, if-then frames ȋǲif you do it then you will get moneyǳȌ, and even basic coordination frames ȋǲgrassǳ with certain classes of physical eventsȌ. 
Complex relational networks involving deictic frames, it has been argued, are the 
building blocks of a sense of self.  They allow people to respond accurately to questions such as ǲWhat did I do?ǳ or ǲWhere were you then?ǳ.  When combining with conditional frames, 
relational performances involving moral components may start to appear: a question such as ǲWhat would you do if you were him?ǳ is complex in that it requires the ability to respond in 
accordance with several relational frames in order to be understood.  As the developing 
person has more opportunities to frame relationally in terms of perspective, a sense of self 
consolidates and acquires more and more properties.  In RFT terms, this amounts to 
increased complexity of relational networks involving perspective. 
Observing Relational Framing: the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure 
Supporting evidence was available for the general principles of RFT upon its formal 
presentation in 2001, but there was no way of observing relational framing ǲon-the-flyǳ until 
the mid-ʹͲͲͲǯs, when the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) was designed 
(Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006; Barnes-Holmes, Hayden, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2008).  The 
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IRAP is a computer-based task designed to present a context in which the strength and 
directionality of relational framing can be assessed (Hussey, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-
Holmes, 2015).   
The IRAP is based on the idea that across time, well established relational responses 
tend to be emitted faster and more accurately in evocative contexts, whereas less well 
established responses may be emitted at relatively lower levels of accuracy and speed. The 
former (well established) responses have been described as Brief and Immediate Relational 
Responses (BIRRs for short) and the latter as Extended and Elaborated Relational Responses 
(EERRs). Even though it may be tempting to assign the more traditional labels of ǲautomaticǳ vs. ǲcontrolledǳ processes to both, the use of the behavioural terminology is a reminder of a 
different, functional conceptual framework upon which an RFT account of such responding 
rests. The formal model is called the Relational Elaboration and Coherence (REC) model 
(Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2010; Hughes et al., 2012), and its basic premise is as 
follows.  
When an individual first acquires a particular relational response it may be more 
EERR like (than BIRR like), particularly if it involves deriving a particular relation. Thus, for 
example, if a person learns that A is the same as B and B is the same as C, initial responses 
that involve relating A and C as the same may be considered relatively high in derivation and 
complexity. That is, the person may work through a relatively complex derived response, such as ǲif A is the same as B and B is the same as C, then A and C must be the sameǳ. )f, 
however, the person is presented with many opportunities to derive this relational frame, the 
level of derivation and complexity will likely decline, such that the person may come to emit the simple relational response ǲA same as C.ǳ At this point, the relational response is more 
properly considered a BIRR. The IRAP was specifically designed to capture the more BIRR-
like properties of relational responses than are likely to be reflected in other measures of 
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relational responding. This is achieved primarily by asking participants to emit specific 
patterns of relatively simple relational responses under time pressure (i.e. requiring brief 
and immediate responses). 
A typical IRAP presents six test blocks preceded by a variable number of practice 
block pairs, each block consisting of 24 trials.  Each IRAP trial is presented on a computer 
screen and requires participants to indicate, quickly and accurately, the relationship between 
a label stimulus presented at the top of the screen, and a target stimulus presented below the 
label.  Response options that may indicate the relationship ȋe.g., ǲsameǳ and ǲoppositeǳȌ 
between the label and target stimuli are presented at the bottom left and bottom right of the 
screen. In some IRAPs their left-right positions are randomised across trials. Each block of 
trials requires that participants respond in accordance with one of two patterns that are 
deemed to be consistent or inconsistent with a particular response bias. Thus, one block of 
trials might require that participants respond in a manner that reflects natural verbal 
categories and another block would require the orthogonal pattern. For example, if the label 
and target stimuli, ǲPleasantǳ and ǲLoveǳ were presented in a consistent block, choosing the response option ǲSimilarǳ would be deemed the correct response, but during an inconsistent block of trials choosing ǲOppositeǳ would be deemed correct. The typical IRAP consists of 
four different trial-types, based on pairing each label with each target stimulus, with each 
trial-type being presented an equal number of times within each block (see Figure 1). The 
IRAP program presents the two types of blocks of trials (consistent versus inconsistent) in an 
alternating pattern throughout the practice and test phases of the procedure. 
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Figure 1. An example of the four trial types in the IRAP (source: Barnes-Holmes, 
Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2010, p. 531) 
If a response is not made on any given trial within the specified time criterion, the 
program displays a customisable ǲToo Slowǳ warning in red in order to advise the participant 
that faster responding is needed.  When the response is incorrect (consistent response in 
inconsistent blocks or inconsistent response in consistent blocks), a red X is displayed and 
the participant must enter the correct response in order to proceed to the next trial.  A 
guided introduction with practice blocks is performed by the researcher before the actual 
test blocks, which are only presented if the participant achieves predefined accuracy and 
latency criteria in the final pair of practice blocks (normally >=80% correct responses and 
<=2000 milliseconds average latency).   
The presentation software outputs response accuracy and latencies for each trial, 
which are analysed according to a standardised protocol which transforms accuracy/latency 
data into D-scores using a version of the D algorithm by Greenwald, Nosek and Banaji (2003), 
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called the D-IRAP score, which seems to control for individual differences such as cognitive 
ability, age and other factors (Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 
2010).   
  The IRAP has been widely used in several assessment contexts with promising 
results.  It has proven useful in assessing implicit cognitions in a range of domains, from fear 
(Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012b) to eating disorders and perceptions of body image 
(Parling, Cernvall, Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, & Ghaderi, 2012; Roddy et al., 2011), to the 
prediction of drug treatment outcomes (Carpenter, Martinez, Vadhan, Barnes-Holmes, & 
Nunes, 2012).  It seems especially suited to the assessment of complex sociocultural issues 
such as prejudice and morals because of its functional roots and its ability to tap into the 
directionality of the relationships between concepts. Indeed, a recent meta-analysis indicates 
that the IRAP predicts clinically relevant criterion variables at r = .45, which compares 
favourably with all other measures of implicit cognition, including the IAT (Vahey, Nicholson, 
& Barnes-Holmes, 2015). 
The research reported in the current thesis draws heavily upon RFT, the REC model 
and the IRAP in an effort to develop a behaviour-analytic approach to the study of moral 
behaviour and, so called, cheating responses in particular. Before concluding the current 
chapter, we will consider how RFT approaches the topic of morality and cheating behaviours, 
and consider some of the experimental procedures that have been developed to examine 
cheating itself under laboratory conditions.  
A Relational Frame Account of Morality 
By explaining how humans can dispense with the need for direct training of a large 
number of elements in their learning histories by deriving relations and transforming 
psychological functions, RFT provides a conceptual framework for studying human 
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behaviour that would typically be seen as difficult to explain in terms of direct histories of 
reinforcement or generalization performances that are closely tied to the physical properties 
of the environment. As we shall see, some features or properties of moral behaviour appear 
difficult to explain in terms direct acting contingencies and physical generalization processes, 
and this is why RFT seems to be well-suited to study morality. 
Relational Frame Theory is firmly grounded in behaviour analysis, and thus a view of 
moral behaviour from this perspective retains foundational premises of the operant account, 
such as the cultural/social dependence of human morals and rights, the rejection of internal 
causative agents, and the recognition of the need for a scientific study of value judgments.  It 
adds to this account the role of language and an explanation of the formation of increasingly 
complex and overlapping relational networks, that can be used to functionally explain the 
coherence, and lack thereof, in human moral behaviour.  In RFT, moral behaviour is hence defined functionally as ǲbehaviour governed by, and consistent with, verbal rules about what is socially and personally goodǳ ȋ(ayes & (ayes, 1994, p. 46).  Therefore, a small review of 
rules and what they mean in behaviour analysis and RFT specifically is in order before 
moving on. 
Rules and rule-following in RFT 
The notion of rules has been used before in behavioural psychology to explain the 
kind of complex behaviour in which humans respond in consistent ways in the absence of a 
direct training history, in what has been called rule-governed behaviour, as opposed to 
contingency-shaped behaviour.  The concept of rule-following was first advanced by Skinner 
in his approach to problem solving (1966), where rule-governed behaviour was defined as 
behaviour under the control of stimuli that specify contingencies, known as instructions or 
rules. 
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Although there was some value in this proposal, it failed to provide an adequate 
functional explanation of rule-following itself.  For example, Skinner argued that rules specify 
contingencies but he failed to articulate exactly what it means to specify a contingency in 
functional terms (for a detailed discussion see Hayes et al., 2001). Only with the development 
of RFT did such an account become possible, since it conceptualises rules as verbal stimuli 
that participate in relational frames (Hayes et al., 2001). As noted earlier, different classes or 
patterns of relational framing may combine to form complex relational networks that may 
function as instructions or rules ȋe.g., ǲ) will leave on holidays in two weeks and will be gone 
for a month. If you water and mow my lawn each week I am gone, the following month I will pay you $ͳͲͲ.ǳ; (ayes et al., ͳͻͻͺ, p. ʹͷ͸Ȍ.  The ability to understand this instruction involves 
before-after frames ȋǲmow after two weeksǳȌ, if-then frames ȋǲif you do it then you will get moneyǳȌ, and basic coordination frames ȋǲgrassǳ with certain classes of physical eventsȌ, and 
the appropriate transformations of functions in accordance with those frames. For example, the statement ǲit is three weeks since ) was asked to mow the lawnǳ may now function as a 
verbal stimulus that evokes lawn-mowing in the listener (because the speaker has been on 
holiday for two weeks and a week has passed since she left). On balance, as most parents of 
teenage children know, understanding a rule does not automatically mean that it will be 
followed. Nevertheless, the need to provide a functional analysis of rule-following, rather 
than just rule-understanding, has also been addressed within RFT.  
Hayes et al. (1998) proposed that two functional classes of rule-following behaviour 
can be established depending on the nature of the controlling history.  In the case of pliance, 
rule-following behaviour is under the control of socially mediated consequences for the 
correspondence between the rule and the relevant behaviour.  For example, reducing speed upon seeing a sign that says ǲMaximum speed: ͷͲ km/hǳ is probably under the control of 
positive consequences for following that type of rule (traffic signs) and negative 
consequences for their transgressions.  In this case, failing to follow the rule may lead to 
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punishment by a law-enforcement office or agency. In other words, the listener complies ȋhence ǲplianceǳȌ with the rule because doing so is consequated by the ǲrule-giver.ǳ 
A second functional class of rule-following is tracking, where the source of control is a 
correspondence between the rule and the contingency it describes.  For instance, a rule such as "the plate is hot, please be carefulǳ will likely be followed because of a history of 
reinforcement or punishment for following or failing to follow such rules in the past. In this 
case, the consequences of rule-following are provided by the physical environment rather 
than by the rule-giver (i.e., following the rule ensures that the listener is not burnt by the hot 
plate). In effect, the rule is a track or guidepost that specifies a contingency that is 
independent from the consequating behaviours of the individual who provided the rule. 
Pliance and tracking can be affected by a process called augmenting, which involves 
the creation of new consequences (formative augmenting) or the enhancement of pre-
existing ones (motivative augmenting) through the use of augmentals, verbal stimuli that 
change the relative strength of reinforcers or punishers in a contingent relation.  An example of a formative augmental could be ǲThis voucher may be exchanged for a free item in the supermarketǳ. That is, the statement may establish reinforcing functions for the voucher, 
without any direct history of reinforcement with the voucher or physically similar stimuli. 
Motivative augmentals are seen as altering the reinforcing or punishing functions of particular stimuli. For example, the statement, ǲ)tǯs hot --  wouldnǯt it be good to drink a glass 
of cold, foamy, refreshing beer?ǳ may serve to increase the reinforcing functions of beer, such 
that a listener responds in a manner that allows access to the reinforcer (e.g., by driving to a 
supermarket to buy some beer). Critically, the statement does not increase or decrease the 
availability of beer (the listener was free to drive to the supermarket at any time). Rather, 
simply hearing the rhetorical question causes the listener to seek out beer at a higher 
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probability than if he or she had not heard the question. It appears that a great deal of 
advertising, at least for ǲcash-cowǳ products, is based on this psychological process. 
Hayes et al. (1998) suggest that children learn pliance first because it is convenient 
for the verbal community and because it lays the foundation for higher sophistication in rule-
following.  Tracking then helps the child make effective contact with the way consequences 
are arranged in the natural environment. Augmenting makes it possible to increase or 
decrease responding that facilitates access to novel consequences (formative augmentals) or 
to manipulate the extent to which previously experienced consequences are established as 
reinforcing or punishing at a particular point in time (e.g., an ice-cream on a hot summerǯs 
day). 
Relational framing in moral issues 
To illustrate how verbal or relational responding appears to be central to moral 
behaviour, consider this example by Haidt and Joseph (2004): two biological siblings agree to 
have protected sexual intercourse, and despite not regretting it and finding that it 
strengthened, instead of undermining, their personal relationship, they decide to keep it 
secret and never to do it again.  Most people will condemn this behaviour as immoral, even 
though the usual reasons of the genetic dangers of incest or psychological trauma are not 
present, ultimately stating that they are not sure of the reason, but they simply know it is 
morally wrong. However, if we were to simply substitute the word ǲsiblingsǳ with ǲstrangersǳ, the moral acceptability of this situation would change, at least for some people.  )n this case, participants would be responding ǲwrongǳ when they are asked about the 
relation between ǲsexǳ and ǲsiblingsǳ, but ǲrightǳ when the relation is between ǲsexǳ and ǲstrangersǳ.   
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In effect, the reaction that the majority of readers will have to the example of siblings 
having sex will be strongly negative, not because they will have had any direct experience of incestuous relations, and the potential negative consequences, but because ǲincestǳ 
participates in a rich network of verbal relations that serve to establish relatively strong 
negative (or taboo) functions for the act itself. Moral judgements, therefore, do not require 
direct experience or exposure to relevant contingencies of reinforcement and/or 
punishment, but the establishment of increasingly complex and rich relational networks that serve to establish specific actions as either ǲmoralǳ or ǲimmoralǳ. Ultimately, moral 
judgements that are largely verbal may be traced to perhaps directly experienced events 
(increased chances of genetic abnormalities in the off-spring produced by siblings), but such 
events were likely experienced by our ancestors in the distant past, and only very rarely by 
humans in modern culture today. In other words, our moral aversion to incest may be largely 
verbal, not experiential. 
Classical moral dilemmas offer an opportunity to see how these verbal processes underlie what has been traditionally called ǲmoral reasoningǳ.  Consider the trolley problem 
mentioned earlier.  Specifically, participants frequently confirm that they would ǲflick a switchǳ that would lead to the death of one person but save the lives of five others; however, 
far fewer individuals confirm that they would physically push a person under the trolley if 
doing so saved five other lives. From an RFT perspective, the cost-benefit ratio of the 
network is identical across the two examples (losing one life saves five), but the 
psychological functions evoked by the two scenarios are dramatically different. That is, 
flicking a switch (remotely) is less likely to elicit the highly negatively valenced functions of 
physically pushing another human being under a train carriage.  
The foregoing example begs the question as to why sacrificing one person in two 
different ways (flicking a switch versus physically pushing) evokes such contrasting 
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transformations of functions. One answer to this question would focus on the importance of 
deictic framing in moral reasoning and decision making. As noted earlier, deictic relations are 
involved in learning to engage in perspective-taking. Through this type of learning, a sense of 
self versus others emerges. In the early years, the perspective-taking may be relatively 
simple, as when a child learns to report what he or she is eating versus what someone else is 
eating during a meal. As this relatively basic type of deictic relational responding becomes 
extended and elaborated across many different contexts, specific moral codes or rules may be 
specified by care-givers.  For example, the advice, ǲDo unto others as you would have done unto youǳ requires that the listener engage in relatively complex relational responding to 
first establish how he or she would like to be treated by others and then to apply that to his 
or her treatment of other people. Technically, this requires a type reversal in I-YOU relations of the form, ǲif ) was you and you were me, how would ) feel if you did X to meǳ. )f the answer 
is ǲI would feel badǳ then the moral code requires that you do not do X to other people.  
Note, however, that this is not simply an abstract relational issue. Although reversing 
the I-YOU relation is required, the verbal action also requires that the negatively valenced 
functions of X are evoked for the individual and these are then transferred to the other 
person. The maxim thus requires what might be described as a type of verbal ǲempathyǳ. In 
other words, deictic framing helps us as individuals to feel the pain of others based on 
transformations of psychological functions among complex relational networks that include 
the ability to engage in the reversal of deictic relations. Critically, this ability ensures that 
verbal morality is not simply a matter of following abstract (purely relational) rules, but 
involves, in a verbal sense, experiencing the pain and suffering of others.  
Thus, when a person engages in an immoral act that would cause pain and suffering 
to another human being, it may well elicit or evoke some level of pain or suffering in the 
perpetrator too.  Insofar as this is the case, flicking a switch from a remote location that 
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causes the death of another human being (in which the actual death is not witnessed) may 
well be seen as far less aversive than physically pushing a person under the trolley and being 
forced to witness the actual death of another human being. Metaphorically, in killing another 
human being, verbally, one may kill oneself (or less metaphorically induce a sense of guilt so 
strong that one is unable to live with it). 
Summary 
The specification of behavioural guidelines or rules that serve certain social purposes 
is central to morality.  From the point of view of RFT, rules can be conceptualised as 
relational networks that people come to understand through continued opportunities to 
exercise different types of relational framing, and then follow through pliance, tracking and 
augmenting.  But morality also incorporates an emotional component that can be accounted 
for from the point of view of RFT through transformations of functions via deictic relations.   
Those two pillars, transformation of functions and rule understanding and following, enable 
RFT to provide an account of morality that reconciles the cognitive and emotional 
dimensions of moral behaviour in a unified framework. 
This conceptual view of morality has been part of RFT since the beginning (Hayes et 
al., 2001), but less well established from this theoretical perspective is that responses 
relevant to human morality may occur relatively slowly or rapidly and the resulting response 
classes may be functionally distinct. For example, moral relational responses that are slow 
and deliberate may come under the control of extraneous social variables such as social 
desirability, whereas fast responses may be less susceptible in this regard.  Indeed, as noted 
earlier the basic argument of this theoretical position, has been articulated formally in the 
context of the REC model (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2010).  
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It is worth noting that the concept of relatively fast relational or verbal responding, 
highlighted by the REC model, shows potential overlap with other theoretical approaches. 
For example, the Social Intuitionist Model of Ethics (Haidt, 2001), is a cognitive model that 
claims that many if not most moral evaluations or judgments made with respect to culturally-
dependent virtues come from quick moral intuitions that are then followed, if needed, by 
moral reasoning.  The parallels with the behavioural account that we have described are easy 
to see, in the form of socially-mediated verbal histories, which involve brief versus extended 
relational responding under relevant forms of contextual control. 
At the time writing the author was unaware of any published (or unpublished) 
research that had attempted to study moral behaviour specifically from an RFT perspective 
that also drew on the recent developments with the IRAP and the REC model.  Nicholson and 
Barnes-Holmes (2012a) used a socio-moral task within the context of developing an IRAP to 
measure disgust, in which participants were asked to think about moral violations and to rate 
feelings evoked by the thought of transgressing them, but the study did not intend to focus 
specifically on the IRAP as a predictor of moral choice or feelings related to moral decisions. 
The overarching or general aim of the research reported in the current thesis was to 
lay the groundwork for this empirical investigation. In pursuing this line of inquiry there 
were many possible ways of attempting to capture behaviours in an experimental context 
that could be seen as involving an important moral dimension. Indeed, there is a reasonably 
well developed literature on various laboratory-based tasks and procedures that have been 
used to assess or measure moral versus immoral behaviours in the form of ǲcheatingǳ tasks. 
Specifically, these tasks typically present research participants with an opportunity to engage 
in an act or acts that involve deception or lying in some way that gains some advantage for 
the perpetrator. In effect, participants are placed in a context in which they may behave 
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morally (choosing not to cheat on a task) or immorally (choosing to cheat). The current 
research drew heavily on this work.  
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Introduction to the Current Research Programme 
As noted at the end of the previous chapter, a range of different tasks have been 
employed in the psychological literature to study immoral behaviour in experimental settings, operationalised as ǲcheatingǳ.  Most of them involve discreetly providing an 
opportunity to do better on a task, especially if the result is paired with monetary 
compensation.  For example, giving a discreet chance to consult a dictionary during a 
vocabulary test, where correct responses were contingent on monetary payoffs(Ong & Weiss, 
2000, p. 1695-1699), or receiving a small amount of money for finding pairs of numbers in a 
timed visual search task (Shu et al., 2011; Vohs & Schooler, 2008), where it was possible for 
participants to over-report the actual number of identified number pairs.  
In the current programme of research, it was decided to use the Mental Math Task 
(Von Hippel, Lakin, & Shakarchi, 2005), except for one experiment (the rationale for which 
will be explained later in the thesis). In this computer-based task, participants have to 
complete two sets of 10 equations consisting of numbers from 1 to 20 to be subtracted and 
added.  The opportunity to cheat is provided by a putative bug in the program, which allows 
the participants to see the correct answer to each problem. Unbeknownst to the participants, 
the program logs the number of trials in which the program bug is used to cheat by each 
participant. 
Several reasons prompted us to use this task for most of the experiments: (i) it is the 
most widely used task in the literature to operationalise cheating behaviour; (ii) it tends to 
produce relatively high amounts of cheating; (iii) it can be employed within a single session; 
(iv) it is relatively simple and straightforward to perform; (v) in contrast to some other 
measures of cheating it provides an individual score for number of cheats for each 
participant, and (vi) it is largely independent of verbal ability, since it only involves basic 
arithmetic. Furthermore, pilot work indicated that it was relatively easy to employ and 
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worked reasonably well with the type of sample population (college students) that would be 
employed in the current research. 
A brief description of the entire research programme will follow, before presenting 
the individual studies in chapters 4-6. 
Description of the Studies 
To begin this research programme, we intended to determine whether specially-
tailored IRAPs correlate with performance on a deception task, and could therefore be used 
as predictors of moral behaviour.  In Chapter 4, we report two studies where we use two 
IRAPs with different measures of deception and moral disengagement, in an initial 
exploration of relational framing involved in immoral behaviour.  The two IRAPs were 
designed to tap into beliefs about what is good and bad, and also about the amount of moral 
or immoral behaviour emitted by participants on a daily basis. The key difference between 
these two exploratory studies was the use of different measures of deception.   
 In this first experimental phase, we confirmed conclusions from previous research, 
namely that participants readily classify good and bad actions, and that they rapidly state 
that their behaviour is often good.  However, some of the results support the multi-
dimensionality of morality and the existence of grey areas where moral opinion seems to 
depart from commonly held values and virtues. 
Encouraged by the results from this first phase, we decided to explore the role of 
psychopathy, which seems to predict moral choice (Tassy, Deruelle, Mancini, Leistedt, & 
Wicker, 2013) on moral behaviour in student samples from Ireland and Colombia, to see also 
if the IRAP reflects any cultural differences.  The two studies are presented in Chapter 5.  We 
designed and tested another IRAP in this phase, intended to tap into positive or negative 
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feelings upon engaging in moral and immoral actions.  The main finding was a stable 
correlation between certain trial types in this latter IRAP and the cheating measure. 
The final experimental phase consisted of two separate studies and focused on a 
values-oriented intervention on immoral behaviour.  The intervention stems from Terror 
Management Theory (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991) which proposes that 
cultures as symbolic systems help people give meaning to their lives and alleviate the 
distress created by the inevitability and proximity of death.  The procedure itself, called the 
Mortality Salience Intervention (MSI), features two different components, one that focuses on 
the relative shortness of life (the time component) and another that focuses on the feelings 
evoked by the inevitability of death (the mortality component proper).  In study 5, we found 
a significant effect of the MSI on the moral feelings IRAP and on cheating, and in study 6 we 
separated the components of the MSI to examine the contribution of each to the effect 
observed. 
In the seventh and final chapter, a summary of the research is provided and a range of 
empirical and conceptual issues stemming from the empirical studies are discussed. 
Ethical Considerations for this Research Programme   
As mentioned before, both anecdotal and empirical evidence coming from different 
fields of psychology has identified that people are prone to distort their answers in 
interviews and questionnaires in order to present themselves as possessing desirable 
attributes.  This is generally known within psychology as ǲSocial Desirabilityǳ, and implies 
that people value certain behavioural dispositions as good and others as bad.  It has also been 
observed that people seem to think that good or bad behaviour is the reflection of internal, 
relatively stable inclinations, so they readily label persons, rather than behaviours, as ǲgoodǳ or ǲevilǳ – this is called the ǲfundamental attribution errorǳ (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). 
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Naturally, facing participants with results that suggested that their behaviour does 
not quite match their impressions of it could potentially create a state of mild psychological 
distress with anxiety and uncertainty.  We identified this and other potential concerns raised 
by the nature of our research and aimed to address them according to the general principles 
laid out in the Code of Ethics and Conduct of the British Psychological Society (2009), the 
Guidelines for Safe Work Practice of the Department of Psychology (2015) and the Ethics and 
Deontology Code of the Colombian College of Psychologists (2006).  Specifically, we paid 
careful attention to the following considerations: 
a) A small monetary compensation of €ͷ.00 (or roughly equivalent $10.000 COP) 
was provided to all participants throughout the studies.  Participants were given 
this financial compensation right after signing the informed consent, and at the 
same time they were told that it was theirs to keep from that moment without 
prejudice to their rights as participants, specifically their right to withdraw from 
the experiment at any time. 
b) Full debriefing was performed at the end of every experimental session, 
specifically involving a thorough explanation of the true purpose of the deception 
measures and the rationale behind the justified deception (reactivity due to social 
desirability).  Critically, participants were also told that there was nothing 
inherently good or bad about their answers, and that the tasks were not 
personality tests.  Concerns were addressed carefully to ensure that the 
participants left the experimental session in a positive psychological state. 
c) A protocol was in place to deal with manifestations of heightened distress as per 
the Guidelines for Safe Work Practice of the Department of Psychology (National 
University of Ireland - Maynooth - Department of Psychology, 2015), involving 
the termination of experimental tasks and immediate remission to the University 
Medical Centre.  Fortunately, at no point did this protocol need to be activated. 
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Study 1:  Investigating the Use of the IRAP as a Predictor of Cheating 
In the first study we started our exploration of the IRAP as an estimator of the 
probability of engaging in immoral behaviour.  With this in mind, we used a well-known 
cheating task (Von Hippel et al., 2005) as an operationalisation of immoral behaviour, and set 
out to determine if a set of IRAPs could measure the likelihood of engaging in cheating.   
We hypothesised that two different types of relational responding could be involved 
in this sort of moral decision making.  The first is the ability to classify actions as good or bad, 
independently of the moral actor who performs the action. In order to capture this type of response we designed an )RAP that we called the ǲConceptual Moralityǳ ȋCMȌ )RAP.  This 
IRAP asks participants whether good or bad actions are in fact good or bad, and serves as a 
starting point to begin exploring relational networks related to morality. 
As discussed previously, RFT suggests that a key component of morality involves 
deictic relational responding. Specifically, a given individual may recognise that certain 
actions are perceived to be immoral by the wider culture but not necessarily agree with those 
views. With the goal of tapping into the more deictic properties of moral responding, we also 
employed what we called a ǲDeictic Moralityǳ ȋDMȌ )RAP.  The primary goal of this first study 
in the current research programme was to determine if performance on one or both of the 
two IRAPs predicted performance on the measure of cheating. 
Previous studies have reported that people tend to provide explanations for their 
wrongdoings as a way of reconciling their positive self-image with the negative assessment of 
the morality of their actions (Bandura, 2002).  This process is called moral disengagement in 
Social Cognitive Theory, we hypothesised that it may be conceptualised as a verbal process 
and accounted for from an RFT perspective.  Therefore, we included measures of moral 
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disengagement to determine if the IRAP(s) could capture relational framing related to a 
tendency to justify immorality. 
Material and Methods 
Participants. A convenience sample of 38 students (64.9% females) with ages 
between 18 and 35 (M = 22.43, SD = 4.28) from the National University of Ireland, Maynooth, 
volunteered for this study.  One participant decided to withdraw from the study as he was 
completing the IRAP, so he was thanked, debriefed and dismissed, and another nine did not 
reach the test criteria in at least one of the IRAPs – the data for these ten participants were 
excluded from analysis, leaving a sample consisting of 28 participants. All participants had a 
high level of fluency in English.   
Measures. Cheating was operationalised as the performance on the Mental Math Task 
(Von Hippel et al., 2005).  This is a computer based task that presents participants with two 
sets of 10 equations, each consisting of ten numbers between 1 and 20 to be mentally (i.e., 
without using a calculator or pen and paper) subtracted and added. Each equation is 
preceded by a prompt that reads ǲ(ere comes the next oneǳ for 500 milliseconds.  In order to 
enter an answer, the user must press the Spacebar within the allotted time of 10 seconds for the first set ȋǲSlow blockǳȌ and one second for the second set ȋǲFast blockǳȌ to make an input 
box appear.  If the participant does not press the Spacebar within that period, the correct 
answer shows up below the equation, but the input box can still be brought up to enter an 
answer.  The program logs whether the participant waited to see the answer, which 
constitutes cheating.  This task has been used in other studies with slight modifications (R. P. 
Brown et al., 2011; R. P. Brown, Budzek, & Tamborski, 2009; Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 
2011; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2011; Teper & Inzlicht, 2010; Vohs & Schooler, 2008).  The task 
is preceded by instructions designed to give the impression that the possibility of seeing the 
correct answer is a ǲbugǳ in the program, and participants are specifically asked to press the 
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Spacebar as soon as they see the equation appear, which will prevent the correct answer 
from appearing.  The original software that we used was kindly provided by its author. 
The Civic Moral Disengagement Scale (Caprara, Fida, Vecchione, Tramontano, & 
Barbaranelli, 2009) was designed to assess moral disengagement in the realm of civic duties, 
that is, behaviours related to the use of public resources and property.  The 32-item version used here has a Cronbachǯs alpha of Ͳ.ͻʹ.  The questionnaire is scored in a range of 32 to 160 
using 5-point Likert scales, with higher values indicating greater disengagement (see 
Appendix A).  Items are grouped as part of eight conceptualised mechanisms of moral 
disengagement: Moral justification, Euphemistic language, Advantageous Comparison, 
Displacement of Responsibility, Diffusion of Responsibility, Distorting Consequences, 
Attribution of Blame and Dehumanisation. 
The Moral Disengagement Scale (Bandura et al., 1996; Bandura, 2002) is a 5-point, 
33-item questionnaire designed to assess levels of moral disengagement.  Despite being 
originally conceived for school-aged children, it has been used with undergraduate (e.g. 
Jackson & Gaertner, 2010) and adult (e.g. Claybourn, 2010) populations.  Participants in the pilot study had difficulty understanding item ͳͷ ȋǲ)t is okay to treat badly somebody who behaved like a ǮwormǯǳȌ, so we changed it to ǲIf someone acts like a jerk, it is okay to treat 
them badlyǳ, as suggested by Pelton, Gound, Forehand and Brody (2004).  The authors reported a Cronbachǯs alpha of Ͳ.ͺʹ and the complete scale is reproduced in Appendix B. 
In order to assess social desirability bias, the widely-used Marlowe-Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) was employed.  The scale is a 33-item 
questionnaire with two response options for each question: true or false. Despite a lack of 
agreement regarding its dimensionality and validity, it has been the most frequently used 
measure for the assessment of social desirability bias, having already been used in over one 
thousand studies and dissertations (Beretvas, Meyers, & Leite, 2002).  Scores over 19 are 
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suggestive of high concern with social approval and a tendency to use self-presentation 
strategies. The full scale is presented in Appendix C. 
Implicit attitudes related to personal morality were assessed by means of two 
separate Implicit Relational Assessment Procedures (Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, et al., 2010; 
Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006).  The stimulus set for the Conceptual Morality )RAP ȋǲCM-IRAPǳȌ 
was as follows: 
- For label ͳ ȋǲ) think it is good toǳȌ, consistent targets were: ǲTell the truthǳ, ǲBe fairǳ, ǲBe honestǳ, ǲBe moralǳ, ǲObey the lawǳ, ǲBehave wellǳ. 
- For label ʹ ȋǲ) think it is bad toǳȌ, consistent targets were ǲTell liesǳ, ǲCheatǳ, ǲMisbehaveǳ, ǲBe immoralǳ, ǲBreak the lawǳ, ǲBe dishonestǳ. 
 The stimulus set for the Deictic Morality )RAP ȋǲDM-IRAPǳȌ was as follows: 
 
- Label set ͳ consisted of the following stimuli: ǲ) tell the truthǳ, ǲ) am goodǳ, ǲ) am ethicalǳ, ǲ) am honestǳ, ǲ) behave wellǳ, ǲ) am fairǳ.  Consistent targets for this set were ǲFrequentlyǳ, ǲMost oftenǳ, ǲVery oftenǳ. 
- Label set ʹ consisted of the following stimuli: ǲ) am badǳ, ǲ) deceiveǳ, ǲ) defraudǳ, ǲ) lieǳ, ǲ) stealǳ, ǲ) cheatǳ.  Consistent targets for this set were ǲRarelyǳ, ǲSeldomlyǳ, ǲNeverǳ. 
Procedure. At the start of each experimental session the researcher thanked the 
participants for volunteering and attending, and informed them that they were about to take 
part in a preliminary study, designed to evaluate different types of tests in order to select the 
most appropriate ones for a forthcoming study.  They were instructed to read the informed 
consent form (Appendix E), and reassured that their participation was voluntary, 
confidential, anonymous and that they had the right to terminate their participation at any 
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time, which none of them decided to do. After signing the informed consent, they were given €ͷ for their participation and were told that the money was theirs to keep independently of 
their performance or the exertion of their right to terminate their participation before 
completion of all the tasks. Participants were then presented with the cheating task, which 
was always given first because a pilot phase in which the IRAPs were presented first revealed 
that participants were much more likely to guess the true nature of the MMT. 
The MMT.  The task started with instructions presented on screen, which participants 
were asked to read carefully before proceeding with the equations.  The instructions block 
read: 
ǲThe following task is a classic cognitive experiment that looks at 
mathematical skills.  You will be presented with an equation that we would 
like you to solve.  It consists of 10 numbers between 1 and 20 that are to be 
added or subtracted.  The equation will appear on screen, and then you 
MUST hit the SPACEBAR for the response box to appear.  Please calculate 
the correct response as fast as you can, and enter it into the response box.  
Hit enter when you are done.  You will be informed whether your answer is 
correct or incorrect.  If it is incorrect, you will be given the opportunity to 
respond again until your answer is correct.  Shortly after that, the next 
equation will appear.  Altogether there are 20 such equations, presented in 
two blocks of ten equations each.ǳ 
After reading the instructions, participants were told that once they pressed the 
Spacebar they had as much time as they needed to complete the equation, but that it was 
important to press it because otherwise this particular version of the program, allegedly 
unfinished, displayed the correct answer after some time.  The researcher aimed to deliver 
this information in a neutral manner so as to not attract attention to the opportunity to cheat, 
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but at the same time making sure that participants understood that it was present.  Having 
said this and made sure that the participant understood the instructions, the researcher then 
left the room to let the participant complete the MMT.  After its completion, participants 
rated it on a scale from 1 (very boring) to 5 (very interesting), and proceeded to complete the 
IRAPs. 
The IRAPs.  We used the 2010 version of the IRAP software, at the time available for 
download at http://irapresearch.org/wp/downloads-and-training, on modern PCs ȋDell™ OptiPlex™ ͹ͻͲȌ with standard ͳͶǳ screens and running Windows ͹. The software controls the presentation of instructions and stimuli, records participantsǯ responses and outputs raw 
trial-by-trial data for analysis.   
All IRAP tasks consisted of six blocks of 24 trials. Participants were first exposed to 
pairs of practice blocks, and were required to achieve two performance mastery criteria 
(detailed below) in order to proceed to a fixed set of three pairs of test blocks. Each trial 
started with two response options at the bottom of the screen, followed after 400 
milliseconds by a label at the top and a target in the middle of the screen.  There were four 
trial-types defined by combinations of the labels and targets according to a 2x2 cross-over of 
the label and target stimuli (see Figure 2). The program presented these four trial-types in a 
quasi-random order ensuring that each trial-type was presented six times within each block.  
The program also ensured that each trial-type was presented once in each sequence of four 
trials and that the same trial-type was never repeated across successive trials.  Thus, in the 
Conceptual Morality IRAPs, the first trial-type involved presenting the label ǲ) think it is good toǳ with a positive target such as ǲbehave wellǳ.  Another trial-type involved presenting the same label, but with a negative target ȋǲCheatǳȌ.  The other two trial types presented the negative labels ȋǲ) think it is bad toǳȌ with the positive and negative targets, respectively.  
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These four trial-types are summarized here as Good/Moral, Good/Immoral, Bad/Moral, and 
Bad/Immoral (displayed in Figure 2).   
 
Figure 2.  Visual representation of the four trial types in the CM-IRAP. Note that 
neither the words ǲconsistentǳ and ǲinconsistentǳ, nor the arrows, appeared on 
screen. 
73 
 
 
Figure 3. Visual representation of the four trial types in the DM-IRAP. Note that 
neither the words ǲconsistentǳ and ǲinconsistentǳ, nor the arrows, appeared on 
screen. 
Pressing the key corresponding to the response deemed correct in each trial cleared 
the label and target stimuli from the screen, and 400 milliseconds later the next trial was 
presented. If participants emitted an incorrect response, a red X appeared immediately below 
the target and remained on screen until the correct response was emitted.  If a participant 
failed to emit a response within ʹͷͲͲ milliseconds on each trial, the words ǲToo Slowǳ 
appeared directly below where the red X appeared and remained on screen until a response 
(correct or incorrect) was emitted. 
At the beginning of each practice block, a message appeared on screen informing 
participants that it was a practice phase and that a few errors were expected, but also to try 
to avoid the red X (i.e., incorrect responses).  The second block in every pair, both during 
practice and test phases, started with a message indicating that the previously correct and 
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incorrect responses were reversed, such that all odd numbered blocks required responding 
in a manner deemed consistent with common verbal practices – responding ǲTrueǳ on the 
first and last trial-types (Good/Moral and Bad/ImmoralȌ, and ǲFalseǳ on the other trial-types. 
During all even numbered blocks the opposite response was required, such that responses 
deemed inconsistent with common verbal practices were deemed correct (e.g., responding ǲFalseǳ on the Good/Moral trial-type). Responses deemed consistent versus inconsistent with 
common verbal practices are indicated in Figures 2 and 3, although it is important to note 
that these labels did not appear in the actual IRAP programme (i.e., participants were not told 
what was deemed consistent or inconsistent by the IRAP program or the researcher). Finally, 
at the end of each block, performance feedback appeared, which indicated the percentage of 
correct responses and median response latency for that block.   
If the participant did not meet the accuracy and latency criteria in a pair of practice 
blocks, feedback for both blocks was presented along with a message that indicated that the 
participant was doing well but that it was a difficult task and they were invited to try again to 
reach the performance criteria.  Once the criteria were met, a message appeared at the 
beginning of the next block and every block thereafter informing them that it was a test 
block. Participants were told to respond accurately and fast, trying to make as few mistakes 
as possible. The program progressed through the test blocks until all six were complete and 
then a blue screed appeared asking the participant to report to the researcher (who was 
waiting outside the experimental room).    
Common configuration options for both IRAPs were the following: i) response options were labelled ǲTrueǳ and ǲFalseǳ; iiȌ response options did not appear in the same left-
right position across more than three consecutive trials; iii) pairs of practice blocks were to 
be presented until participants achieved 80% correct responses and mean latencies under 
2500 milliseconds in each block before proceeding to a fixed set of 6 test blocks. Performance 
75 
 
criteria were not required to proceed through the test blocks but accuracy and latency 
feedback were presented at the end of each block to encourage participants to maintain the 
performance criteria achieved during the practice blocks. 
Instructions to participants. The two IRAPs were presented consecutively but in a 
counterbalanced order and started with a series of instructions based on the guidelines specified on the )RAPǯs ǲExperimenterǯs Scriptǳ ȋavailable for download at the website 
mentioned above).  After sitting down and facing the computer, participants were told that 
the task comprised a number of trials and that their goal was to respond rapidly and 
accurately on each trial.  They were informed that each trial displayed part of a sentence at 
the top of the screen and the rest in the centre, along with two response options at the 
bottom, which were always ǲTrueǳ and ǲFalseǳ but changed left-right positions across trials. 
The response requirements were explained to the participants by pointing out that 
they could use the ǮDǯ key to select the response option on the left side and the ǮKǯ key to 
select the right-side option, and they were told to keep their index fingers resting lightly on 
those keys throughout each block of trials. They were informed that in each trial, they were 
to press the key that corresponded to the appropriate response option, and that they would 
receive feedback as to what constituted correct and incorrect answers – the latter being 
signalled by the appearance of a red X which would disappear when the correct key was 
pressed.   
For the first two practice blocks the researcher sat beside the participant and 
instructed the individual on how to respond correctly and incorrectly on each trial. The 
experimenter focused on accuracy during the first two pairs of practice blocks, and then 
emphasized increasing speed during subsequent practice blocks. The experimenter also 
emphasized that the pattern of correct/incorrect responding would switch from block to 
block, so that participants needed to reverse their patterns of responding across blocks. 
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Participants were informed that the task was not asking them to express a particular opinion 
or belief but simply required them to respond as accurately and rapidly as possible across all 
blocks of trials. Once participants met the accuracy and latency criteria for a pair of practice 
blocks, the researcher withdrew from the experimental room stating that he would be just 
outside should the participant encounter any difficulty or wish to withdraw from the study. 
Only one participant communicated with the researcher before the IRAPs were completed 
and on this occasion he expressed a wish to terminate participation – he was thanked and 
debriefed immediately and his data were excluded from analysis. 
Scales and Debriefing.  Having finished the IRAPs, participants took a short two-
minute break and were then asked to complete the scales, this time according to their own 
opinions.  Finally, they were asked whether they saw something unusual or strange about the 
math task (as done by Von Hippel et al., 2005), told to read the disclosure information sheet 
presented in Appendix F.  Finally, they were asked if they understood the reason for the 
temporary deception and the true nature of the study and whether they wanted the 
researcher to keep their responses for analysis, which they all agreed to.  The procedure 
strictly adhered to the Guidelines for Safe Work Practice of the Department of Psychology 
and to relevant ethical guidelines as explained in Chapter 3. 
Results and Discussion 
Cheating measure.  The software outputs a text file containing information about 
each trial: total time to give an answer, time before pressing the Spacebar to make the 
response box appear, response given, and, critically, whether the correct response was 
shown on the screen. Hence, cheating can be reported in absolute terms (cheaters vs. non-
cheaters) and also in terms of magnitude (number of cheats). None of the participants 
reported guessing the true goal of the task after its completion. Each of the two blocks 
consisted of ten trials: if the participant did not press the Spacebar during the Slow block the 
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answer appeared after 10 seconds from the presentation of the equation, and in the Fast 
block the answer appeared after 1 second.   Table 1 shows the main descriptive statistics for 
the cheating measure. 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for the MMT in Study 1  
Task % who cheated Average cheats SD Range 
Slow block only 35.1 0.59 0.95 0-3 
Fast block only 64.9 1.57 1.62 0-6 
Combined 67.6 2.16 2.23 0-7 
A majority of the sample waited to see the answer at least once, which is in line with 
findings in other studies.  Von Hippel et al. (2005) found that 79-85% across different 
experiments with the task waited to see the answer ȋi.e., ǲcheatedǳȌ, with a slightly wider 
range (0-10) and comparatively more cheating in the second block (fast task), which we also 
observed.  Jordan et al. (2011) found that 57% of the sample allowed the answer to appear at 
least once.  However, a study by Teper and Inzlicht (2010) reported that most participants 
did not cheat at all, even with a monetary payoff, which probably calls attention to a potential 
susceptibility of the task to external factors.  We found no significant correlation between the 
rating given to the task (in terms of boredom) and the amount of cheating.   
Scales.  Consistent with Caprara et al. (2009), and as expected, the two moral 
disengagement scales correlated highly with each other (r = 0.79, p < 0.01).  Table 2 shows 
descriptive analyses for the moral disengagement and social desirability scales. 
Table 2.  
Descriptive Statistics for the Scales in Study 1  
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Scale Range Mean SD 
Civic Moral Disengagement (CMD) 46-107 69.81 13.49 
Moral Disengagement (MDS) 4-36 15.08 7.52 
Social Desirability Scale (MC-SDS) 7-29 15.95 5.35 
 
IRAPs.  
Data preparation. Response latencies, or the elapsed time in milliseconds between 
the onset of the trial and the emission of a correct response by the participant, are the 
primary datum from the IRAP.  The presentation software outputs raw trial-by-trial latency 
data and calculates scores for analysis according to an algorithm derived from the standard 
transformation of IAT scores (H. Cai, Sriram, Greenwald, & McFarland, 2004).  This procedure 
has been shown to minimise the impact of individual differences in age, IQ and speed of 
responding, amongst other individual factors (Barnes-Holmes, Murtagh, et al., 2010; Power, 
Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009), and specifically involves the following 
steps: 
(a) remove the entire data set with more than 10% latencies below 300 milliseconds. 
(b) remove latencies at or above 10.000 milliseconds from the dataset;  
(c) calculate the standard deviation across each pair of test blocks for each of the four 
trial types, yielding 12 standard deviations; 
(d) calculate mean latencies for each trial type within each block of test trials, 
yielding 24 means; 
(e) subtract the mean latency for each trial-type in test block 1 from test block 2, and 
repeat for test blocks 3 and 4, and for test blocks 5 and 6, to obtain twelve 
difference scores; 
(f) divide the difference scores obtained in the previous step by their associated 
standard deviations obtained in step c; 
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(g)  obtain four mean D-IRAP scores, one for each trial type, by averaging the scores 
from the three pairs of test blocks. 
Only test block data from participants who completed both IRAPs were used for this 
calculation. The data for nine participants were excluded from the analyses because they 
failed to meet the performance criteria during practice blocks in either of the IRAPs, and 
therefore never progressed to the test blocks. 
Moral biases. Mean D-IRAP scores for each trial type, obtained from step g above, can 
be plotted into a figure, and visual inspection of the direction and height of the bars can be 
used as a rough estimation of pro- or anti-moral bias: bar height indicates the strength of the 
effect and the direction (positive or negative) indicates the nature of the bias.  In the case of 
the CM-IRAP, the overall mean D-IRAP scores for the four trial-types presented in Figure 4 
indicate that, in general, participants responded ǲTrueǳ more quickly than ǲFalseǳ on the 
Good/Moral and Bad/Immoral trial-types, and responded ǲFalseǳ more quickly than ǲTrueǳ on 
the Bad/Moral trial-type. The D-IRAP effect was strongest for the Good/Moral trial-type in 
both groups and weakest, in fact approaching zero, for the Good/Immoral trial-type. Four 
one-sample t-tests indicated that the IRAP effect was significantly different from zero for the 
Good/Moral (t = 5.814, p < 0.01) and Bad/Moral (t =2.273, p < 0.05) trial-types only. 
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Figure 4. Mean D-IRAP scores with standard error bars for the four trial types of the 
conceptual (CM) IRAP.  Positive numbers indicate a pro-moral bias, and negative 
numbers indicate an anti-moral bias. 
The mean D-IRAP scores for the DM-IRAP are shown in Figure 5.  The scores indicate that in general participants responded ǲTrueǳ more quickly than ǲFalseǳ on Good/Often and 
Bad/Often with relatively weak effects observed for the remaining two trial-types. One-
sample t tests revealed effects that the effects for Good/Often (t = 5.779, p < 0.01) and 
Bad/Often (t = -0.370, p < 0.01) were indeed significantly different from zero, but the effects 
for the other two trial-types were not.  
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Figure 5. Mean D-IRAP scores with standard error bars for the four trial types of the 
deictic (DM) IRAP.  Positive numbers indicate a pro-moral bias, and negative numbers 
indicate an anti-moral bias. 
Predicting cheating behaviours.  With the goal of determining whether the IRAPs 
could predict immoral behaviour, Pearson correlations were calculated between the total 
MMT score and the mean D-IRAP scores for the four trial types in each IRAP (see Table 3).  Of 
the eight correlations, two proved to be significant, one from the CM-IRAP for the 
Bad/Immoral trial-type and one from the DM-IRAP for the Bad/Often trial-type. The former 
correlation indicates that an increasing bias towards confirming that bad actions are immoral 
predicts more cheating responses on the MMT. The latter correlation indicates that a bias 
towards denying a high frequency of immoral behaviour also predicts more cheating on the 
MMT.  
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Table 3.  
 Correlations between MMT score and Mean D-IRAP Scores for both CM- and DM-IRAPs 
Trial type 
Correlation with MMT 
r p 
CM-IRAP   
Good/Moral -0.147 > 0.3 
Bad/Moral -0.109 > 0.4 
Good/Immoral -0.037 > 0.5 
Bad/Immoral    0.428* 0.02 
DM-IRAP   
Good/Often 0.072 > 0.5 
Good/Rarely 0.111 > 0.4 
Bad/Often  0.380* 0.04 
Bad/Rarely 0.162 > 0.3 
(*) Significant at the p < 0.05 level; (**) Significant at the p < 0.01 level. 
Moral disengagement.  No significant correlations were found between the total 
scores in the moral disengagement scales and the mean D-IRAP scores. 
Split-half correlations.  Following other studies, overall split-half reliability scores 
were calculated for each IRAP in order to provide a measure of internal consistency, and this 
yielded a moderate and significant result for the DM-IRAP (r = 0.48, p < 0.01), but not the CM-
IRAP.  
Summary and Conclusions. Overall, the results of this first study for the CM-IRAP 
produced three IRAP effects that were consistent with common sense, in that participants 
confirmed Good/Moral and Bad/Immoral relations more quickly than they denied them, and 
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denied Bad/Moral relations more quickly than they confirmed them. However, there was no 
clear bias when responding to Good/Immoral relations on the IRAP. The DM-IRAP yielded 
results that were even more counter-intuitive. First, participants revealed a tendency to 
confirm that they often engaged in both good and bad behaviours. Second, participants failed 
to show any clear biases on the remaining two trial-types, which required responses to 
questions concerning how rarely they engaged in good or bad behaviours. Although the 
emergence of putatively counter-intuitive results raise important questions, which we will 
address later, it seemed important to replicate these effects before drawing any strong 
conclusions.  
Another possibly counter-intuitive result that emerged was the finding that increased 
bias scores in a pro-moral direction for the Bad/Immoral trial-type (in the CM-IRAP) and the 
Bad/Often trial-type (in the DM-IRAP) appeared to predict increased cheating on the MMT. In 
other words, it appears that participants who more strongly confirmed that bad actions are 
immoral, and denied engaging in immoral behaviour, tended to cheat more.  One possible 
explanation for this finding might be that individuals who tend to cheat, lie and deceive may 
well be more practiced at criticising immoral actions and denying that they engage in such 
behaviours precisely because doing so is an example of such behaviour itself. Insofar as the 
IRAP is a measure of the relative probabilities of specific verbal relations, then these 
correlations may not be so counter-intuitive.  
Once again, it is important to recognise that the current findings were obtained from 
only one exploratory study and thus it was deemed important to attempt to replicate the 
results in a second study before speculating too broadly. With this in mind, the second study 
reported in the current thesis employed the same two IRAPs employed in Study 1 but 
adopted a different cheating task. A different cheating task was employed at this point in the 
research programme due to ad hoc comments that were provided by some participants in 
84 
 
Experiment 1. Specifically, they reported that the answer appeared too quickly in the second 
block and they were focused on reading the equation and temporarily forgot to press the 
Spacebar. Consequently, it is possible that at least in some cases, the participant did not 
intend to see the answer, but was distracted and failed to prevent it from showing up.  
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Study 2: Replicating Study 1 Using an Alternative Cheating Measure 
Even though the MMT had been used as a way to operationalise immoral behaviour in 
more than twenty studies at the time of the current research was being conducted, as noted 
above there was a potential that false-positive cheating responses may have been recorded. 
In Study 2, therefore, we explored the idea of creating a different cheating measure based on 
the dice-in-a-cup task by Fischbacher and Heusi (2008).  The original task involves 
participants privately rolling a die under a cup, memorising the number and then completing 
a purportedly unrelated questionnaire, after which they get monetary compensation 
depending on the reported result of the die roll.  The distribution of reported rolls is typically 
compared to the expected uniform distribution, and if numbers below 4 are significantly less 
reported, this suggests that many participants lied about the number they actually rolled. 
The original task is inadequate for our purposes because it makes it impossible to 
observe deception at an individual level, a requirement for our research programme given 
that we aimed to relate individual performances on the IRAP with the cheating task. Indeed, 
the problem of identifying cheating at the individual level is a limitation of other cheating 
tasks that have also been used to operationalise immoral behaviour, and they are hence 
unsuitable as well.  Therefore, we decided to create a computerised task ȋǲDice Cheating Taskǳ or DCTȌ, in principle would provide a measure of individual cheating responses. We 
also used all the other measures from Study 1 except for the MMT. 
Materials and Methods 
Participants.  A sample consisting of 30 undergraduate students from the National 
University of Ireland, Maynooth (18 females, 60%) aged 18 to 25 (M = 19.23, SD = 1.63) 
contributed to this study.  Participants were contacted from a volunteer pool assembled 
through announcements made at the start of each academic year.  Upon their arrival at the 
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laboratory, they were again told that the researcher intended to get feedback on a number of 
tasks in order to select the appropriate ones for a forthcoming study.  Next, they read and 
signed a standard informed consent form (Appendix E), although the justified deception from 
Study 1 was maintained due to potential reactivity.  Immediately after signing the consent 
form and having been given the opportunity to ask any questions about the procedure, they were given €ͷ for their participation.  Two participants failed to achieve criteria to proceed 
to the test blocks in one of the IRAPs and their data were excluded from analysis, leaving us 
with a sample of 28 participants. 
Measures.  Study 2 tested a new cheating task and aimed to replicate the results from 
Study 1 thus providing convergent validity. The same scales and IRAPs from the previous 
study were used, but cheating was operationalised in terms of performance in a Die Cheating 
Task (DCT).  The task is presented to participants as an attentional task with the goal of 
getting a high score. Participants are presented with a computer interface similar to that 
shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Main Interface of the Die Cheating Task, showing the five main elements: A) 
a simulated die; B) a start/stop button that initiated or stopped the simulated roll of 
the die; C) a button that displayed the number rolled and that had to be clicked in 
order to increase the score; D) a score counter, and E) a progress bar that served as a 
visual indicator of the remaining number of trials (Letters added to the figure for 
clarity). 
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The task, coded in Visual Basic Express 2012 specifically for this experiment, was 
presented on the same type of computer as Study 1 and in the same location.  At the 
beginning of the task, a tutorial was presented consisting of a set of PowerPoint slides that 
explained how to interact with the task.  The researcher sat beside the participant during this 
presentation to ensure that the instructions were being understood and to answer any 
questions that might arise.  The tutorial (slides reproduced in Appendix G) informed 
participants that the task tested their reflexes and attention and that their goal was to get a 
score as high as possible by adding the results of simulated dice rolls to a tally counter.  
Critically, participants were required to stop each roll of the die and thus getting a high score 
involved stopping the roll when the die was displaying high numbers (i.e., 5 or 6). This task 
was complicated by the fact that the roll was fast and stopping it at the desired number 
required them to be very focused and attentive. 
The tutorial also informed that they could interact with the task by pressing the ǲStart/Stopǳ button ȋB in Figure 6) to roll the die or the ǲAdd to scoreǳ button ȋC in the same 
figure) to increase their score by the number displayed on the face of the dice.  When the ǲStart/Stopǳ button was pressed, the roll was simulated by replacing the image of the die 
with another randomly selected face of the die followed by a blank face after 220 
milliseconds.  This produced the effect of a rapidly changing die face.  Pilot work showed that 
participants could clearly see the numbers, but that pressing the Stop button when a 
desirable (i.e., high) number was being displayed was challenging given the short time that 
the number remained on screen.   
The task involved 80 trials. 50 of those were ǲnormalǳ trials in which the ǲAdd to scoreǳ button displayed the same number that the die was showing when the roll stopped.  
However, in 30 specific trials the computer always displayed pre-selected combinations of 
die rolls and scores to be added to the tally counter.  Figure 7 shows these special trials: on 
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High Roll-Low score (HL) trials, the die would show a high number (5 or 6) but the button 
would show a low number (2 or 3).  On Low Roll-High Score (LH) trials, the opposite was 
true – the die would show a lower number than the button.  Cheating was defined as adding 
scores in the LH trials, since the payoff in terms of score was higher.  HL trials were not 
considered cheating and served as a way to determine if the participants had understood the 
tasks and were performing it according to the instructions.  The tutorial clearly indicated that 
the program would sometimes display different numbers in the die and the button, in which case they were supposed to just roll the die again and not click the ǲAdd to scoreǳ button. 
 
Figure 7. The three types of trials in the DCT, showing the relation between the 
number on the die and the number on the button.  On normal trials, both numbers 
match.  On LH trials, the die shows a lower number than the button, and in HR trials, 
the die shows a higher number than the button. 
The magnitude of the difference between the number rolled and the number 
displayed by the button can be used to further characterise the cheating (i.e. LH) trials: adding a Ͷ when the roll is actually ͵, for example, is a ǲsmallǳ cheat.  But adding a ͷ when the 
roll is actually a 2 involves aiming for a bigger payoff.  We hypothesised that people were 
more likely to engage in cheating when the distance between the expected and deceptive 
behaviours was smaller, which is consistent with previous research (Hilbig & Hessler, 2012).  
After 80 trials, the task asked participants to restate the nature and the goal of the 
task and to give two ratings from 0 to 10: how difficult and how entertaining the task was.  A 
preliminary pilot phase (n = 15) using the DCT was conducted to test its properties, without 
using the other measures.  All the participants in the pilot phase reported at the end that they 
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believed that the task was testing their reflexes and their attention and during debriefing 
none of them reported thinking that it was a measure of deception, although a few of them 
(n=6, 40%) revealed that they had taken advantage of the LH trials to increase their score 
(i.e., they cheated).   
Insofar as this study intended to replicate Study 1 with a different deception measure, 
the same instruments from Study 1 were used, namely the two IRAPs (Conceptual and 
Deictic), the moral disengagement scales and the social desirability scale. 
Procedure.  The experiment took place in one of the experimental cubicles at the 
Department of Psychology, where participants were given similar instructions to those from 
Study 1, specifically that their performance on different types of tests was going to be used to 
select the most appropriate ones for future research.  This was followed by reading and 
signing the consent form, reassurance of all their rights as participants and the delivery of a monetary compensation of €ͷ.   
Completion of these preliminary procedures was followed by the DCT.  The 
researcher started the tutorial, stayed in the room with the participant to ensure that the 
instructions were read and understood, answered whatever procedural questions arose and 
started the actual task and left the experimental room to let the participant complete the 
task.   
Upon conclusion of the DCT, the session proceeded exactly as in Study 1 at this point, 
in that participants were given the two IRAPs in a counterbalanced fashion and then they 
completed the questionnaire measures.  Finally, they were thoroughly debriefed in the same 
manner described in Study 1, thanked for their participation and asked if they wanted their 
data to be kept or erased.  All the participants consented to having their data used for the 
study.   
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Results and Discussion 
Data analysis followed the same principles detailed for Study 1, except for the 
cheating measure.  In this case, the presentation software saved a file containing all the 
relevant information for each trial, and specifically whether the participant availed of the 
cheating mechanism.   
Cheating measure.  46.4% of the sample increased their score by clicking the ǲAdd to scoreǳ button when the die displayed a lower number, which was our operational definition 
of cheating.  None of the participants clicked the button when a lower number was being 
displayed though, which suggests that all the participants were sufficiently engaged in the 
task as to ignore the High roll-Low score trials.  All the participants correctly responded that 
the goal was to get the highest score when asked at the end of the task.  As predicted, 42.8% 
of the sample engaged in ǲsmallǳ cheats but only ʹ1.4% in ǲbigǳ cheats, the difference 
between the two variables being statistically significant in a paired samples t-test (t = 2.357, 
p < 0.03).  The average rating of the task on a scale from 1 (boring) to 10 (entertaining) was 
7.8, and in terms of difficulty the average rating was 5.7 / 10.   
Scales. Again, and as expected, the moral disengagement scales (CMD and MDS) 
showed a moderately high correlation (r = 0.53, p < 0.05).  No correlation was found between 
the cheating measure and the overall moral disengagement scores in either of the two scales.  
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the scales. 
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Table 4.   
Descriptive Statistics for scales in Study 2 
Scale Range Mean SD 
Civic Moral Disengagement (CMD) 53-101 80.47 10.35 
Moral Disengagement (MDS) 1-27 14.40 5.47 
Social Desirability Scale (MC-SDS) 5-26 14.43 4.31 
IRAPs.  Overall mean D-IRAP scores for the four trial-types in the CM-IRAP are 
presented in Figure 8.  )n general, participants responded ǲTrueǳ more quickly than ǲFalseǳ 
on the Good/Moral and Bad/Immoral trial types.  This pattern of responding was also 
observed, albeit on a smaller scale, in the Good/Immoral trial-type, but was reversed in the 
Bad/Moral trial-type.  In general, the distribution of effects resembled that of the CM-IRAP in 
Study 1.  To evaluate if the mean scores were significantly different from zero, we performed 
four one-sample t-tests that indicated a statistically significant effect on the Good/Moral (t = 
3.473, p < 0.01) and the Bad/Immoral (t = 3.341, p < 0.01) trial-types only, suggesting once 
again that participants readily responded to good actions as moral and bad actions as 
immoral. 
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Figure 8. Mean D-IRAP scores with standard error bars for the four trial types of the 
conceptual (CM) IRAP.  Positive numbers indicate a pro-moral bias, and negative 
numbers indicate an anti-moral bias.   
The DM-IRAP is presented in Figure 9.  The effects displayed in this IRAP are not 
unlike those of Experiment 1, especially in the trial types where targets correspond to the ǲOftenǳ category.  The strongest effects were for the Good/Often and Good/Rarely trial types 
and both showed pro-moral biases.  One-sample t tests indicate that the mean scores were 
significantly different from zero for Good/Often (t = 7.783, p < 0.01) and for Good/Rarely (t = 
3.014, p < 0.01).  The effect for the Bad/Often trial-type was significant in Study 1 and 
approached significance in the current study (t = -1.761, p = 0.08); again the bias was in an 
anti-moral direction. 
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Figure 9. Mean D-IRAP scores with standard error bars for the four trial types of the 
conceptual (DM) IRAP.  Positive numbers indicate a pro-moral bias, and negative 
numbers indicate an anti-moral bias.   
Predicting cheating.  We calculated Pearson correlations between the three different scores offered by the DCT ȋǲsmallǳ cheats, ǲbigǳ cheats and total cheatsȌ and the mean D-IRAP 
scores for the four trial types in each IRAP.  The resulting 2x4x3 correlation matrix is 
presented in Table 5.  Even though there were no statistically significant correlations with an α < 0.05, two trial-types in the DM-IRAP, namely Good/Rarely and Bad/Often, showed weak to 
moderate correlation coefficients, which approached significance, with number of ǲsmallǳ 
cheats. The correlation for the latter trial-type (Bad/Often) was similar to that observed in 
Study 1, indicating that a bias towards denying engaging in bad behaviour predicted higher 
levels of cheating. The correlation for the Good/Rarely trial-type, which was specific to this 
study, indicates that a bias towards denying that one is rarely good predicts increased 
cheating responses. In both cases, therefore, the correlations on the trial-types that involved 
denying immoral behaviour appeared to predict cheating. This outcome is consistent with the 
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argument that denying dishonesty on the IRAP may be reflective of well-practiced verbal 
responses for individuals who engage in relatively high levels of cheating in the natural 
environment (i.e., denying that they are ǲcheatsǳ). A correlation that approached significance 
was also recorded for the CM-IRAP between the Bad/Moral trial-type and big cheats, but the 
N was so low (6 participants) interpreting this result would be unwise. 
Table 5.   
Correlations between DCT scores and Mean D-IRAP Scores for both CM- and DM-IRAPs 
Trial-types 
Small cheats Big cheats Total cheats 
r p r p r p 
CM-IRAP       
Good/Moral 0.07 > 0.5 -0.06 > 0.5 0.04 > 0.5 
Bad/Moral 0.04 > 0.4 0.32  0.08 0.16 > 0.3 
Good/Immoral 0.06 > 0.5 0.05 > 0.5 0.03 > 0.5 
Bad/Immoral -0.21 > 0.1 -0.08 > 0.5 -0.18 > 0.2 
DM-IRAP       
Good/Often 0.06 > 0.5 0.24 > 0.1 0.15 > 0.3 
Good/Rarely 0.33   0.08 0.12 > 0.4 0.28 > 0.1 
Bad/Often 0.34   0.07 0.05 > 0.6 0.28 > 0.1 
Bad/Rarely 0.27 > 0.09 0.15 > 0.3 0.24 > 0.1 
Moral disengagement.  Once again, no significant correlations were found between the 
total scores from the moral disengagement scales and the mean D-IRAP scores. 
Summary and Conclusions.  The IRAP effects observed here resemble the ones from 
Study 1 in many ways.  The CM-IRAP produced effects that are consistent with intuitive, 
common sense expectations of faster confirmation of Good/Moral and Bad/Immoral relations.  
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Once again, however, no clear bias could be detected when responding to Good/Immoral or 
Bad/Moral relations.  In the DM-IRAP in the previous study, participants revealed a counter-
intuitive bias towards confirming that they engaged in bad behaviours often – this effect was 
also present in the current study, even though this trend did not reach statistical significance.   
At this point in the research programme we had employed two different IRAPs (CM 
and DM) with two different cheating tasks (the MMT and DCT). In Study 1 we found 
significant correlations between one trial-type in each IRAP (CM-IRAP, Bad/Immoral; DM-
IRAP, Bad/Often) and the cheating measure. In Study 2 we failed to record any significant 
correlations, although two of them approached significance and were generally consistent 
with the interpretation of the results we offered previously – that people who tend to cheat in 
the natural environment will be more highly practiced at denying that they do and this may 
be reflected on IRAP trial-types that target ǲdenial-basedǳ verbal responses. 
Although there was some overlap in the results from Study 1 to Study 2, a number of 
concerns arose at this point. The first is that the DCT failed to generate the same variance in 
cheating behaviour relative to the MMT, thus potentially undermining the DCTǯs usefulness 
as a laboratory measure of cheating behaviour. A directly related concern was that the 
correlations between the trial-types and the cheating measure in the second study only 
approached significance, although the trends from Study 1 were still observed. The 
remaining studies reported in the current thesis therefore employed a slightly modified 
version of the MMT, rather than the DCT.  
The third concern was that, once again, there was no correlation between the moral 
disengagement scales and the cheating measure or the IRAPs in both studies. As noted 
previously, it is possible that the self-report scales were subject to self-presentation effects 
and thus at this point, given the lack of correlations, we ceased using them for the remainder 
of the current research programme. The final concern that emerged following Study 2 was 
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recognition that the DM-IRAP may have been targeting only a limited aspect of deictic 
relations, namely frequency of cheating.  Much of the research on cheating, however, 
highlights the important role played by maintaining a moral sense of self even when engaging 
in immoral behaviour (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Bandura et al., 1996). To address all this 
concern, in Study 3 we employed an IRAP that was designed to target how participants feel 
when they engage in good and bad behaviours.  
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Study 3. Exploring the role of Feelings in Deictic Responding 
As explained previously, in Study 3 we decided to modify the DM-IRAP, such that it 
would target feelings associated with moral and immoral behaviour rather than simply 
frequency.  In addition to the foregoing changes for Study 3, we also introduced a self-report 
instrument that was designed to target the construct of ǲpsychopathyǳ. We introduced this 
measure based on the argument, outlined previously, that a degree of verbal empathy might 
be needed to encourage individuals to follow moral rules. Specifically, based on an 
understanding of the consequences, especially the pain felt by others, through 
transformations of stimulus functions, engaging in behaviours that are coordinated with verbal labels such as ǲgoodǳ, and ǲmoralǳ may be inherently reinforcing. )ndeed, in 
mainstream psychology, low levels of empathy and remorse, together with behavioural 
boldness, are all part of the construct of psychopathy (Scott, 2014). In fact, Sobhani and 
Bechara (2011) suggest that people who engage in immoral behaviour or corruption might 
have personality traits resembling those of psychopaths.  With this in mind, and given our 
theoretical interest in these attributes, we decided to explore whether a well-known measure 
of psychopathy would correlate with the cheating measure (MMT) and one or more of the 
trial types in the IRAP.  
Materials and Methods 
Participants.   33 students from the National University of Ireland, Maynooth, aged 
between 18 and 25 (M = 19.03, SD = 1.26) took part in this study.  They were recruited 
through classroom announcements during which they could register their interest in 
participating in psychological research.  In the end, four participants did not achieve the 
criteria required to proceed to the test blocks in at least one of the IRAPs, and consequently 
their data were excluded from analysis, leaving a sample of 29 participants (62.1% females). 
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Measures. Our cheating measure for this study was a slightly revised version of the 
MMT.  In the original, it could be argued that some of the participants were simply slow 
responders or were just distracted momentarily and failed to press the spacebar in time to 
prevent the answer from showing up on screen (i.e., a cheating response was registered but it 
should not have been recorded as such). A simple fix suggested by Jordan, Mullen and 
Murnighan (2011) was therefore implemented, namely that the answer that appeared was 
+/- 1 from the mathematically correct answer.  The software signalled whether the 
participant entered the correct response or the altered one – the latter (incorrect value) was 
taken as a deliberate cheat, because it implied that the participant had not actually 
performed the calculation, but just entered the number that showed up on the screen, even 
though it was incorrect.  The task was otherwise identical to the original.   
Once again, we used two IRAPs in this study.  The CM-IRAP was the same as in the 
previous experiments, but the new deictic IRAP referred to feelings when engaging in moral 
and immoral actions.  This modified version, that we called the DF-IRAP, involved presenting 
two sets of label stimuli, the first of which was the phrase ǲWhen )ǳ followed by ǲBehave wellǳ, ǲPlay by the rulesǳ, ǲObey the lawǳ, ǲDo the right thingǳ, ǲAct morallyǳ, and ǲTell the truthǳ. The second set of label stimuli also presented the phrase ǲWhen )ǳ but was followed 
by: ǲBreak the lawǳ, ǲCheatǳ, ǲAct immorallyǳ, ǲTell liesǳ, ǲBreak the rulesǳ, and ǲDeceiveǳ. The two types of target stimuli were the phrases ǲ) feel goodǳ and ǲ) feel badǳ. The four trial-types 
for the DF-IRAP may thus be summarized as: 1. Do-Good/Feel-Good; 2. Do-Good/Feel-Bad; 3. 
Do-Bad/Feel-Good; and 4. Do-Bad/Feel-Bad, and are presented in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10.  Visual representation of the four trial types in the DF-IRAP. Note that neither the words ǲconsistentǳ and ǲinconsistentǳ, nor the arrows, appeared on 
screen.   
In this study we used the revised 2012 version of the IRAP software. This version is 
procedurally identical to the previous version, but it permits the researcher to insert a 
specific rule, which appears at the beginning of each practice and test block. The rules that 
were inserted in to the CM-IRAP were as follows: Consistent blocks, ǲPlease answer AS IF 
GOOD actions were MORAL and BAD actions were IMMORALǳ; )nconsistent blocks, ǲPlease 
answer AS IF GOOD actions were IMMORAL and BAD actions were MORALǳ The rules that were 
inserted into the DF-)RAP were as follows: Consistent blocks ǲPlease answer AS IF being 
GOOD makes you feel GOOD and being BAD makes you feel BADǳ; )nconsistent blocks, ǲPlease 
answer AS IF being GOOD makes you feel BAD and being BAD makes you feel GOODǳ.  
As a measure of Psychopathy we used the widely known Levenson Psychopathy Scale 
(LPS), self-report questionnaire consisting of 26 items (7 reversed to control for 
acquiescence). The LPS has the distinct advantage of being one of the few psychopathy 
101 
 
measures specifically intended for a non-clinical population, and it is based on the two-factor 
model of psychopathy, which proposes the existence of primary and secondary psychopathy.  
As such, 16 items of the scale evaluate primary psychopathy, or a general disposition towards 
callousness, manipulation, selfishness and lying.  Examples of items for this factor are ǲLooking out for myself is my top priorityǳ or ǲI enjoy manipulating other people's feelingsǳ.  
Secondary psychopathy, targeted by the remaining 10 items, is a contextually-mediated and 
situational engagement in antisocial and immoral behaviour, with negative emotions such as 
anxiety, fear and remorse that are not present in primary psychopathy (Dean et al., 2013).  
This factor is assessed in the scale with items such as ǲWhen I get frustrated, I often Ǯlet off 
steamǯ by blowing my topǳ and ǲBefore I do anything, I carefully consider the possible 
consequencesǳ. The item response format is a 5-point Likert scale from 1 to 5, which permits a 
range of 13 to 65 for each subscale, and 26 to 130 for the total scale.  The reported Cronbachǯs alpha for the scale was 0.82. (Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick, 1995).  We tested the 
scale in a small sample and found problems with item ͸ ȋǲ) let others worry about higher 
values; my main concern is with the bottom lineǳȌ, which was replaced by ǲ) let others worry about higher values; my main concern is with the bare necessities.ǳ (suggested by Hauck-
Filho & Teixeira, 2014).  
Procedure.  Participants were invited to the Psychology Laboratory, thanked for 
volunteering and attending the session, and given similar instructions to those from the 
previous studies.  Specifically, they were told that the study intended to evaluate different 
types of tests in order to select a few for future studies based on performance.  They read and 
signed a standard consent form (Appendix E) and received reassurance of confidentiality, anonymity and right to withdraw from the study at any time.  Then they received €ͷ for their 
participation and started the session by completing the revised MMT in the exact same 
manner as described in Study 1. 
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After completion of the cheating measure, they were presented with the two IRAPs in 
a counterbalanced order, such that one group started with the CM-IRAP and the other group 
started with the DF-IRAP.  These were followed by administration of the Levenson 
Psychopathy Scale.  At the end, they underwent full debriefing.  None of the participants 
declined to have their data recorded and used for further analysis, and they all reported that 
they understood the reason for the deception involving the MMT. 
Results and Discussion 
Cheating measure.  Cheating levels in the modified MMT were similar to those 
observed in previous studies and in Experiment 1 of the current thesis.  Table 6 presents the 
percentage of participants who availed of the opportunity to cheat in each block, and the 
average number of cheating responses with standard deviations and ranges.   
Table 6 
 Descriptive statistics for the MMT. 
Task % who cheated Average cheats SD Range 
Slow block only 58.6 1.03 1.08 0-3 
Fast block only 58.6 1.41 1.70 0-7 
Combined 68.9 2.22 1.24 0-8 
Psychopathy.  Table 7 presents descriptive statistics for the Levenson Psychopathy 
scale.  There are no recommended cut-off points for the scale: Levenson et al. (1995) found a 
mean of 29.13 (SD = 6.86) for Primary Psychopathy and 19.32 (SD = 4.06) for Secondary 
Psychopathy in college students in the United States.  More recently, Falkenbach, Poythress, 
Norman and Creevy (2008) found means of 31.93 (SD = 9.01) and 20.93 (SD = 4.99) in a 
similar sample of college students.   
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Table 7.  
Descriptive statistics for the Levenson Psychopathy Scale. 
Sub-scale Mean SD Range 
Primary Psychopathy 34.41 4.96 24-42 
Secondary Psychopathy 21.41 2.36 15-26 
Total score 55.82 6.25 44-65 
IRAPs.  The mean D-IRAP scores for the four trial types in the CM-IRAP are presented 
in Figure 11. Continuing with the trend of the previous studies, participants tended to respond ǲTrueǳ more quickly than ǲFalseǳ to the Good/Moral and Bad/Immoral trial types, 
and respond ǲFalseǳ more quickly than ǲTrueǳ on the Bad/Moral trial-type. The effect on the 
Good/Immoral trial-type was almost zero. One-sample t tests revealed a significant effect 
only for the Good/Moral trial type (t = 5.56, p < 0.01).   
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Figure 11. Mean D-IRAP scores with standard error bars for the four trial types of the 
CM-IRAP in experiment 3.  Positive numbers indicate a pro-moral bias, and negative 
numbers indicate an anti-moral bias 
In the new DF-IRAP (see Figure 12), participants tended to respond ǲTrueǳ more quickly than ǲFalseǳ on the Do-good/Feel-good, Do-bad/Feel-Good and Do-bad/Feel-bad trial types, and respond ǲFalseǳ more quickly than ǲTrueǳ in the Do-Good/Feel-Bad trial-type. Four 
one-sample t tests revealed two significant effects, for the Do-good/Feel-good (t = 6.029, p < 
0.01) and Do-bad/Feel-bad trial-types (t = 4.314, p < 0.05).  
 
Figure 12. Mean D-IRAP scores with standard error bars for the four trial types of the 
DF IRAP in experiment 3.  Scores above zero indicate pro-moral bias. 
Predicting cheating behaviours.  To determine whether the IRAPs could predict 
immoral behaviour in this study, Pearson correlations were calculated between the total 
MMT score and the mean D-IRAP scores for the four trial types in each IRAP (see Table 8, 
rightmost column).  One statistically significant negative correlation emerged between the 
Do-bad/Feel-bad trial type and the total number of cheats in the MMT (r = -0.37, p < 0.05), 
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indicating that increasing pro-moral bias on the IRAP predicted less cheating.  The 
correlation between the Bad/Immoral trial-type and the MMT that was significant in Study 1 
approached significance in this study and showed the same trend, which is in line with our 
interpretation that people who engage in immoral behaviour might be more highly practised 
at denying it. 
Correlations with psychopathy.  We conducted Pearson correlations between the MMT 
score, the two indexes of psychopathy (primary and secondary) and the trial-types in both 
IRAPs.  In the resulting correlation matrix (see Table 8) we observed a significant negative 
correlation between the DF-IRAP and the Do-good/Feel-good trial type and Secondary 
psychopathy (r = -0.38,  p < 0.05), indicating that increasing levels of pro-moral bias on the 
IRAP predicted lower levels of self-reported situational psychopathy. Even though no 
statistically significant correlations emerged between the psychopathy subscales and the 
mean D-IRAP scores in the CM-IRAP, a moderate inverse correlation between the Good/Moral 
trial-type and Secondary psychopathy approached significance, indicating that increasing 
pro-moral bias predicted lower levels of self-reported situational and remorseful 
psychopathy.   
Despite the goal being to correlate the IRAP trial-types and cheating and 
psychopathy, we also found that the MMT correlated with the secondary psychopathy factor 
(r = 0.38, p < 0.05), indicating that higher levels of situational psychopathy predicted 
increasing cheating responses.   
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Table 8.   
Correlations between psychopathy, cheating and mean D-IRAP scores 
Trial-types 
Primary 
Psychopathy 
Secondary 
Psychopathy MMT 
r p r p r p 
CM-IRAP       
Good/Moral -0.113 > 0.1 -0.341† 0.07 -0.174 > 0.1 
Good/Immoral 0.049 > 0.1 -0.174 > 0.1 0.076 > 0.1 
Bad/Moral 0.113 > 0.1 -0.133 > 0.1 0.048 > 0.1 
Bad/Immoral 0.277 > 0.1 -0.052  > 0.1 0.312† 0.09 
DF-IRAP       
Do-Good/Feel-Good -0.225 > 0.1 -0.384* 0.03 -0.083 > 0.1 
Do-Good/Feel-Bad -0.093 > 0.1 -0.176 > 0.1 0.104 > 0.1 
Do-Bad/Feel-Good -0.004 > 0.1 -0.251 > 0.1 -0.281 > 0.1 
Do-Bad/Feel-Bad 0.092 > 0.1 -0.035 > 0.1 -0.374* 0.04 
(*) Significant at the 0.05 level.  ȋ†Ȍ Approached significance. 
Given that both the IRAPs and cheating correlated with secondary psychopathy we 
conducted partial correlations between trial-types and the two indexes of psychopathy with 
the MMT score as a controlling variable. Once again no significant correlations emerged 
between the trial-types and primary psychopathy, but secondary psychopathy was still 
associated with the Good/Moral trial-type (r = -0.301, p < 0.04) and the Do-Good/Feel-Good 
trial-types (r = -0.382, p < 0.05).  This indicates that the IRAPs indeed seem to tap into verbal 
networks associated with boldness and impulsivity, conceptually associated with 
psychopathy, even when controlling for cheating.   
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 Summary and Conclusions.   The CM-IRAP effects in this study resemble those from 
previous studies.  Again, Good/Moral and Bad/Immoral relations were consistent with 
common-sense expectations, although the size of the effect for the latter trial-type was 
relatively weak. No clear bias emerged from the Good/Immoral and Bad/Moral relations.  The 
significant inverse correlation between the Bad/Immoral trial-type and the cheating measure 
was observed again (approaching significance). As before, this finding could be interpreted as 
indicating that increasingly strong claims that bad actions are immoral may reveal well 
established repertoires of deceptive behaviour.  
The new deictic IRAP produced the expected, or common sense effects for the Do-
Good/Feel-Good and Do-Bad/Feel-Bad trial-types. It also produced an inverse correlation 
between the Do-Bad/Feel-Bad trial-type and the cheating measure, indicating that 
participants who more strongly affirmed that they feel bad when engaging in bad behaviour 
tended to cheat less in the MMT. It is perhaps intriguing that the correlations between the 
MMT and the Bad/Immoral trial-type from the CM-IRAP and the Do-Bad/Feel-Bad trial-type 
from the DF-IRAP were in opposite directions. Specifically, this indicates that a bias towards 
confirming that bad actions are immoral predicts increased cheating, but a bias towards 
confirming that engaging in bad actions makes you feel bad predicts decreased cheating. Such 
a result seems highly counter-intuitive. One possible explanation could appeal to the basic 
assumption that the IRAP is sensitive to verbal histories. As noted previously, participants 
who engage in higher levels of cheating may well be better practiced at claiming that bad 
actions are immoral (as part of a general strategy to conceal immoral acts). Indeed, there are 
many social situations in which people may express strong opinions on how immoral or 
disgraceful or evil or awful a particular action might be. In contrast, the opportunities to talk 
about how you feel when you engage in an immoral action are far less frequent. In fact, most 
of us would likely avoid such situations – even thinking privately about how we feel when we 
behave badly is not something that many of us would embrace with any enthusiasm. Thus 
108 
 
verbal relations that involve condemning immoral behaviour may be quite distinct, 
functionally, from verbal relations associated with how one feels following an immoral act. 
We will return to this issue in the context of the General Discussion. 
It is also worth noting that one trial-type from the CM-IRAP and one from the DF-
IRAP produced correlations with secondary psychopathy that either were significant or 
approached significance, but no such evidence was obtained for primary psychopathy. Both 
correlations appear to be relatively intuitive in that they were all negative, indicating that 
lower levels of self-reported secondary psychopathy predicted increased pro-moral bias on 
the IRAPs. As mentioned earlier, secondary psychopathy refers to contextual, situational 
engagement in behaviours characterised by boldness and impulsiveness – however, 
secondary psychopathy does not feature the distinct lack of empathy and remorse that 
primary psychopaths present (Dean et al., 2013). It appears, therefore, the IRAPs employed 
in the current study were capturing behavioural repertoires that overlapped to some extent 
with so-called boldness and impulsiveness in the natural environment rather than lack of 
empathy and remorse. Again, we will also return to this issue in the General Discussion. 
At this point in the current research programme, we had the possibility of addressing 
the issue of ecological validity, the lack of which is rather prevalent in many social sciences, 
including psychology (Henrich, Heine, & Noren, 2010).  Most perspectives in moral 
psychology have been developed with data from European samples, whose moral judgments 
and choices are not necessarily representative of other populations, and thus their 
conclusions about morality have limited applicability outside those cultures.  With the aim of 
providing some ecological validity to our results, we took advantage of the possibility of 
replicating Study 3 on a Colombian student sample from the main researcherǯs home 
university. 
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Study 4. Establishing Ecological Validity for Study 3 
As Henrich et al. (2010) have noted, a large base of psychological research has been 
performed with American undergraduate students, whose views and behaviours are 
particular to their culture and might not extrapolate very well to other populations. Indeed, a 
number of studies have suggested that traits such as individualism, independence, and value 
attributed to choice and options, amongst others, are different in American samples than in 
other western samples (Henrich et al., 2010; Morling & Lamoreaux, 2013). Hence, an agenda 
for behavioural research with higher external validity demands cross-cultural studies or 
replications with samples from other cultures, in order to detect other factors where 
similarities or differences might be identified.  With the dual aim of verifying whether our 
results up to this point showed consistency and reliability, and of contrasting them with 
results obtained from a different culture, we took advantage of the possibility of replicating 
Study 3 on a Colombian student sample from the main researcherǯs home university. 
Materials and Methods 
Participants. A convenience sample of 33 students from the Pontifical Xavier 
University in Bogotá, Colombia, participated in this study.  Three participants did not meet 
criteria for the test blocks in either of the IRAPs and their data were consequently excluded 
from analysis.  The final sample consisted therefore of 30 students (73.3% female) with ages 
between 18 and 23 (M = 18.93, SD = 1.25). 
Measures.  As this was a replication of Study 3, with the goal of providing convergent 
validity and exploring cultural differences, we used the same tasks.  However, we conducted 
a cross-cultural validation procedure of the IRAPs and the consent forms, since we were 
working with a Spanish-speaking sample.  We used the Spanish version of the Levenson 
Psychopathy Scale by Redondo (2012), which has a reported Cronbachǯs alpha of Ͳ.͹͹. 
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Cross-cultural validation procedures.  Items in psychological instruments usually make 
reference to certain cultural backgrounds and scoring is based on behaviours prevalent in 
those backgrounds (Leong & Lyons, 2010).  Plain translations might therefore fail to 
acknowledge cultural subtleties and yield inaccurate information because of the use of a 
culturally inappropriate interpretative framework.  However, there is no standardised 
procedure for cultural adaptation of psychological instruments (Epstein, Santo, & Guillemin, 
2014).   
The main strategy to ensure the equivalence of items and procedures is to perform an 
initial translation into the target language, followed by a backward translation into the 
original (which should yield a version clearly equivalent to the original), and adjust the 
translation according to the findings (Callegaro Borsa, Figuereido Damásio, & Ruschel 
Bandeira, 2012).  The translation phase is followed or done at the same time as the cultural 
adaptation phase, which involves adjusting items to culturally-specific practices.  An example 
of this is an item in the Health Assessment Questionnaire that asked participants if they were 
able to sit in their bathtub.  In Thailand, bathtubs are not common, so the Thai adaptation of 
this item asks about the ability to sit to pay homage to a sacred image (Epstein et al., 2014). 
Despite the lack of standardisation, it seems that most methods achieve comparable 
results (Epstein et al., 2014).  Our method to minimise the effect of linguistic and cultural 
biases on our results involved performing a process of translation-backtranslation-cultural 
assessment of the IRAP stimulus sets.  The forward translation was performed by the main 
researcher, and the backtranslation was performed by another bilingual psychologist with 
experience with cross-cultural validation.  A third psychologist then joined the group, and 
together they proceeded to examine the two versions and consensually solved the few 
conflicts that arose, in order to reach a final version.  The three translators had Colombian 
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Spanish as their native language and good command of the English language and had lived in 
an English-speaking culture for more than one year. 
IRAPs. The resulting stimulus sets from the cross-cultural validation procedure were 
as follows: in the CM-IRAP, ǲ) think it is good toǳ was rendered as ǲCreo que es buenoǳ and ǲ) think it is bad toǳ as ǲCreo que es maloǳ.  The positive labels were: ǲSer moralǳ, ǲDecir la verdadǳ, ǲCumplir la leyǳ, ǲSer justoǳ, ǲPortarse bienǳ, and ǲSer honestoǳ.  The negative labels 
were ǲSer inmoralǳ, ǲDecir mentirasǳ, ǲRomper la leyǳ, ǲ(acer trampaǳ, ǲPortarse malǳ, ǲSer deshonestoǳ.  The rule for consistent blocks was ǲPor favor contesta COMO SI las buenas 
acciones fueran BUENAS y las malas acciones fueran MALASǳ, and the rule for the inconsistent 
blocks was ǲPor favor contesta COMO SI las buenas acciones fueran MALAS y las buenas 
acciones fueran BUENASǳ. 
In the DF-IRAP, labels for the ǲDo-Goodǳ trial-types were ǲCuando me porto bienǳ, ǲCuando soy moralǳ, ǲCuando cumplo la leyǳ, ǲCuando sigo las reglasǳ, ǲCuando hago lo 
correctoǳ, ǲCuando digo la verdadǳ.  The label set for the ǲDo-Badǳ trial-types consisted of the 
following phrases: "Cuando digo mentiras", "Cuando hago trampa", "Cuando quiebro la ley", 
"Cuando rompo las reglas", "Cuando soy inmoral", "Cuando engaño".  The label that signalled a ǲFeel-Goodǳ trial type was rendered as ǲme siento bienǳ and the ǲFeel-Badǳ trial-type had the label ǲme siento malǳ.  The rule for consistent blocks in this IRAP was ǲPor favor contesta 
como si portarte BIEN te hiciera sentir BIEN y portarte MAL te hiciera sentirte MALǳ and the 
rule for inconsistent blocks was "Por favor contesta como si portarte BIEN te hiciera sentir 
MAL y portarte MAL te hiciera sentirte BIENǳ. 
Procedure.  Experimental sessions took place in a module at the laboratory of the 
Faculty of Psychology at the Pontifical Xavier University.  Participants were greeted, thanked 
for volunteering and attending, and given similar instructions to those from previous studies – specifically that that they were about to take part in a preliminary study, designed to 
112 
 
evaluate different types of tests in order to select the most appropriate ones for future 
research.  They were instructed to read a translated version of the Consent Form presented 
in Appendix E and reassured that their participation was voluntary, confidential and 
anonymous.  After answering whatever questions participants had, they signed the consent 
form and were given COP$ 10.000 ȋroughly €ͷ at the time) as a token of appreciation.  Then 
they sat in front of a Dell® OptiPlex™ ͹ͷͷ computer, running Windows XP and equipped with 
a standard 14 inch screen, and were presented with the MMT, with instructions delivered by 
the main researcher in Spanish (the task itself was not translated as it only required 
participants to respond to numbers). Upon finishing the task, they proceeded to complete the 
two IRAPs and the LPS. The experimental session ended with a full debriefing procedure. All 
participants reported understanding the reason for the deception involved in the MMT and 
agreed to have their data included in the analysis. 
Results and Discussion 
Cheating measure.  Cheating levels in the modified MMT were similar to those 
observed in previous studies.  Table 9 presents the percentage of participants who availed of 
the opportunity to cheat in each block, and the average number of cheating responses with 
its standard deviation and range.  In general, the figures are only very slightly higher to those 
from Studies 1 and 3, and closer to what has been found in previous literature as discussed in 
Study 1. 
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Table 9 
 Descriptive statistics for the MMT. 
Task 
% who 
cheated 
Average 
cheats SD Range 
Slow block only 57.6 1.00 1.05 0-3 
Fast block only 70.0 1.53 1.40 0-6 
Combined 70.0 2.56 1.99 0-7 
Psychopathy.  Descriptive statistics for the Levenson Psychopathy scale are 
presented in Table 10.   In general, the figures were similar, if only slightly higher, than in the 
previous study.   
Table 10.  
Descriptive statistics for the Levenson Psychopathy Scale. 
Sub-scale Mean SD Range 
Primary Psychopathy 35.56 5.19 26-47 
Secondary Psychopathy 25.40 4.91 18-36 
Total score 60.96 7.95 46-79 
IRAPs.  The CM-IRAP showed similar trends to those from previous studies, in that participants seemed to respond ǲTrueǳ more quickly than ǲFalseǳ to the Good/Moral and 
Bad/Immoral trial types, but were quicker to respond ǲFalseǳ rather than ǲTrueǳ in the 
Good/Immoral and Bad/Moral trial-types.  One-sample t tests revealed significantly different 
effects from zero for the Good/Moral (t = 5.874, p < 0.01) and Bad/Immoral (t = 5.863, p < 
0.05) trial types.  The effect for the Bad/Moral trial-type approached significance (t = 1.823, p 
= 0.07).  The mean D-IRAP scores are presented in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13. Mean D-IRAP scores with standard error bars for the four trial types of the 
FM IRAP in experiment 4.  Scores above zero indicate pro-moral bias 
The mean D-IRAP scores for the DF-IRAP are displayed in Figure 14 .  Similar to the 
previous study, participants responded ǲTrueǳ faster than ǲFalseǳ on the Do-Good/Feel-Good 
and Do-Bad/Feel-Bad trial types.  In this case, however, the response patterns for the 
remaining trial-types were reversed: whereas in Study 3 participants tended to respond ǲTrueǳ faster than ǲFalseǳ on the Do-Bad/Feel-Good trial-type and ǲFalseǳ faster than ǲTrueǳ 
on the Do-Good/Feel-Bad trial-type, the opposite was true here.  One sample t-tests detected 
effects significantly different from zero for the Do-Good/Feel-Good (t = 12.941, p < 0.01), Do-
Bad/Feel-Good (t = 5.853, p < 0.01) and Do-Bad/Feel-Bad (t = 8.136, p < 0.01) trial-types. 
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Figure 14. Mean D-IRAP scores with standard error bars for the four trial types of the 
FM IRAP in experiment 4.  Scores above zero indicate pro-moral bias. 
Predicting cheating behaviours.  Pearson correlations between the mean D-IRAP 
scores in the trial types in each IRAP were entered into a correlation matrix with the 
psychopathy subscales and the cheating measure (see Table 11).  In the CM-IRAP, a 
significant correlation between the Bad/Immoral trial-type and the MMT emerged, indicating 
that an increasing pro-moral bias in this trial-type predicted higher cheating.  The same 
correlation was marginally significant in Study 3, but in the same direction.  For the first time, 
a weak positive correlation between the Good/Moral trial-type and the MMT seemed to 
appear, although it did not reach significance.  Our previous studies had very weak and 
negative, non-significant correlations between this trial type and the MMT.   
In the DF-IRAP, the correlation between the Do-Bad/Feel-Bad trial-type and the MMT 
from Study 3 was observed (r =  -0.373, p < 0.05), indicating that an increasing pro-moral 
bias predicted less cheating.  Interestingly, the Do-Bad/Feel-Good trial-type showed a weak 
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positive correlation with the MMT, although it did not reach statistical significance – this 
trend indicates that participants who more strongly affirmed feeling good when engaging in 
bad actions also tended to cheat more.  This latter result is unique to the current study. 
Table 11.   
Correlations between psychopathy, cheating and mean D-IRAP scores 
Trial-types 
Primary 
Psychopathy 
Secondary 
Psychopathy MMT 
r p r p r p 
CM-IRAP       
Good/Moral -0.245 > 0.1 -0.040 > 0.1 0.308† 0.09 
Good/Immoral -0.120 > 0.1 0.122 > 0.1 0.037 > 0.1 
Bad/Moral -0.202 > 0.1 -0.259 > 0.1 -0.027 > 0.1 
Bad/Immoral -0.212 > 0.1 -0.013  > 0.1 0.389* 0.03 
DF-IRAP       
Do-Good/Feel-Good -0.259 > 0.1 -Ͳ.͵͵ͻ† 0.06 -0.036 > 0.1 
Do-Good/Feel-Bad 0.268 > 0.1 0.090 > 0.1 -0.141 > 0.1 
Do-Bad/Feel-Good 0.086 > 0.1 -0.156 > 0.1 Ͳ.͵͵ͳ† 0.07 
Do-Bad/Feel-Bad -0.248 > 0.1 -0.114 > 0.1 -0.373* 0.04 
(*) Significant at the 0.05 level.  ȋ†Ȍ Approached significance. 
Correlations with psychopathy.  A marginally significant negative correlation emerged 
between the Do-Good/Feel-Good trial-type in the DF-IRAP and secondary psychopathy, which 
indicates that an anti-moral bias predicts higher situational and emotive psychopathy. A 
similar correlation was found in Study 3, although it failed to reach significance here at the p 
< 0.05 level. Also similar to Study 3, the secondary psychopathy subscale correlated with the 
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MMT (r = -0.358, p = 0.05), indicating that higher levels of situational psychopathy predicted 
increasing cheating responses.  All other correlations were non-significant.  
Summary and conclusions.  This replication showed similar effects to the previous 
study. The distribution of  mean D-scores in both IRAPs points to faster and more accurate 
responding that confirms common sense expectations, especially on the Good/Moral and 
Bad/Immoral trial-types in the CM-IRAP and on the Do-Good/Feel-Good and Do-Bad/Feel-Bad 
trial-types in the DF-IRAP.  
However, and in line with findings from the first three studies, the IRAPs also 
identified less clear biases in certain trial-types, perhaps reflecting their sensitivity to less 
well-established verbal relations. This was especially true for the Good/Immoral trial-type in 
the CM-IRAP, for which we failed to find significant effects throughout the studies up to this 
point. It appears, therefore, that participants had difficulties denying (more readily than 
confirming) that good actions are immoral. In contrast, the Bad/Moral trial-type showed a 
significant effect in Study 1 and an effect that approached significance in the current study, 
indicating a readiness to deny (more readily than confirm) that bad actions are moral.  We 
will come back to this point and suggest possible explanations for this pattern of results in 
the context of the General Discussion. 
Similar to Study 3, the DF-IRAP produced the expected and relatively strong effects 
for the Do-Good/Feel-Good and Do-Bad/Feel-Bad trial-types, and this last trial-type was able 
to predict cheating in the MMT consistently across the two studies presented in the current 
chapter. The Do-Good/Feel-Bad trial-type failed to yield significant effects in both studies but 
the Do-Bad/Feel-Good trial-type produced a relatively strong and significant effect in the 
current study (but not in the former experiment). At the present time, it remains unclear why 
we obtained this difference across the two studies. Of course, it could be due to simple error 
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variance or some undefined cultural differences between Irish and Colombian participants. 
Again, we shall return to this issue in the context of the General Discussion. 
At this point in the current research programme, the CM-IRAP has shown its ability to 
capture the expected, common-sense effects of morality of good actions and immorality of 
bad actions.  It was also able to predict cheating to a certain degree through its Bad/Immoral 
trial-type, leading to our interpretation that stronger confirmations that bad actions are 
immoral might sometimes indicate a higher likelihood of engaging in immoral actions. 
Nevertheless, we have found the DF-IRAP to be a more reliable predictor, both in conceptual 
and empirical terms, in that the correlations were relatively strong and intuitively 
predictable (i.e., confirming Do-Bad/Feel-Bad relations more quickly than denying this 
relation predicted lower levels of cheating). At this point, therefore, it appears that the IRAP 
that targeted deictic relations (i.e., how the participant feels about their own moral and 
immoral actions) was a more appropriate tool for assessing implicit morality than an IRAP 
that targeted implicit attitudes about morality per se. Therefore, for the last part of the 
current thesis, we decided to use the DF-IRAP as the single implicit measure of deceptive 
behaviour. 
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Intervening to curb deceptive behaviour 
Unethical behaviour has direct significant institutional and personal effects.  The 
financial effects of immorality have been widely studied thanks to the severity of their 
consequences and their readily measurable impact.  For example, the collapse of Enron 
Corporation in 2004, brought about by shady business practices and lax audit processes, 
resulted in the loss of thousands of jobs and the evaporation of shareholder value and 
retirement plans.  Gino, Schweitzer, Mead and Ariely (2011) point out that around one 
trillion dollars is lost in the economy of the United States through diverse forms of immoral 
behaviour.   
There are also psychological consequences to immorality.  Acting immorally seems to 
evoke feelings of guilt, produce discomfort upon recall or mention of past unethical actions 
and make moral agents believe the lies they tell (Tobey Klass, 1978).  In a study with early 
career lawyers, Kammeyer-Mueller, Simon and Rich (2012) found higher levels of emotional 
exhaustion and decreased career satisfaction in participants who felt pressed by their 
employer to engage in practices that countered their own sense of morality.  And deception, 
even if undiscovered, has been found to generate distrust and wreak havoc in romantic 
relationships (Sagarin, Rhoads, & Cialdini, 1998). 
Aware of the pervasiveness of immoral behaviour and its costs, governments, 
companies and training facilities worldwide routinely offer workshops and courses intended 
to decrease cheating, deception and harmful unethical practices.  However, these 
interventions tend to be based upon traditional conceptions of morality as an inner sense 
responsible for behaviour that develops in a predictable sequence towards an ultimate goal.  
As such, they target vague internal constructs such as ǲmoral self-conceptǳ or ǲmoral reasoning processesǳ.  (owever, this focus on inferred constructs normally puts them at high 
risk of failing to identify and address functional determinants of immoral behaviour. 
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Zhang et al. (2014) propose that interventions to reduce unethical behaviour can be 
structure-oriented or values-oriented.  Structure-oriented interventions aim to reduce 
external temptations to cheat and increase rewards for ethical behaviour.  This includes the 
implementation of policies, increasing the likelihood and the size of punishment for 
immorality, increasing rewards for ethical behaviour, and generally designing environments 
in such a way that unethical behaviours are impossible or unlikely.  For example, strategic 
placement of CCTV cameras and access control barriers reduced car theft by up to 85%, 
sometimes even eliminating it completely, in several cities in the UK and the USA (La Vigne & 
Lowry, 2011). 
Values-oriented interventions, on the other hand, target a personal desire to behave 
ethically.  For instance, reminding people of their own immoral actions in the past has been 
suggested to produce compensatory moral action in the form of increased prosocial 
behaviour and less cheating (Jordan et al., 2011).  Other possibilities are to expose people to 
general positive values, which has been found to correlate with more prosocial attitudes and 
actions (Zhang et al., 2014) and to promote inferences of oneǯs self-concept to be more ethical 
(Aquino & Reed, 2002).  Finally, priming tasks have found that exposing people to positive 
concepts might help curb immoral behaviour.  For example, Chugh, Kern, Zhu and Lee (2014) 
asked participants to remember situations in which they felt secure and accepted, or anxious 
and rejected, and found decreased deception in the first (secure) group.  Priming with concepts that had a less clear association with cheating ȋfor example ǲtimeǳ instead of ǲmoneyǳȌ seems to produce less unethical behaviour as well (Gino & Mogilner, 2014). 
Within the context of experimental social psychology, many researchers have sought 
out interventions that might help reduce the effects of stereotyping, prejudice, racism, and 
other socio-cognitive processes.  A large set of studies (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, 
Simon, & Breus, 1994) support the notion that thinking of oneǯs death temporarily changes 
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peopleǯs perceptions and reactions towards threats or challenges to personal worldviews.  These ǲmortality salienceǳ effects have been shown to permeate diverse social processes 
such as interpersonal attraction, obedience, nationalism, and it has been proposed that their 
mechanism of action is the temporary perception of a threat to a stable worldview, 
responsible for an increase in negative affect.  Based on these reported mortality salience effects, we decided to test two premises: that bringing attention to oneǯs mortality causes 
cheating to decrease, and that the DF-IRAP will be sensitive to those changes and will 
continue to be useful as a tool for implicit evaluation of morality-related verbal networks. 
Testing these hypotheses was the main goal of the two studies presented in the current 
chapter. 
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Study 5: The Effect of a Values-Oriented Intervention on Cheating Behaviour  
Death is the unavoidable, ultimate fate of all human beings.  Intuitively, such 
experience should be regarded as a necessary component of life and embraced as such, but 
both everyday experience and scientific research (pioneered by Becker, 1973) suggest that 
reacting to thoughts of death with anxiety, fear and other negative emotions is commonplace 
in many cultures.  To account for these reactions, Greenberg et al. (1994) developed Terror 
Management Theory (TMT), which proposes that awareness of mortality encourages a desire 
for finding meaning and building self-esteem as a form of protection against the threat of 
eventual death.  The methodological device used to test this idea in the laboratory is the 
Mortality Salience Induction (MSI), a task that encourages participants to think and reflect on 
their own death, and thus bring it to consciousness and make it more salient.   
The MSI requires participants to respond to four open-ended statements related to 
thoughts of their own death (the items are presented in Appendix H), and it is normally 
presented as part of a package of tasks.  The induction has consistently shown a set of so-called ǲmortality salience effectsǳ that play a role in many different social situations and 
issues: in a meta-analysis of more than 160 studies that used the MSI, Burke et al. (2010) 
found significant effects of the task on such diverse measures as state guilt, desire for control, 
attitudes towards animals, evaluations of others, moral relativity, preference for positive 
words, willingness to interact, and many others.   
The proposed mechanism for the mortality salience effects is the temporary 
perception of a threat to a stable worldview, responsible for an increase in negative affect.  
The task has been found to heighten anxiety and induce negative emotions (Routledge et al., 
2010), but has also been shown to have a wealth of positive effects, such as an increase in 
reciprocity (Schindler, Reinhard, & Stahlberg, 2013), prosocial orientation (Niesta, Fritsche, 
& Jonas, 2008), intentions to engage in healthy behaviours (Arndt, Schimel, & Goldenberg, 
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2003; Bevan, Maxfield, & Bultmann, 2014), and likelihood to participate in donation appeals 
(F. Cai & Wyer, 2014).  In any case, the duration of the effect seems to be minutes or hours 
(Burke et al., 2010). 
Therefore, in this study, we sought to determine whether the MSI had an impact on 
engagement in cheating behaviour and whether the DF-IRAP is sensitive to this impact.  
Materials and Methods 
Participants. Fifty-five students (64% females) recruited from the Departmental 
Volunteer pool from the National University of Ireland, Maynooth, participated in this study, 
with ages between 18 and 26 (M = 19.74, SD = 2.21).  They were recruited into an 
intervention and a control group (details of the tasks will be provided below).  Analyses 
proceeded with data from 50 participants because five did not achieve test criteria in the 
practice blocks of the IRAP, and their data were consequently excluded from the dataset. 
Measures. We used a variation of the Mortality Salience Induction (Greenberg et al., 
1994).  The general goal of the Mortality Salience Induction and its numerous variations is to 
get participants to reflect on their own mortality.  The original intervention simply asks 
participants four open-ended questions about their own mortality, but in the version used in 
this study, we also used a priming task that helped strengthen reflections on mortality in 
other studies conducted in our laboratory (Hussey & Barnes-Holmes, 2015).  This latter task 
involves presenting a piece of paper containing a number of dots that matches the expected 
number of weeks left to live for participants, according to their age and gender, and making 
them aware of the fact that it is a relatively low number of dots.  The complete script and 
questions for the intervention and control versions are presented in Appendix H.  Based on 
the results of Studies 3-5, we selected the DF-IRAP to assess the effect of the intervention. 
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Procedure.  Sessions took place in experimental cubicles identical to the ones used in 
previous studies.  Participants were given similar information to that provided in other 
experiments in the current thesis, i.e., that this was a preliminary study designed to evaluate 
different types of tests in order to select the most appropriate ones for future studies.  This 
was followed by them reading and signing the informed consent form (Appendix E), and 
reassurance by the researcher that their participation was confidential, voluntary, 
anonymous and that they could withdraw from the study at any time, which none of them 
decided to do. They were then given €ͷ for their participation that they could keep even if 
they decided to terminate their participation mid-way.  Before starting the data collection 
proper, participants were asked if they had experienced bereavement over that past 12 
months or if they had a history of diagnosed psychiatric disorders.  No volunteers reported 
either, so the data for the full sample was included in the analyses, except for the five 
mentioned participants who failed to reach the test blocks on the DF-IRAP.  The experimental 
session itself started with either the Mortality Salience Induction (MSI) task or the Control 
task. 
Mortality Salience Induction (MSI) and debriefing.  If the participant had been assigned 
to the intervention group, the researcher verbally delivered the following information: 
ǲ) think itǯs often very easy to forget just how short life is, especially for young healthy students.  To help convey this, )ǯve put together this diagram for you.  Given that ) know your age and gender, itǯs trivial for me to estimate your expected lifespanǳ 
At this point, the researcher placed in front of the participant a sheet of paper 
containing small dots arranged in a square in the centre of the sheet, measuring 
approximately 2.2 inches and containing 52 rows and 52 columns, for a total of 2.704 dots.  
The researcher then explained: 
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ǲBased on that, the number of dots on this piece of paper is equal to the 
number of weeks you have left to live... [long pause] ) promise that )ǯm not 
trying to trick you or deceive you – it is a surprisingly small number of dots, isnǯt it? The thing about dots is that once you spend them, you cannot get 
them back.  This is not a rehearsal, you will not get a second shot.  This is your 
life, right now, ending, one day at a time.  [pause] The other thing about dots 
is that they run out, no matter what you do.  Make no mistake, death is 
coming.  You have a limited number of days left on this planet, and like all of us, youǯre faced with the difficult question of what youǯre going to do with 
them.  [pause] How many of these dots will be well spent dots, doing things 
that you truly value, like time with friends and family, and how many dots will 
be more like hovering dots and X-factor dots?ǳ 
A short pause followed, after which the researcher gave the following instruction ǲWith all that in mind, )ǯd like you to write out a few lines about what you think dying itself will be likeǳ, and put another sheet of paper in front of the participant, that contained the 
following four items:  
1. ǲWhat emotions does the thought of your own death arouse in you?ǳ 
2. ǲJot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you physically 
as you die and once you are physically deadǳ 
3. ǲThe one thing ) fear most about my death is...ǳ 
4. ǲMy scariest thoughts about my death are...ǳ 
After ensuring that the participant had understood the instructions, the researcher 
left the room and the participant started the task.  Upon its completion, the researcher 
reentered the room and told that some people found the task to be unpleasant, given that 
death is not something people generally like to discuss or bring to consciousness.  However, 
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they were told, some research suggested that reflecting on oneǯs death actually brought some 
positive effects, like increased pro-social disposition and motivation, probably due to the 
acknowledgement that life eventually ends and that we have limited time to do what we 
value.  In this short conversation, the researcher also aimed to determine whether the 
participant was experiencing anxiety or stress levels beyond what could be reasonably 
expected.  Many participants, however, reflected positively on the experience and 
acknowledged that it seems likely that awareness of mortality helps put things in perspective 
and increase the chances of engaging in valued action. 
A protocol designed to ensure the well-being of the volunteers was in place, that 
involved terminating the experiment immediately, accompanying the participant to the 
University Medical Centre, reporting the incident to a member of staff at the Department of 
Psychology, and follow up (National University of Ireland, Maynooth, 2015).  However, no 
participant reported having experienced heightened psychological distress and therefore the 
protocol did not need to be activated. 
Control task.  The procedure for participants assigned to the control group was 
similar, but the control task aimed to replace mortality-related stimuli with neutral words 
and expressions that had nothing to do with values.  The script was as follows, with 
departures from the original underlined:  
) think itǯs often very easy to forget just how big our solar system is, especially for young students.  To help convey this, )ǯve put together this diagram for you. 
[place sheet in front of them].  The number of dots on this piece of paper is equal 
to the number of million kilometres that separates the Sun and the Earth. [said very slowly and carefully, and then a long pause].  ) promise that )ǯm not trying to trick or deceive you. )tǯs a surprising number of dots, isnǯt it?  )ǯd like you to write 
out a few lines about what you think about the size of our solar system. 
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1. What emotions does the thought of the size of our solar system arouse in you? 
2. Jot down, as specifically as you can, whether you think mankind will be able to 
travel throughout our solar system. 
3. ǲThe one thing that comes to mind when pondering the size of our solar system 
is…ǳ 
4. ǲMy thoughts about our the size of solar system are…ǳ 
MMT and IRAP.  The first task was immediately followed by the MMT and the DF-
IRAP, delivered in the exact same manner as in Study 3.  Afterwards, participants were 
thoroughly debriefed according to the procedure that has been used in the previous studies. 
All participants agreed to have their data included in the analysis. 
Results and Discussion 
Cheating measure.  Descriptives for the cheating measure (see Table 12) showed 
that overall 58% of the participants availed of the opportunity to cheat – a slight decrease 
from the numbers from previous studies, and the lowest figure from the set of studies using 
the MMT up to this point.  The average number of cheats per group was lower for the MSI in 
every case, supporting our hypothesis, although independent t-tests failed to find significant 
differences between the two groups in every case (p > 0.1).   
Table 12.  
Descriptive statistics for the MMT by task in Study 5  
MMT Block 
MSI Control 
% cheaters* Avg. cheats (SD) % cheaters* Avg. cheats (SD) 
Slow 20.0 0.200 (0.408) 32.0 0.360 (0.569) 
Fast 56.0 1.080 (1.382) 52.0 1.480 (1.782) 
Combined 56.0 1.240 (1.562) 56.0 1.840 (2.035) 
(*) Percentage reported within task 
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IRAP. Figure 15 presents the mean D-IRAP scores for the DF-IRAP per group.  In general, participants responded ǲTrueǳ more quickly than ǲFalseǳ on the Do-Good/Feel-Good 
and Do-Bad/Feel-Bad trial-types, and the opposite responding pattern was observed in the 
Do-Good/Feel-Bad and Do-Bad/Feel-Good trial-types.  One-sample t-tests showed effects 
significantly different from zero at the p < 0.02 level for every trial type. A 2x4 repeated 
measures ANOVA with the trial-types as within-subjects variables and the task as a between-
subjects factor confirmed a statistically significant effect of the task on the mean D-IRAP 
scores (F = 4.092, p < 0.05).  In order to determine the direction and location of the effect, 
independent t-tests grouped by Task (MSI or Control) were conducted. These revealed that 
the MSI group scored higher (M = 0.480, SD = 0.292) than the Control group (M = 0.304, SD = 
0.282) in the Do good-Feel-good trial type (t = 2.160, p < 0.03, gS = 0.602 [95% CI: 0.03 - 
1.17]).   The effect for the Do-Good/Feel-Bad trial-type suggested by the figure was marginally 
significant (t = 1.693, p = 0.09). No significant effects were found for the remaining trial-
types. 
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Figure 15. Mean D-IRAP scores with standard error bars for the four trial types of the 
DF-IRAP, divided by group (MSI or control). 
Predicting cheating.  As observed in Table 13, which shows the correlation matrix 
between trial-types in the DF-IRAP and the MMT score, divided by group (MSI or Control), 
the Do-Bad/Feel-Bad trial-type seemed to maintain its predictive power on the final cheating 
score, slightly improving on the results from previous studies. The overall correlation 
between this trial-type and the MMT (r = -0.414, p < 0.01) suggests once again that this trial-
type is probably the best predictor of cheating scores.  The Do-Good/Feel-Bad trial-type 
showed a weak to moderate negative correlation with the MMT that approached significance, 
indicating that a pro-moral bias in this trial-type predicts lower cheating. 
Table 13 
Correlations between the trial-types in the DF-IRAP and cheating per group 
 MSI Control 
r p r p 
Do-Good/Feel-Good -0.311 < 0.1 -0.208 > 0.2 
Do-Good/Feel-Bad -0.345† 0.09 -0.319 > 0.1 
Do-Bad/Feel-Good -0.113 < 0.5 -0.019 > 0.5 
Do-Bad/Feel-Bad -0.398* > 0.05  -0.406* < 0.05 
Summary and conclusions.  The distribution of the DF-IRAP in this study was similar 
to what has been observed in the previous experiments, in that participants readily 
confirmed that good actions make them feel good and bad actions make them feel bad - all 
the trial-types are in fact in the expected direction. Group comparisons between the MSI and 
control task showed that the MSI seemed to have a strong effect on the Do-Good/Feel-Good 
trial-type, indicating that participants who completed the mortality salience intervention 
confirmed more quickly and accurately that engaging in good actions made them feel good. In 
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fact, the trend was that the MSI produced slightly higher effects than the control task in every 
trial-type, although the difference was statistically significant only for the aforementioned 
Do-Good/Feel-Good trial-type. It is worth noting that a difference between the Do-Good/Feel-
Bad trial-type approached significance, which indicates that participants who completed the 
MSI denied more strongly that engaging in good actions made them feel bad. 
We observed somewhat counterintuitive results when examining the results from the 
cheating measure.  On the one hand, the MSI seems to have decreased the amount of 
cheating, if not by a large margin.  We had hypothesised that this would be the case for the 
MSI, but a similar decrease was observed in the group presented with the neutral 
intervention. At this time, the reason for this general decrease remains unexplained but 
possible explanations will be addressed in the context of the General Discussion.  
Correlations between the cheating measure and the trial-types in the IRAP yielded significant 
inverse correlations with the Do-Bad/Feel-Bad trial-type, similar to what was observed in the 
studies from the previous chapter.  A correlation that approached significance was found 
between the Do-Good/Feel-Bad trial-type and the MMT, indicating that stronger denials that 
engaging in good actions evoked bad feelings seemed to predict lower cheating.   
At this point in the current study, the observed effect prompted us to perform a 
conceptual replication in order to determine whether the effect is stable, and to pinpoint the 
part of the task responsible for the effect.  Therefore, in Study 6, we aimed to separate the 
two components of the intervention and determine whether they still produced the observed 
effect.  
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Study 6. Isolating the Components of the Previous Intervention 
The MSI variation we used in Study 5 can be thought of as a two-component task, one 
being the dots part and the other being the questions.  Even though both aim to increase the 
salience of mortality, the dots task also targets the idea of time heavily: participants are 
instructed to look at the dots and realise that they represent the time they have left to live.   
In their study of priming and immorality, Gino and Mogilner (2014) found that 
priming people with time-related words, as opposed to money-related words, seems to 
decrease unethical behaviour in a deception task.  They speculate that the idea of money is 
more associated with immorality in daily life than time.  This led to the idea of testing the two 
components independently in order to determine what component of the MSI task we used in 
Study 5 carries the largest effect in the observed reduction in immorality. 
Materials and Methods 
Participants.  A convenience sample of 56 Psychology students from the Pontifical 
Xavier University in Bogotá, Colombia was used for this study.  They were quasi-randomly assigned to two intervention groups, the ǲdotsǳ group and the ǲquestionsǳ group.  The data 
for five participants had to be excluded from the analysis because they failed to reach the 
criteria for the test blocks in the IRAP, leaving a total of 51 participants, 26 in the dots group 
and 25 in the control group.  67.7% of the sample were females. 
Measures.  The MSI from Study 5 was separated into its two hypothesised components.  Participants assigned to the ǲdotsǳ condition were presented with the first part of the MS) ȋAppendix G, from ǲDots section beginsǳ until ǲQuestions section beginsǳȌ, and participants assigned to the ǲquestionsǳ condition were presented with the first part of the  
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Validation procedure for the MSI.  As described when presenting Study 4, ensuring 
procedural equivalence is not an exact science and different approaches seem to yield similar 
results.  Our choice in the matter has followed the work of other researchers in Latin America 
and involved a process of translation-backtranslation-cultural assessment of the scripts for 
the dots and questions tasks.  Like before, the main researcher performed the forward 
translation into Spanish, and the same team responsible for backtranslation and cross-
validation in Study 4 helped with the procedure in the same way.  The questions themselves 
have been translated into Spanish by Campos Vizcarra (2013) and we have used them here.  
The complete scripts are presented in Appendix I. 
Procedure.  Data collection took place at the Psychology Laboratory at the Pontifical 
Xavier University, inside standard, insonorised experimental modules.  Participants were 
welcomed to the laboratory, thanked for their willingness to participate, and given similar 
instructions to those from previous studies – specifically that that they were to evaluate 
different types of tests in order to select certain tasks for future research.  They were 
presented with a translated version of the Consent Form from Appendix E and informed that 
their participation was voluntary, confidential and anonymous.  After reading and signing the 
consent form, they were given COP$ ͳͲ.ͲͲͲ ȋroughly €ͷ at the timeȌ as a token of 
appreciation.   
ǲDotsǳ task.  If the participant had been assigned to the Dots sub-task, the researcher 
verbally delivered the information presented in Appendix I.  The task was introduced by 
delivering the following information (in Spanish): 
ǲCreo que suele ser muy fácil olvidar lo corta que es la vida, especialmente 
para estudiantes jóvenes y sanos. Para ayudarte a comprender esto, he creado 
este diagrama. Dado que conozco tu edad y tu sexo, puedo estimar fácilmente tu expectativa de vidaǳ [) think itǯs often very easy to forget just how short life 
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is, especially for young healthy students.  To help convey this, )ǯve put together 
this diagram for you.  Given that ) know your age and gender, itǯs trivial for me 
to estimate your expected lifespan]. 
At this point the participant was given the sheet of paper containing dots, and told:  
ǲCon base en eso, el número de puntos en esta hoja de papel representa el 
número de semanas que te quedan de vida [decirlo lenta y cuidadosamente, y 
luego una pausa larga). Te aseguro que no estoy tratando de engañarte con 
esto.  Es un número sorprendentemente pequeño de puntos, ¿no es verdad?  
La cosa con estos puntos es que una vez que los gastas no los puedes tener de 
nuevo.  Esto no es un ensayo, no habrá una segunda oportunidad.  Esta es tu 
vida, ahora mismo, acabándose día a día. Otra cosa de estos puntos es que van 
a acabar, sin importar lo que hagas.  La muerte llegará – no pienses que no. 
¿Cuántos de estos puntos vas a gastar bien, haciendo cosas que de verdad 
valoras, como pasar tiempo con tu familia, y cuántos serán puntos haciendo 
pereza y viendo ǮYo me llamoǯ?ǳ [Based on that, the number of dots on this 
piece of paper is equal to the number of weeks you have left to live... [long 
pause] ) promise that )ǯm not trying to trick you or deceive you – it is a 
surprisingly small number of dots, isnǯt it? The thing about dots is that once you 
spend them, you cannot get them back.  This is not a rehearsal, you will not get a 
second shot.  This is your life, right now, ending, one day at a time.  [pause] The 
other thing about dots is that they run out, no matter what you do.  Make no 
mistake, death is coming.  You have a limited number of days left on this planet, 
and like all of us, youǯre faced with the difficult question of what youǯre going to 
do with them.  [pause] How many of these dots will be well spent dots, doing 
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things that you truly value, like time with friends and family, and how many 
dots will be more like hovering dots and X-factor dots?] 
Participants were then instructed to take a few minutes to reflect mentally on the 
information provided, during which the experimenter left the room.  After about a minute 
had passed, the experimenter reentered the module and started the debriefing described in 
Study 4. 
Questions task.  If the participant was assigned to this group, the sub-task was 
introduced in a similar way to the Dots task, without the critical manipulation, by delivering 
this message: 
ǲCreo que suele ser muy fácil olvidar lo corta que es la vida, especialmente 
para estudiantes jóvenes y sanos.  Ahora te voy a pedir que reflexiones un 
poco sobre tu propia vida y su final inevitable, y que escribas en esta hoja las respuestas a las preguntas que están escritasǳ [) think itǯs often very easy to 
forget just how short life is, especially for young healthy students.  Now I will ask 
you to reflect a little bit on your life and its inevitable end, and that you write 
some answers for the questions on this sheet].  
This was followed by a short pause, after which the researcher prompted the 
participant to write out a few lines about their perceptions of what their death would be like, 
on a piece of paper with the following questions, equivalent to their English versions, on it:  
1. ¿Qué emociones te genera pensar sobre tu propia muerte? 
2. Escribe, con tanto detalle como puedas, qué crees que te pasará físicamente 
cuando mueras y cuando estés físicamente muerto(a) 
3. ǲLo que más me asusta de mi muerte es…ǳ 
4. ǲMis pensamientos más aterrorizantes sobre la muerte son…ǳ  
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Having made sure that the participant had understood the instructions, the 
researcher left the room and the participant started the assigned task.  Independently of the 
task, the researcher reentered the room when the participant had finished and started the 
debriefing by telling participants that the task was unpleasant to some, because death is not a 
popular topic and certainly not something people think much about.  They were told about 
the positive effects of the task and during this conversation the researcher aimed to ensure 
that the participant was not distressed or experiencing any negative affect.  The session 
continued with the administration of the MMT and the IRAP in the same manner as in Study 
4, and finished with the same debriefing procedure.  All participants agreed to have their data 
included in the following analysis. 
Results and Discussion 
Cheating measure.  The descriptives for the MMT are presented in Table 14. In 
general, the dots group had slightly lower levels of cheating, which is in agreement with 
results from Study 5 and our hypothesis that the intervention decreases immoral behaviour.  
However, the Questions group presents levels of cheating that are rather similar, if only 
slightly lower, to those found in previous studies, with more than half of the sample having 
cheated at least once. Therefore, from these results, the Dots task seemed to be the main 
carrier of the decrease in cheating.  In every case, the average number of cheats on the MMT 
is lower on the Dots group compared to the Questions group, although the difference is not 
significant on an independent samples t-test (p > 0.1). 
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Table 14 
Descriptive statistics for the MMT by task in Study 6 
MMT Block 
Dots Questions 
% cheaters* Avg. cheats (SD) % cheaters* Avg. cheats (SD) 
Slow 19.2 0.269 (0.604) 28.0 0.360 (0.700) 
Fast 50.0 1.154 (1.592) 60.0 1.640 (1.705) 
Combined 50.0 1.423 (1.943) 64.0 2.120 (2.186) 
IRAP.  The mean D-IRAP scores for Study 6, divided by group, are presented in Figure 
16.  The general distribution is strikingly similar to that from every study using the DF-IRAP 
so far.  Participants confirmed faster and more accurately that doing good things evoked 
good feelings and that engaging in bad actions conversely produced bad feelings – the 
common sense expectation that the DF-IRAP has consistently shown so far.  The remaining 
trial-types are also in the expected, pro-moral direction, and one-sample t tests to determine 
if the effects were significantly different from zero yielded significant results for all but the 
Do-Good/Feel-Bad trial-type (t = 1.945, p = 0.06 for the Dots group and t = 1.503, p < 0.1 for  
the Questions group).  In order to determine whether the task had an effect on the mean D-
IRAP scores, we conducted a 2x4 repeated measures ANOVA that confirmed a difference 
favouring the Dots task (F = 4.054, p  < 0.05).  This was followed by independent T tests that 
revealed that the Dots group scored higher (M = 0.310, SD = 0.161) than the Questions group 
(M = 0.0.226, SD = 0.124) on the Do Good/Feel-Good trial type (t = 2.081, p < 0.05, gS = 0.57 
[95% CI: 0.01 – 1.14]) and on the Do-Bad/Feel-Bad trial type (t = 2.032, p = 0.05, gS = 0.56 
[95% CI: 0.00 – 1.13]).  No significant effects were found for the remaining trial-types. 
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Figure 16.  Mean D-IRAP scores with standard error bars for the four trial types of the 
DF-IRAP in Study 6, divided by group (MSI or control). 
Predicting cheating.  As depicted in Table 15, a pro-moral bias on the Do-Bad/Feel-
Bad trial-type predicted lower cheating (r = -0.410, p = 0.03) in the Dots task only.  None of 
the remaining trial-types predicted MMT scores, although the overall correlation between the 
Do-Bad/Feel-Bad trial-type and the cheating measure persisted when considering the entire 
sample (r = -0.389, p < 0.01). 
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Table 15 
Correlations between the trial-types in the DF-IRAP and cheating per group 
 MMT total score 
 Dots group Questions group 
r p r P 
Do-Good/Feel-Good -0.324 < 0.1 0.215 < 0.1 
Do-Good/Feel-Bad -0.315 < 0.1 -0.273 < 0.1 
Do-Bad/Feel-Good -0.069 < 0.1 0.296 < 0.1 
Do-Bad/Feel-Bad -0.410* 0.03 -0.316 < 0.1 
Summary and conclusions. The distribution of mean D-IRAP scores in the DF-IRAP in 
the current study was similar to that from previous studies, which is further evidence that 
the IRAP is a useful tool that can capture relational responding related to morality. The trial-
types were all in the expected direction, although the Do-Good/Feel-Bad trial-type once again 
exhibited some inconsistency, which supports our notion that opportunities to exercise this 
particular type of response throughout common verbal histories are limited, and this is 
reflected on the performance on the IRAP.   
Our deconstruction of the MSI task that we had used in Study 5 suggested that the 
Dots task, which makes participants reflect on their mortality by strongly targeting the 
notion of a limited lifetime and encouraging thoughts on valued action, seems to bear most of 
the observed effect on the cheating measure.  We will discuss potential explanations for this 
in the context of the General Discussion. 
This final study in the current programme of research once again provided support 
for the consistency and reliability in the inverse correlation between the cheating measure 
and the Do-Bad/Feel-Bad trial-type on the DF-IRAP. As such, the current thesis supports the 
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DF-IRAP as a potentially useful measure in the context of predicting immoral behaviour, at 
least in well controlled experimental setting. In the next and final chapter the empirical 
research presented throughout the current thesis will first be summarized and then a range 
of issues raised by the work will be discussed.  
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General Discussion 
The general aim of the current research programme was to develop a set of IRAPs 
that could be used to explore verbal networks related to morality and predict the occurrence 
of immoral behaviour. This final chapter will summarise the major findings of the six 
empirical studies presented in this thesis and will consider a number of conceptual, 
theoretical, and methodological issues arising from the work, as well as suggest new 
directions for further research. 
Overview of the research programme 
In Study 1 (presented in Chapter 4), we initiated exploratory work on capturing 
verbal networks related to morality by designing and implementing two IRAPs, one that 
targeted thoughts about good and bad actions and one that targeted frequency of moral and 
immoral behaviour.  The ultimate goal was to determine whether the two IRAPs could be 
used to predict cheating behaviour in a math task that has been used for that purpose.  In 
order to isolate difficulties with the cheating task, we performed a conceptual replication 
with a different cheating task in Study 2, with results that were inconclusive, but with some 
support for our first findings.  Although the specifics will be discussed in the following 
section that compiles the effects for each of the IRAPs we used throughout the thesis, results 
from this first part of the current research programme suggested that the two IRAPs were 
able to predict cheating to a certain extent, and revealed that participants responded to 
certain trial-types according to common sense expectations, but presented interesting 
response patterns in others.   
A secondary goal of the first part was to examine the relationships between the hypothetical process of ǲmoral disengagementǳ and the IRAPs. Specifically, we expected to 
find a relationship between certain trial-types in the IRAPs and indices of moral 
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disengagement, because this social psychology concept describes how people justify certain 
immoral choices and actions in order to maintain a positive moral self-image. In event, 
however, no such relationship was found in the current research programme. 
The second part of the current research programme, described in Chapter 5, 
consisted of two studies in which we sought to deepen our exploration of deictic responding 
by designing an IRAP that tapped into the feelings towards engaging in moral or immoral 
actions. We hypothesised performance on the IRAPs would correlate with the cheating 
measure and would thus be a predictor of immoral behaviour.  Our literature review also 
pointed to a relation between willingness to engage in immoral behaviour and psychopathic 
traits such as boldness and impulsivity, and for that reason we decided to explore whether a 
well-known index of non-clinical psychopathy would correlate with performance on the 
IRAPs and cheating measure. In Study 3 we found the expected common-sense effects for 
certain trial-types in the IRAP, along with intriguing correlations between IRAP performance, 
cheating, and secondary psychopathy.  These results, for the most part, were replicated in 
Study 4, in which we used the same measures in a Colombian sample in order to address the 
issue of ecological validity. 
In the third and final part of the empirical programme we took interest in the 
possibility of testing the effects of a values-oriented procedure, called the Mortality Salience 
Induction, on cheating behaviour and the ability of the IRAP to detect these effects.  In Study 
5 we found a significant effect of the task when compared to a control group, and we decided 
to conduct another replication in a Spanish-speaking sample in Study 6, which largely 
reproduced our results.   
This collection of findings generally demonstrated the viability of using the IRAP to 
assess moral behaviour, its ability to predict cheating to a certain extent, and its potential 
usefulness to examine the effects of interventions in the moral domain. Throughout the 
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entire research programme we conceived and tested three different IRAPs, each of which 
intended to examine a particular type of moral responding and yielded important results that 
we will now discuss. 
IRAP effects 
The CM-IRAP.  This particular IRAP was conceived as a device to observe ways in 
which moral labels are assigned to actions in verbal networks by asking participants to 
categorise moral and immoral actions as good or bad. This relatively easy test was expected 
to yield strong effects in agreement with common-sense labelling (i.e., consider good actions 
as moral and bad actions and immoral), and to provide an adequate starting point for an 
exploratory research programme like the one presented in the current thesis.  In general, 
throughout the studies that used the CM-IRAP, these common-sense expected effects were 
found for the Good/Moral and Bad/Immoral trial-types, which asked participants to respond 
that good actions were good and bad actions were bad.  In terms of the REC model (described 
in Chapter 2), this implies that responding to good as moral and bad as immoral is well-
established in the participants' verbal networks and is therefore a low-derivation and low-
complexity type of responding. 
However, the CM-IRAP also delivered paradoxical effects.  For example, intuitively 
one might expect that people who can readily respond that moral actions are good can also 
quickly and strongly deny that moral actions are bad or that immoral actions are good (after 
all it seems to be the very same question, only asked differently).  However, the CM-IRAP 
consistently found low effects and unclear responding patterns to the Good/Immoral and 
Bad/Moral trial-types, implying that there had been fewer opportunities to respond in those 
ways throughout the formation of the participants' verbal histories thus indicating higher 
levels of derivation for those trial-types.  
A potential explanation for why there are fewer opportunities to derive those 
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relations in the natural environment is that traditional, common-sense conceptions of 
morality tend to be biased towards binary models: people are either good or bad, innocent or 
guilty, lawful or criminal.  Moreover, these models generally presume that the quality of 
being moral or immoral is relatively stable – in fact, most of our legal systems are based on 
this idea, and even certain everyday expressions contain it ȋǲonce a thief, always a thiefǳ, ǲthe leopard does not change its spotsǳȌ.  It is likely that, given our cultural predilection for those 
polar models of morality, individuals have fewer opportunities to respond to the Good-
Immoral and Bad-Moral trial-types and this was reflected by performance on the CM-IRAP.   
Another interesting effect that emerged from the CM-IRAP was the counter-intuitive 
correlation between the cheating measure and the Bad/Immoral trial type, indicating that 
people who confirmed more strongly that bad behaviour was immoral also tended to cheat 
more.  Our interpretation of this finding is that strong, convincing affirmations that bad 
actions are immoral are developed throughout a verbal history as a curtain behind which 
immorality can more safely take place. In other words, a person who tends to lie, cheat and 
deceive as a functional class of behaviour may tend to lie and deceive in the context of 
convincing others of how aversive he or she finds immoral behaviour to be. In other words, 
the cheater, by definition, will frequently lie about cheating itself. In relational terms, this 
involves becoming highly practised at criticising immoral behaviour, as reflected in the CM-
IRAP performances 
As interesting and promising as these findings are, they only paint part of the picture.  
There is only so much knowledge to be gained about verbal networks related to morality if 
only these types of conceptual networks are targeted, because they tell more about the 
culture in which a person learned moral behaviour than the vicissitudes of individual 
morality. Therefore, as part of our research programme we wanted to test the ability of the 
IRAP to address the moral component of perspective-taking or deictic relational responding.  
Two types of deictic responding were explored in the current research programme by means 
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of two different IRAPs.  In Studies 1 and 2 we used an IRAP (DM-IRAP) that asked 
participants to make implicit reports of the frequency of their own moral and immoral 
behaviour, which again provided a starting point to explore deictic responding.  However, for 
the remainder of the current research programme, we decided to investigate how 
participants would feel when engaging in moral and immoral actions. We called the latter 
IRAP the DF (for deictic/feelings) IRAP.  We will now summarise our findings using both 
tools.  
The DM-IRAP. The deictic morality (DM) IRAP asked participants to report whether 
they engaged in good or bad actions frequently or rarely. Our literature review led us to 
expect that participants would report being often good and rarely bad, given that people generally think highly of their own morals and regard themselves as ǲgood peopleǳ (Jordan et 
al., 2011); this was true to a certain extent, but the DM-IRAP also yielded some results that 
could be construed as counter-intuitive.  We found the expected strong effects on the 
Good/Often trial-type, implying that participants considered that they frequently engaged in 
good actions, but we failed to find significant effects on the Bad/Rarely trial-type, which 
indicated that participants could not strongly confirm that their immoral behaviour was 
infrequent.   
Counterintuitively, the Bad/Often trial-type was a predictor of immoral behaviour 
and revealed an unexpected anti-moral bias in both studies.  The implication is that 
participants who more strongly denied engaging in bad behaviour also tended to cheat more, 
and fits together with results from the CM-IRAP to paint a picture of concealed immorality 
through well-practised relational responses.  Indeed, these relatively strong effects on the 
Good/Often (pro-moral) and Bad/Often (anti-moral) trial types indicate that people seem to 
think that their behaviour is frequently good, but also consider it to be often bad.  This is 
seemingly contradictory, but given that morality involves different sub-domains and 
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contexts, it is therefore possible to say that a person can often behave well (tells the truth, 
pays for his train ticket even in the absence of inspectors) but also engages in unethical behaviour frequently ȋtells lies, secretly reads his significant otherǯs phone messagesȌ.  These 
findings are in agreement to some extent with contemporary literature on moral behaviour.  
For example, Gino (2015) pointed out that even people who care about morality behave 
immorally, and do so often.  In effect, morality is malleable, and people are not always able to 
tell when they have crossed an ethical boundary.   
The DF-IRAP. For the remainder of the research programme, we decided to delve into 
the emotional component of moral responding by asking participants to report their feelings 
when engaging in moral and immoral actions. This new instrument consistently produced 
strong expected effects on the Do-Good/Feel-Good and Do-Bad/Feel-Bad trial-types, indicating 
that participants experience positive feelings when carrying out moral actions and negative 
feelings when engaging in immoral actions. Responses to the remaining trial-types were less 
clear, specifically to the Do-Good/Feel-Bad trial-type. In the latter case, it may be that 
participants have had relatively fewer opportunities throughout their verbal histories to perform this type of responding ȋǲdo you feel bad after doing something good?ǳȌ. 
Alternatively, the lack of a significant effect might indicate that sometimes engaging in good 
actions does bring negative feelings (e.g., paying your taxes may be moral but not enjoyable), 
and thus the responses on this trial-type are not as clear due to less well-established 
relational networks involving this type of responding. 
When considering the performance on the DF-IRAP as a predictor of cheating, we 
found consistent weak-to-moderate inverse correlations between the Do-bad/Feel-bad trial-
type and the deception measure, indicating that lower probabilities of cheating were found 
amongst those who more strongly confirmed that negative feelings accompany bad 
behaviours. This contrasts with the DM-IRAP, where strong denials of engagement in 
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immoral behaviour predicted higher cheating.  The two deictic IRAPs suggest, therefore, that 
under time pressure people who cheat and deceive tend to deny doing so (DM-IRAP) and 
confirm less readily that they feel bad when they cheat (DF-IRAP). 
Up to this point, therefore, two different sets of relational networks, which are 
revealed under time pressure, seem to be involved in acts of dishonesty or cheating. A 
possible explanation for the inverse correlation between actual cheating and denial of 
cheating (on the DM-IRAP) could be that both behaviours overlap functionally. That is, 
people who tend to cheat will probably deny doing so more strongly, precisely because that 
denial is in itself a form of cheating. A possible explanation for the positive correlation 
between lower levels of cheating and confirmation of feeling bad when engaging in immoral 
actions seems more obvious. That is, one would expect lower levels of a particular behaviour 
if that behaviour evokes aversive consequences (in this case negative feelings about the self). 
Although tentative, these findings suggest that efforts to reduce immoral behaviour would be 
best focused on attempting to increase negative self-evaluation when such behaviour occurs 
rather than focusing on the more abstract features of immorality (e.g., the cost to the 
economy, etc). Of course, the current findings are largely correlational and thus point to 
behaviour-behaviour relations, rather than to contextual variables, which might be 
manipulated in order to influence cheating behaviours directly. The latter part of the 
research programme focused more on manipulable variables.  
Effects of the intervention on the IRAPs. The Mortality Salience Induction tended to 
decrease the frequency of cheating in the MMT and produced stronger pro-moral effects on 
the DF-IRAP, particularly on the Do-Good/Feel-Good trial-type. In other words, increased 
death awareness strengthened implicit pro-moral responses and decreased the likelihood of 
cheating (although the latter involved a non-significant trend in the data). Interestingly, these 
effects seemed to depend on how mortality awareness was made salient. Specifically, the 
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complete MSI employed in Study 5 included a ǲdestinationǳ component ȋthis will end – how 
do you feel about it?Ȍ and a ǲprocessǳ component (this is ending – what are you going to do?), 
corresponding to the questions and dots tasks, respectively. Although the complete MSI ǲworked,ǳ in Study ͸ when only the dots task was used a similar impact on the IRAP effects 
and cheating was observed. Thus, it appears that temporarily increasing the salience of death 
as a process (i.e., towards which everyone is moving), is sufficient to increase pro-moral 
implicit biases, and perhaps offer a ǲprotectiveǳ factor against choices to engage in immoral 
behaviour. 
In this sense, the DF-IRAP proved to be useful in testing the effects of an intervention 
component.  That is, it was able to discriminate the effects of the MSI relative to controls in 
Study 5 and of the dots sub-task relative to the questions sub-task in Study 6.  These results 
are encouraging and promising because they establish the DF-IRAP as a viable option to 
examine deictic moral relational responding within a behavioural framework of morality. 
Moral disengagement, psychopathy and IRAP performance  
So far, our interpretation operates within a contextualistic, functional, clearly 
behavioural account of morality, but it seems useful to establish links between our findings 
and more traditional perspectives in Psychology.  Indeed, some of the instruments we used 
aimed to cross into domains related to moral psychology but addressed from other 
theoretical and methodological perspectives.  In the first part of our research programme we 
explored relations between the IRAPs, the cheating measure and moral disengagement, and 
later on we also investigated the role of psychopathy. Interestingly, the performances on DF-
IRAP failed to correlate with the moral disengagement scales and also with primary 
psychopathy, but it did correlate with secondary psychopathy. Explaining this pattern of 
results requires looking at the scales themselves. 
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When one examines the types of questions that are asked in the moral disengagement 
scale and the primary psychopathy subscale, they could be seen as more likely to evoke 
responses that involve self-presentation biases than the secondary psychopathy subscale. 
Consider, for example, the following small selection of items from the moral disengagement 
scales: 
• ǲSome people deserve to be treated like animalsǳ ȋMDS item ͹Ȍ • ǲSomeone who is obnoxious does not deserve to be treated like a human beingǳ ȋMDS item ʹ͵Ȍ  • ǲRivals deserve being humiliated and maltreatedǳ ȋCMD item ʹͺȌ. • ǲUsing force is often inevitable to protect one's own interestsǳ ȋCMD item ʹʹȌ. 
The wording of these statements makes it likely that ordinary respondents will answer in a 
socially desirable way, indicating some level of disagreement with such sentiments. This is 
likely even despite reassurance that responses are confidential, anonymous and will not have 
any consequences on their daily lives. 
The same may be true of the primary psychopathy sub-factor of the Levenson Psychopathy Scale. For instance, consider items such as: ǲI enjoy manipulating other people's 
feelingsǳ or ǲSuccess is based on survival of the fittest – I am not concerned about the losersǳ in contrast to sentences from the secondary psychopathy factor, such as ǲI am often boredǳ or ǲI 
quickly lose interests in tasks I startǳ.  )n the first two cases, it is relatively easy to appreciate 
that self-presentation biases may be involved, but in the latter case less so. Clearly, many of 
us would not wish to be seen as someone who does not readily and willingly go to the aid of 
someone in distress and certainly many of us would not like to be seen as ruthlessly self-
serving with scant regard for the feelings and welfare of others. In contrast, admitting that 
one is easily bored does not necessarily imply anything negative about the self. Insofar as the 
IRAP is largely uncontaminated by self-presentational biases, it makes sense that it 
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correlated with only those questions with less potential for self-presentational responses 
(i.e., those related to secondary psychopathy). Of course this is a post-hoc interpretation of 
the current findings but it does provide an interesting basis for future research, something 
we will return to later.  
Strengths, limitations, and new directions for research 
Even though the original formulation of RFT includes some work on the development 
of verbal relations that underlie moral behaviour (for example Hayes & Hayes, 1994), to our 
knowledge this is the first programme of research that explores the study of moral 
behaviour, focusing on cheating in particular, from an RFT perspective. Furthermore, the 
current work contributes towards a very small body of existing research that has studied 
cheating using measures of implicit cognition – indeed, the only similar study that we were 
able to find in our literature review was by Perugini and Leone (2009), in which a moral self-
concept IAT marginally predicted deceptive reports of a dice roll. In contrast, the current 
thesis presents a more complete research programme that used a well-known, standardised 
operationalization of cheating and three IRAPs that targeted relations between actions and 
concepts of morality, reports of frequency of moral behaviour, and personal feelings towards 
engaging in moral actions. In the end, we managed to develop a set of IRAPs that show 
promise for the assessment of cheating behaviour and perhaps in the long run, the prediction 
of immoral behaviour in general. 
Our intervention component is also worth mentioning as a strong point of the present 
work.  A few studies have examined mortality salience effects on moral judgment of 
transgressions (covered by Burke et al., 2010), but to our knowledge, the current research 
programme is the first to suggest effects of the Mortality Salience Induction on an implicit 
measure of cheating responses (at a significant level) and actual deceptive behaviour (non-
significant trend) under controlled conditions, as a way to reduce cheating.   
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We would also highlight the fact that we ran experiments in two different cultural 
settings, using two separate languages, and found similar effects, which increases the 
ecological validity of our results. As we discussed in the introduction to the current thesis, 
one of the main concerns with traditional theories of morality in Psychology is that they are 
likely to be rather biased towards European and North American populations, and this has 
been supported by the fact that assessment tools deliver counterintuitive results when used 
in other populations (Snarey, 1985). 
Despite the aforementioned advantages of our research programme, we must also 
mention some points that future research needs to address in order to gain a clearer 
perspective on the subject of cheating and moral behaviour.  The first criticism of our work 
applies to a good number of studies in psychology, and it is related to the samples used.  
Participants in the current research programme were college students from Ireland and 
Colombia, and a concern has been raised numerous times (see Henrich et al., 2010) that 
college student samples are probably not representative of the general population in many 
domains, and thus conclusions extracted from this type of research might not easily 
generalise.  
A second possible criticism applies to the IRAP in general.  OǯShea, Watson and Brown 
(2015) recently claimed to have found a positivity bias in the IRAP that stems from the well-
known finding that people tend to frame events in ways that highlight increases rather than 
decreases, or positivity rather than negativity. For example, it is much more likely that people 
will make statements such as ǲhe is thinnerǳ or ǲthe boy is getting tallerǳ or ǲthe river is getting strongerǳ instead of ǲhe is less fatǳ or ǲthe boy is getting less shortǳ, or ǲthe river is getting less weakǳ. The presence of a general positivity bias in the current studies on cheating 
may help to explain that the largest IRAP effects tended to be for positive-positive trial types such as ǲGood-Moralǳ, ǲGood-Oftenǳ and ǲDo-good/Feel-goodǳ, with more variability in the 
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other trial-types. On balance, it is important to note that it was the ǲnegativeǳ trial-types 
(Bad-Immoral and Do-bad/Feel-bad) that predicted cheating throughout our research 
programme, and it seems, therefore, that the validity of the IRAP did not appear to be 
threatened by the possible presence of a positivity bias. Indeed, the presence of a positivity 
bias has been noted and discussed in a number of previous articles on the IRAP (e.g. Barnes-
Holmes, Murphy, et al., 2010, pp. 75-76; Scanlon, McEnteggart, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-
Holmes, 2014). Indeed, it may even be the case that sensitivity to such positivity biases in the 
IRAP serves to increase its predictive validity (see Bast, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 
n.d.). Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the potential presence and impact of a so-called 
positivity bias in the IRAP should be explored in future research. 
In closing, it is important to see the research presented in the current thesis as 
merely a starting point for further research in the areas of cheating behaviour and implicit 
cognition, and as such, many questions still remain. For example, would other measures of 
implicit cognition (or BIRRs) predict cheating behaviours more accurately than the IRAP? 
Would other types of cheating behaviours in the laboratory be predicted by the IRAP? And 
perhaps the most critical question is whether the IRAP could predict ǲreal-worldǳ cheating 
behaviours in naturalistic settings - for example, if it could discriminate between participants 
with a history of repeated deception and cheating behaviours, such as criminals who engage in ǲconfidence scamsǳ, versus individuals of high moral standing. All of these and related 
questions remain to be answered in future research.  
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Appendix A. Items from the Civic Moral Disengagement Scale 
(Caprara et al., 2009) 
1. When there are no efficient refuse disposal services, there is no sense reproaching 
citizens who leave trash on the street 
2. Some people are real disasters 
3. To forget to declare a financial error in our favour is not serious, since it is the 
responsibility of the receiving person or institution to check for errors 
4. There is no reason to fine those who draw ǮǮgraffitiǳ on walls since others commit 
much more serious acts of vandalism 
5. When traffic moves quickly, drivers who exceed the speed limit in order to keep up 
should not be fined 
6. )t doesnǯt make sense for the individual to worry about environmental deterioration 
since the harmful effects are produced at the societal level 
7. Evading taxes cannot be considered reprehensible considering the squandering of 
public money 
8. Those who behave brutishly can only expect to be treated the same way by others 
9. Thefts in large department stores are irrelevant compared to the storesǯ earnings 
10. Victims generally have trouble staying out of harmǯs way 
11. Thefts do not damage retail sales very much since insurance covers the losses 
12. Drawing graffiti on walls is the expression of ǮǮcreative spiritǳ 
13. There is no sense feeling guilty for damages we have contributed to a problem if our 
contribution is a small part of the problem 
14. Fraud in economic transactions is simply a ǮǮstrategic distortionǳ 
15. Silencing those who continue to be annoying, even using hard measures, is 
understandable 
16. There is no sense in blaming individuals who evade a rule when everybody else does 
the same thing 
17. Gambling is a passtime just like any other one 
18. For the advance of science, it is lawful to use humans as ǮǮguinea pigsǳ even in high 
risk experiments 
19. If people leave their belongings around, it is their fault if someone steals them 
20. If someone loses control during a brawl, he/she is not completely responsible for the 
consequences of his/her actions 
21. Citizens who litter the streets should not be severely persecuted since industry 
produces much more serious pollution 
22. Using force is often inevitable to protect oneǯs own interests 
23. Given the widespread corruption in society, one cannot disapprove of those who pay 
for favours 
24. In order to keep family cohesion, its members should always be defended, even when 
they are guilty of serious crimes 
25. Destroying old things is a way of convincing the state to provide new facilities 
26. It is not the fault of drivers if they exceed the speed limit since cars are made to go at 
high speeds 
27. Young people cannot be considered guilty if they smoke a joint since most adults use 
much stronger drugs 
28. Rivals deserve being humiliated and maltreated 
29. Loyalty involves not denouncing the transgressions committed by oneǯs friends 
30. Employees are never responsible for executing the illegal decisions of their bosses 
31. In order to force some people to work, they have to be treated like beasts of burden 
32. Pornography is basically a cheap form of erotic activity 
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Appendix B. Items from the Moral Disengagement Scale 
(Bandura et al., 1996) 
1. It is alright to fight to protect your friends. 
2. Slapping and shoving someone is just a way of joking. 
3. Damaging some property is no big deal when you consider that others are beating 
people up. 
4. A kid in a gang should not be blamed for the trouble the gang causes. 
5. If kids are living under bad conditions they cannot be blamed for behaving 
aggressively. 
6. It is okay to tell small lies because they don't really do any harm. 
7. Some people deserve to be treated like animals. 
8. If kids fight and misbehave in school it is their teacher's fault. 
9. It is alright to beat someone who bad mouths your family. 
10. To hit obnoxious classmates is just giving them "a lesson." 
11. Stealing some money is not too serious compared to those who steal a lot of money. 
12. A kid who only suggests breaking rules should not be blamed if other kids go ahead 
and do it. 
13. Kids who are not taught to obey the rules should not be blamed for misbehaving. 
14. Children do not mind being teased because it shows interest in them. 
15. If someone acts like a jerk, it is okay to treat them badly. 
16. If people are careless where they leave their things it is their own fault if they get 
stolen 
17. It is alright to fight when your group's honour is threatened. 
18. Taking someone's bicycle without their permission is just "borrowing it." 
19. It is okay to insult a classmate because beating him/her is worse. 
20. If a group decides together to do something harmful it is unfair to blame any kid in 
the group for it. 
21. Kids cannot be blamed for using bad words when all their friends do it. 
22. Teasing someone does not really hurt them. 
23. Someone who is obnoxious does not deserve to be treated like a human being. 
24. Kids who get mistreated usually do things that deserve it. 
25. It is alright to lie to keep your friends out of trouble. 
26. It is not a bad thing to "get high" once in a while. 
27. Compared to the illegal things people do, taking some things from a store without 
paying for them is not very serious. 
28. It is unfair to blame a child who had only a small part in the harm caused by a group. 
29. Kids cannot be blamed for misbehaving if their friends pressured them to do it. 
30. Insults among children do not hurt anyone. 
31. Some people have to be treated roughly because they lack feelings that can be hurt. 
32. Children are not at fault for misbehaving if their parents force them too much. 
  
171 
 
Appendix C. Items from the Social Desirability Scale 
(Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) 
Instructions: Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and 
traits. Read each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you 
personally.: 
If you have any questions please ask the researcher 
1. Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates. 
2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble. 
3. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. 
4. I have never intensely disliked anyone. 
5. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life. 
6. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. 
7. I am always careful about my manner of dress. 
8. My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant.  
9. If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not seen I would  probably 
do it. 
10. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my 
ability. 
11. I like to gossip at times. 
12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even 
though I knew they were right. 
13. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener. 
14. I can remember "playing sick" to get out of something. 
15. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. 
16. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. 
17. I always try to practice what I preach. 
18. I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud mouthed, obnoxious people. 
19. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
20. When I don't know something I don't at all mind admitting it. 
21. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. 
22. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way. 
23. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things. 
24. I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my wrongdoings. 
25. I never resent being asked to return a favour. 
26. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own. 
27. I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car. 
28. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others. 
29. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off. 
30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favours of me.  
31. I have never felt that I was punished without cause. 
32. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved.  
33. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings.  
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Appendix D. Items from the Levenson Psychopathy Scale 
1. Success is based on survival of the fittest; I am not concerned about the losers. 
2. I find myself in the same kinds of trouble, time after time. 
3. For me, what's right is whatever I can get away with. 
4. I am often bored. 
5. In today's world, I feel justified in doing anything I can get away with to succeed. 
6. I find that I am able to pursue one goal for a long time. 
7. My main purpose in life is getting as many goodies as I can. 
8. I don't plan anything very far in advance. 
9. Making a lot of money is my most important goal. 
10. I quickly lose interest in tasks I start. 
11. I let others worry about higher values; my main concern is practical matters. 
12. Most of my problems are due to the fact that other people just don't understand me. 
13. People who are stupid enough to get ripped off usually deserve it. 
14. Before I do anything, I carefully consider the possible consequences. 
15. Looking out for myself is my top priority. 
16. I have been in a lot of shouting matches with other people. 
17. I tell other people what they want to hear so that they will do what I want them to do. 
18. When I get frustrated, I often "let off steam" by blowing my top. 
19. I would be upset if my success came at someone else's expense. 
20. Love is overrated. 
21. I often admire a really clever scam. 
22. I make a point of trying not to hurt others in pursuit of my goals. 
23. I enjoy manipulating other people's feelings. 
24. I feel bad if my words or actions cause someone else to feel emotional pain. 
25. Even if I were trying very hard to sell something, I wouldn't lie about it. 
26. Cheating is not justified because it is unfair to others. 
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Appendix E. Standard Consent Form 
) …………………………… consent to participate in an experimental psychology study being run by 
Luis Manuel Silva supervised by Professor Dermot Barnes-Holmes in the Department of 
Psychology, National University of Ireland, Maynooth (Tel: +353 1 708 4765).  
I understand and consent to the following: 
o The experiment will not last longer than 2 hours.   
o All data from the study will be treated confidentially. The data will be stored in a 
locked cabinet in the Department of Psychology and will be retained for a minimum of five 
years. An alphanumeric code will be entered into the IRAP program to protect my identity. 
This alphanumeric code will also be used on all explicit measures to protect my identity.  
o Results from this research work will not be used deceptively or without my consent. 
o My data is available to me at my discretion. 
o I am free to terminate my participation in the study at any time and may withdraw 
the data obtained from my participation, if I so wish, up to the time of publication. If during 
my participation in the study I feel the information and guidelines I have been given are 
neglected or disregarded in anyway, or if I am unhappy about the process I may contact the 
Secretary of the National University of Ireland Maynooth Ethics Committee at 
pgdean@nuim.ie or 01 708 6018.  
o I was given at least 24 hours before agreeing to volunteer for this study. 
Please print and sign your name below if you are willing to abide fully by the conditions 
stated above. 
Name:   _______________   Signature: ________________   Date:   ____________ 
 
EXPERIMENTER: 
I, Luis Manuel Silva, and Prof. Dermot Barnes-Holmes, as primary researchers, accept full 
responsibility for the care of all experimental participants and I confirm that all the necessary 
safety precautions have been taken.  
Signature of experimenter: ________________   Date: ________________ 
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Appendix F. Disclosure Information Sheet 
This study. In the study you just took part in, we measure attitudes and beliefs towards certain 
social situations and opinions about “moral” situations – that is, situations in which people can 
cause benefit or harm to others.  Beyond math skills, what we intend with the mental math task is 
to check whether participants deliberately wait to see the answer at least once.   
Rationale.  If we had told you that this is what we were going to measure, you would have 
probably given it a second thought, and avoided doing it even if willing to, but since we are 
interested in what people ordinarily do, we wanted to create a situation in which you could feel 
comfortable to decide whether you wanted to wait for the answer or not.  Studies involving mild 
deception, such as this one, are permitted in cases where full disclosure may affect the performance 
on a critical task, and provided that said full disclosure is performed after the completion of the 
tasks (which is why we give you this sheet). 
Your feelings.  There is nothing inherently wrong in having decided to wait for the answer, nor 
inherently right in not doing it, so you should not feel that your choice implies that you are a fair 
player or not.  This is not a psychological test – it is not, and it actually cannot, be used to make 
general conclusions regarding your personality.  Studies carried in the Department of Psychology 
are fully compliant with several Codes of Professional Ethics, and you can be sure that you are not 
being judged in any way for your responses.   
Your data.  Personal information that may enable someone to identify you has not been collected.  
The computer never asked for your name, address (postal or electronic), course of study, or other 
sensible information – we only have your responses, your age and your gender.  This guarantees 
that your responses can never be matched to your name.  For this reason, we are unable to provide 
feedback regarding your own performance – the analysis will be done with a group of participants, 
not on a case-by-case basis.   
Publishing.  The results of this study will be part of the doctorate thesis of the researcher, and some 
data will probably appear in a paper in a peer-reviewed scientific journal.  It should be emphasised 
that, since no personal information was collected, there is no way you can be identified. 
Your rights. Despite the protection of your data, if you decide now that you would not like to have 
your responses recorded and analysed you can have your responses erased.  If this is your wish, the 
researcher will show you to a paper shredder where you can destroy the response sheets, and he 
will delete your data from the computer in your presence.  However, before making the decision, 
please remember, once again, that your responses cannot be matched to your name in any way.  
You will not forfeit your incentive by having your data erased.  It will also not affect your 
subsequent participation in other studies should you want to volunteer for them in the future. 
If you have any questions whatsoever at this point about the study, please feel free to ask the 
researcher.   
I understand the true nature of the study and the reason for its temporary concealment, and agree 
with it.  I understand how the data will be handled and I agree with it. 
Name: _______________________ Date: _________   Signature: __________________ 
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Appendix G. Training Slides for the Dice Cheating Task 
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Appendix H. Mortality Salience Induction Procedure 
Sample figure containing number of dots (weeks left to live) for a female participant aged 18: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Script for the intervention (experimental group) 
(DOTS SECTION BEGINS) ) think itǯs often very easy to forget just how short life is, especially for young healthy 
students. To help convey this, )ǯve put together this diagram for you. Given that ) know your age and gender, itǯs trivial for me to estimate your expected lifespan. 
[place sheet in front of them] 
Based on that, the number of dots on this piece of paper is equal to the number of weeks you 
have left to live. [said very slowly and carefully, and then a long pause] ) promise that )ǯm not trying to trick or deceive you. )tǯs a surprisingly small number of dots, isnǯt it? The thing about dots is that once you spend them you canǯt get them back. This is not a 
rehearsal, you will not get a second shot. This is your life, right now, ending, one day at a 
time. 
The other thing about dots is that they run out, no matter what you do. Make no mistake, 
death is coming. 
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You have a limited number of days left on this planet, and, like all of us, youǯre faced with the difficult question of what youǯre going to do with them.  
How many of these dots will be well spent dots, doing things that you truly value, like time 
with friends and family, and how many dots will be more like hovering dots and X-factor 
dots? 
(QUESTIONS SECTION BEGINS) With all of that in mind, )ǯd like you to write out a few lines about what you think dying itself 
will be like. 
[Give them sheet containing the following questions: 
1. What emotions does the thought of your own death arouse in you? 
2. Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you physically as 
you die and once you are physically dead. 
3. ǲThe one thing ) fear most about my death is…ǳ 
4. ǲMy scariest thoughts about death are…ǳ] 
Post experiment debrief: 
Discuss with participant how, although death is inevitable, it has also been said that it is the ultimate motivator in life, or even ǲthe mirror in which meaning in life is reflectedǳ. By 
knowing that we have a limited number of dots to spend, we are motivated to spend them in 
ways we value. 
Script for control group ) think itǯs often very easy to forget just how big our solar system is, especially for young 
students. To help convey this, )ǯve put together this diagram for you. [place sheet in front of them] 
The number of dots on this piece of paper is equal to the number of million kilometres that 
separates the Sun and the Earth. [said very slowly and carefully, and then a long pause] ) promise that )ǯm not trying to trick or deceive you. )tǯs a surprising number of dots, isnǯt it? )ǯd like you to write out a few lines about what you think about the size of our solar system. 
1. What emotions does the thought of the size of our solar system arouse in you? 
2. Jot down, as specifically as you can, whether you think mankind will be able to travel 
throughout our solar system. 
3. ǲThe one thing that comes to mind when pondering the size of our solar system is…ǳ 
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4. ǲMy thoughts about our solar system are…ǳ 
 
Appendix I. Spanish Translations of the MSI used in Study 6 
(SECCIÓN DE PUNTOS) 
Creo que suele ser muy fácil olvidar lo corta que es la vida, especialmente para estudiantes 
jóvenes y sanos. 
Para ayudarte a comprender esto, he creado este diagrama. 
Dado que conozco tu edad y tu sexo, puedo estimar fácilmente tu expectativa de vida [poner 
hoja frente al participante] 
Con base en eso, el número de puntos en esta hoja de papel representa el número de semanas 
que te quedan de vida [decirlo lenta y cuidadosamente, y luego una pausa larga). 
Te aseguro que no estoy tratando de engañarte con esto.  Es un número sorprendentemente 
pequeño de puntos, ¿no es verdad? 
La cosa con estos puntos es que una vez que los gastas no los puedes tener de nuevo.  Esto no 
es un ensayo, no habrá una segunda oportunidad.  Esta es tu vida, ahora mismo, acabándose 
día a día. 
Otra cosa de estos puntos es que van a acabar, sin importar lo que hagas.  La muerte llegará – 
no pienses que no. 
¿Cuántos de estos puntos vas a gastar bien, haciendo cosas que de verdad valoras, como pasar tiempo con tu familia, y cuántos serán puntos haciendo pereza y viendo ǲYo me llamoǳ? 
 (SECCIÓN DE PREGUNTAS) 
Me gustaría que escribieras algunas líneas sobre cómo piensas que será morir algún día. 
 [Darles la hoja de las preguntas]: 
1. ¿Qué emociones te genera pensar sobre tu propia muerte? 
2. Escribe, con tanto detalle como puedas, qué crees que te pasará físicamente cuando 
mueras y cuando estés físicamente muerto(a) 
3. ǲLo que más me asusta de mi muerte es…ǳ 
4. ǲMis pensamientos más aterrorizantes sobre la muerte son…ǳ 
